The fundamental limits of statistical data privacy by Kairouz, Peter
c© 2016 Peter Kairouz
THE FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF STATISTICAL DATA PRIVACY
BY
PETER KAIROUZ
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Pramod Viswanath, Chair
Associate Professor Nikita Borisov
Professor Bruce Hajek
Assistant Professor Sewoong Oh
Professor Rayadurgam Srikant
ABSTRACT
The Internet is shaping our daily lives. On the one hand, social networks
like Facebook and Twitter allow people to share their precious moments and
opinions with virtually anyone around the world. On the other, services like
Google, Netflix, and Amazon allow people to look up information, watch
movies, and shop online anytime, anywhere. However, with this unprece-
dented level of connectivity comes the danger of being monitored. There is
an increasing tension between the need to share data and the need to pre-
serve the privacy of Internet users. The need for privacy appears in three
main contexts: (1) the global privacy context, as in when private compa-
nies and public institutions release personal information about individuals
to the public; (2) the local privacy context, as in when individuals disclose
their personal information with potentially malicious service providers; (3)
the multi-party privacy context, as in when different parties cooperate to
interactively compute a function that is defined over all the parties’ data.
Differential privacy has recently surfaced as a strong measure of privacy
in all three contexts. Under differential privacy, privacy is achieved by ran-
domizing the data before releasing it. This leads to a fundamental tradeoff
between privacy and utility. In this thesis, we take a concrete step towards
understanding the fundamental structure of privacy mechanisms that achieve
the best privacy-utility tradeoff. This tradeoff is formulated as a constrained
optimization problem: maximize utility subject to differential privacy con-
straints. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that in all three privacy contexts, the
optimal privacy mechanisms have the same combinatorial staircase structure.
This deep result is a direct consequence of the geometry of the constraints
imposed by differential privacy on the privatization mechanisms.
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“All I am or ever hope to be, I owe to my lovely mother.”− Abraham
Lincoln
To my mother, for her love and support.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a fundamental individual right. Traditionally, individual informa-
tion access was limited and corresponding privacy violations were essentially
local, both temporally and geographically. In the era of big data, massive
amounts of data about individuals are collected both voluntarily and invol-
untarily. With the ready ability to search for information and correlate it
across distinct sources, privacy violation takes on an ominous note in this
information age.
Classical approaches to providing privacy guarantees involve anonymizing
user information. While this seems to be a reasonable approach to protect
the privacy of individuals, it is not invulnerable to correlation attacks: by
correlating the anonymized database with another (perhaps publicly avail-
able) deanonymized database, a user’s privacy could still be divulged. Early
work in 1997 by Sweeney [1] demonstrated such an attack by correlating
anonymized health records released by the state of Massachusetts with voter
registration records. Similar deanonymization attacks have been routinely
conducted in the ensuing years, despite the adoption of more sophisticated
anonymization strategies [2]: AOL search logs (reported by NYTimes in
2006), Netflix collaborative filtering contest [3], Kaggle recommender system
contest of Flickr data [4], and surname inference from genome datasets [5] are
instances that have received widespread attention. While correlation attacks
using currently available databases are already devastating for anonymiza-
tion techniques, an even larger issue is that anonymization is susceptible to
future data releases.
A way out of the limitations of anonymization is to release randomized
data. We refer to this privatization method as statistical data privacy. Under
statistical data privacy, the introduced randomness guarantees that upon
observing the released data, no one should be able to learn any sensitive
information about an individual. Indeed, statistical data privacy is robust
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to adversarial side information: any adversary cannot learn much beyond
whatever side information she has access to. This thesis explores a relatively
recent notion of statistical data privacy called differential privacy [6, 7, 8,
9]. At a high level, differential privacy imposes mathematical constraints
on the shape and amount of noise that is added to the raw data. The
differential privacy framework is very general and provides strong plausible
deniability guarantees - worst case over present auxiliary information and
future discoveries. With the plausible deniability guarantees of differential
privacy, data could be made more widely available leading to faster and more
accurate data analytics.
1.1 The Fundamental Limits of Differential Privacy
One of the main limitations of differential privacy in practice is that cur-
rent approaches make the released database “too random”, thus making the
data released essentially useless. Despite a decade of research efforts, many
fundamental questions in differential privacy are still left open. The lack of
theoretical understanding of the fundamental tradeoffs in differential privacy
has led to a widespread practice of using coarse methods that are strictly
sub-optimal. For instance, the Laplacian noise adding mechanism, featured
in the vast majority of the literature on differential privacy, is often used
without any clear justification.
It is of fundamental interest to characterize privacy mechanisms that ran-
domize “just enough” to keep the released data as true as possible, providing
maximal utility. In this thesis, we address the following important question:
for a given application and a fixed privacy level, what is the best privacy
preserving mechanism that maximizes the utility of the application while
achieving the desired privacy level? In specific, we study the fundamental
limits of differential privacy in three main contexts.
The global context
In the global context, trusted service providers or institutions want to re-
lease sensitive information about individuals. For instance, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) might be interested in releasing medical records
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so that researchers can find the causes and cures of certain diseases. This
information is clearly sensitive and should be privatized carefully prior to its
release. In this context, differential privacy provides a formal guarantee on
the anonymity level of an individual user with respect to a data release.
The local context
In the local context, data providers want to share their personal data with
a potentially malicious service provider. For instance, Android users might
want to share their Android keyboard activities (clicks, swipes, chats, etc.)
with Google so that they can benefit from improved services (e.g., auto-
completion, next word prediction, etc.). However, the users are worried that
Google can learn a lot of personal information about them by analyzing
the data that it collects. In this context, differential privacy ensures that
the service provider (Google) can only learn aggregate information about
individuals.
The multi-party context
In the multi-party context, individuals interact to compute a joint function
on their private data. For instance, the individuals might be interested in
computing their average salary, height, or weight. In this context, differ-
ential privacy allows the users to interactively compute the function while
preventing them from learning the each other’s information.
1.2 Outline and Contributions
An outline of the thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2: Global Differential Privacy
Chapter 2 studies global differential privacy. We start by providing an op-
erational interpretation of global differential privacy. Specifically, we show
that differential privacy guarantees that the probabilities of false alarm and
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missed detection of any binary hypothesis testing problem involving the pres-
ence/absence of a user’s data in a released database query cannot be simul-
taneously small. We then derive the optimal privacy mechanism for one
and two dimensional real-valued database queries under a universal utility-
maximization framework. Precisely, we show that a simple noise adding
mechanism with a staircase distribution achieves the best utility-privacy
tradeoff. We conclude Chapter 2 by studying the impact of sequential query-
ing of differentially private mechanisms. In particular, we characterize how
the overall privacy level degrades under the composition of differentially pri-
vate mechanisms. Our solution is fundamental: we prove an upper bound
on the overall privacy level and construct a sequence of privatization mech-
anisms that achieves this bound.
Chapter 3: Local Differential Privacy
Chapter 3 investigates local differential privacy. Similar to Chapter 2, we
start by providing an operational definition of local differential privacy. We
then uncover the combinatorial structure of the family of optimal privatiza-
tion mechanisms for a broad class of information theoretic utility functions
such as mutual information and f -divergences. Surprisingly, we show that,
similar to the global privacy context, the optimal privacy mechanisms in the
local privacy context have the same staircase shape. We also prove that for
a given utility function and a fixed privacy level, solving the privacy-utility
maximization problem is equivalent to solving a finite-dimensional linear pro-
gram, the outcome of which is the optimal privatization mechanism. How-
ever, solving this linear program can be computationally expensive since it
has a number of variables that is exponential in the size of the alphabet the
data lives in. To account for this, we show that two simple privatization
mechanisms are universally optimal in the high and low privacy regimes. We
conclude Chapter 3 by proving the universal optimality of a simple privatiza-
tion mechanism under approximate differential privacy, a popular relaxation
to differential privacy.
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Chapter 4: Multi-Party Differential Privacy
Chapter 4 studies multi-party differential privacy. We start by studying the
problem of interactive function computation by multiple parties, each pos-
sessing a bit, in a differential privacy setting. Each party wants to compute
a function, which could differ from party to party, and there could be a cen-
tral observer interested in computing a separate function. Performance at
each party is measured via the accuracy of the function to be computed. We
allow for an arbitrary cost metric to measure the distortion between the true
and the computed function values. Our main result is the optimality of a
simple non-interactive protocol: each party randomizes its bit (sufficiently)
and shares the privatized version with the other parties. This optimality re-
sult is very general: it holds for all types of functions, heterogeneous privacy
conditions on the parties, all types of cost metrics, and both average and
worst-case (over the inputs) measures of accuracy. We conclude Chapter 4
by showing that interaction can be helpful in settings where parties possess
more than just one bit.
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Summary
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis and discusses a few interesting and non-trivial
directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
GLOBAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
2.1 Introduction
Differential privacy is a formal framework to quantify to what extent indi-
vidual privacy in a statistical database is preserved while releasing useful
aggregate information about the database. It provides strong privacy guar-
antees by requiring the indistinguishability of whether or not an individual
is in a database based on the released information, regardless of the side
information on the other aspects of the database the adversary may possess.
Denoting the database when the individual is present as D1 and as D0 when
the individual is not, a differentially private mechanism provides indistin-
guishability guarantees with respect to the pair (D0, D1). The databases D0
and D1 are referred to as “neighboring” databases.
Definition 2.1.1 (Differential Privacy [7, 9]) A randomized mechanism
M over a set of databases is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of
neighboring databases D0 and D1, and for all sets S in the output space of
the mechanism X ,
P(M(D0) ∈ S) ≤ eε P(M(D1) ∈ S) + δ .
2.2 Operational Interpretation of Differential Privacy
Given a random output Y of a database access mechanism M , consider the
following hypothesis testing experiment. We choose a null hypothesis as
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database D0 and alternative hypothesis as D1:
H0 : Y came from a database D0 ,
H1 : Y came from a database D1 .
For a choice of a rejection region S, the probability of false alarm (type I
error), when the null hypothesis is true but rejected, is defined as
PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≡ P
(
M(D0) ∈ S
)
,
and the probability of missed detection (type II error), when the null hy-
pothesis is false but retained, is defined as
PMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≡ P
(
M(D1) ∈ S¯
)
,
where S¯ is the complement of S. It turns out that imposing differential
privacy conditions on a mechanism M is equivalent to restricting the proba-
bilities of false alarm and missed detection from being simultaneously small.
Wasserman and Zhu proved that (ε, 0)-differential privacy implies the con-
ditions in Equation (2.1) for the special case when δ = 0 [10, Theorem 2.4].
The same proof technique can be used to prove a similar result for a gen-
eral δ ∈ [0, 1], and to prove that the conditions in Equation (2.1) imply
(ε, δ)-differential privacy as well. We refer the reader to Section A.1.1 for a
proof.
Theorem 2.2.1 For any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a database mechanism M is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if the following conditions are satisfied
for all pairs of neighboring databases D0 and D1, and all rejection region
S ⊆ X :
PFA(D0, D1,M, S) + e
εPMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ , and (2.1)
eεPFA(D0, D1,M, S) + PMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ .
This operational perspective relates the privacy parameters ε and δ to a set
of conditions on probability of false alarm and missed detection. This shows
that under differential privacy, it is impossible for both PMD and PFA to be
simultaneously small. This operational interpretation of differential privacy
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Figure 2.1: Privacy region for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Dotted line
represents the solution of a maximization problem (A.1). For simplicity, we
only show the privacy region below the line PFA + PMD ≤ 1, since the whole
region is symmetric w.r.t. the line PFA + PMD = 1.
suggests a graphical representation of differential privacy as illustrated in
Figure 2.1. We define the privacy region for (ε, δ)-differential privacy as
R(ε, δ) ≡
{
(PMD, PFA)
∣∣PFA + eεPMD ≥ 1− δ ,
and eεPFA + PMD ≥ 1− δ
}
. (2.2)
Similarly, we define the privacy region of a database access mechanism M
with respect to two neighboring databases D0 and D1 as
R(M,D0, D1) ≡ conv
({
(PMD(D0, D1,M, S), PFA(D0, D1,M, S))∣∣for all S ⊆ X}), (2.3)
where conv(·) is the convex hull of a set and X is the alphabet of the pri-
vatized output. Operationally, by taking the convex hull, the region in-
cludes the pairs of false alarm and missed detection probabilities achieved
by soft decisions that might use internal randomness in the hypothesis test-
ing rule. Precisely, let γ : X → {H0, H1} be any randomized decision.
For example, we can accept the null hypothesis with a certain probabil-
ity p1 if the output is in a set S1 and probability p2 if it is in another
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set S2. In full generality, a decision rule γ can be fully described by a
partition {Si} of the output space X , and a corresponding accept proba-
bilities {pi}. The probabilities of false alarm and missed detection for a
decision rule γ are defined as PFA(D0, D1,M, γ) ≡ P(γ(M(D0)) = H1) and
PMD(D0, D1,M, γ) ≡ P(γ(M(D1)) = H0).
Remark 1 For all neighboring databases D0 and D1, and a database ac-
cess mechanism M , the pair of false alarm and missed detection probabilities
achieved by any decision rule γ is included in the privacy region:
(PMD(D0, D1,M, γ), PFA(D0, D1,M, γ)) ∈ R(M,D0, D1) ,
for all decision rules γ.
The proof of Remark 1 is provided in Appendix A.1.2. Let D0 ∼ D1 de-
note that the two databases are neighbors. The union over all neighboring
databases defines the privacy region of the mechanism.
R(M) ≡
⋃
D0∼D1
R(M,D0, D1) .
The following corollary, which follows immediately from Theorem 2.2.1, gives
a necessary and sufficient condition on the privacy region for (ε, δ)-differential
privacy.
Corollary 2.2.2 A mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only
if R(M) ⊆ R(ε, δ).
To illustrate the strengths of the graphical representation of differential pri-
vacy, we provide simpler proofs for some well-known results in differential
privacy in Appendix A.1.3.
Consider two database access mechanisms M(·) and M ′(·). Let X and
Y denote the random outputs of mechanisms M and M ′ respectively. We
say that M dominates M ′ if M ′(D) is conditionally independent of D given
the outcome of M(D). In other words, the database D, X = M(D) and
Y = M ′(D) form the following Markov chain: D–X–Y .
Theorem 2.2.3 (Data processing inequality for differential privacy)
If a mechanism M dominates a mechanism M ′, then for all pairs of neigh-
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boring databases D0 and D1,
R(M ′, D0, D1) ⊆ R(M,D0, D1) .
We refer the reader to Appendix A.1.4 for a proof. Wasserman and Zhu
[10, Lemma 2.6] have proved a similar result for the special case when M
is (ε, 0)-differentially private, M ′ is also (ε, 0)-differentially private, which is
a corollary to the above theorem. Perhaps surprisingly, the converse is also
true.
Theorem 2.2.4 ([11, Corollary of Theorem 10]) Fix a pair of neigh-
boring databases D0 and D1, and let X and Y denote the random outputs of
mechanisms M and M ′, respectively. If M and M ′ satisfy
R(M ′, D0, D1) ⊆ R(M,D0, D1) ,
then there exists a coupling of the random outputs X and Y such that they
form a Markov chain D–X–Y where D ∈ {D0, D1}.
In other words, when the privacy region of M ′ is included in M , there ex-
ists a stochastic transformation T that operates on X and produces a ran-
dom output that has the same marginal distribution as Y conditioned on the
database D. We can consider this mechanism T as a privatization mechanism
that takes a (privatized) output X and provides even further privatization.
The above theorem was proved in [11, Corollary of Theorem 10] in the con-
text of comparing two experiments, where a statistical experiment denotes a
mechanism in the context of differential privacy.
2.3 Optimal Mechanisms for Differential Privacy
In this section, we formulate the utility-maximization (cost-minimization)
framework under -differential privacy as a functional optimization prob-
lem and prove that the multi-dimensional (correlated) staircase mechanism
achieves the best privacy-utility tradeoff. Our formulation and proof tech-
niques follow those developed by Geng et al. in [12, 13, 14].
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2.3.1 Problem formulation
Consider a multidimensional real-valued query function
q : Dn → Rd,
where Dn is the domain of the databases, and d is the dimension of the query
output. Given D ∈ Dn, the query output can be written as
q(D) = (q1(D), q2(D), . . . , qd(D)),
where qi(D) ∈ R, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d. The global sensitivity of the query function q
is defined as
∆ , max
D0,D1⊆Dn:|D0−D1|≤1
‖q(D0)− q(D1)‖1 =
d∑
i=1
|qi(D0)− qi(D1)|, (2.4)
where the maximum is taken over all possible pairs of neighboring database
entries D0 and D1 which differ in at most one element, i.e., one is a proper
subset of the other and the larger database contains just one additional ele-
ment [15]. For instance, the global sensitivity of a histogram query function
is one, since each element in the dataset can affect only one component of
the query output by one.
The standard approach to preserving the differential privacy is to add noise
to the output of the query function. Letting q(D) be the value of the query
function evaluated at D ⊆ Dn, the noise-adding mechanism M will output
M(D) = q(D) + X = (q1(D) +X1, . . . , qd(D) +Xd),
where X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ Rd is the noise added by the mechanism to
the output of the query function. Due to the optimality of query-output
independent perturbation mechanisms (under a technical condition) in [13],
we restrict ourselves to query-output independent noise-adding mechanisms,
i.e., we assume that the noise X is independent of the query output.
Using the definition of differential privacy in Equation (2.1), observe that
differential privacy imposes the following constraints on the probability dis-
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tribution of X:
Pr[M(D0) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(D1) ∈ S]
⇔ Pr[q(D0) + X ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[q(D1) + X ∈ S]
⇔ Pr[X ∈ S − q(D0)] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S − q(D1)]
⇔ Pr[X ∈ S ′] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S ′ + q(D0)− q(D1)], (2.5)
where S ′ , S − q(D0) = {s− q(D0)|s ∈ S}. Moreover, since the differential
privacy conditions in (2.1) must hold for all measurable sets S ⊆ Rd and
‖q(D0)− q(D1)‖1 ≤ ∆, from (2.5) we have
Pr[X ∈ S ′] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S ′ + t], (2.6)
for all measurable sets S ′ ⊆ R and for all t ∈ Rd such that ‖t‖1 ≤ ∆.
Consider a cost function L(·) : Rd → R which is a function of the added
noise X. Our goal is to minimize the expectation of the cost subject to the
-differential privacy constraint (2.6).
More precisely, let P denote the probability distribution of X and use P(S)
to denote the probability Pr[X ∈ S]. The optimization problem we study is
given by
minimize
P
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x1, x2, . . . , xd)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + t),∀ measurable set S ⊆ Rd, ∀‖t‖1 ≤ ∆. (2.7)
We solve the above functional optimization problem and derive the optimal
noise probability distribution for L(x1, . . . , xd) =
∑d
i=1 |xi| with d = 2.
2.3.2 Main result
In this section, we state our main result: The correlated multi-dimensional
staircase mechanism is the optimal solution to the functional optimization
problem in (2.7) (see Theorem 2.3.1). The detailed proof is given in Appendix
A.2.
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In this work we consider the `1 cost function:
L(x1, x2, . . . , xd) =
d∑
i=1
|xi|,∀(x1, x2, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd.
Consider a class of multidimensional probability distributions with sym-
metric and staircase-shaped probability density function defined as follows.
Given γ ∈ [0, 1], define Pγ as the probability distribution with probability
density function fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =
e−ka(γ) ‖x‖1 ∈ [k∆, (k + γ)∆) for k ∈ Ne−(k+1)a(γ) ‖x‖1 ∈ [(k + γ)∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N, (2.8)
where a(γ) is the normalization factor to make∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd = 1.
Define b , e−, and define
ck ,
+∞∑
i=0
ikbi, ∀k ∈ N,
where by convention 00 is defined as 1. Then the closed-form expression for
a(γ) is
a(γ) , d!
2d∆d
∑d
k=1
(
d
k
)
cd−k(b+ (1− b)γk)
.
It is straightforward to verify that fγ(·) is a valid probability density func-
tion and Pγ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7). Indeed, the
probability density function fγ(x) satisfies
fγ(x) ≤ efγ(x + t),∀x ∈ Rd,∀t ∈ Rd s.t. ‖t‖1 ≤ ∆,
which implies (2.7).
We plot the probability density function fγ(x) in Figure 2.2 for d = 2. It
is easy to see that fγ(x) is multi-dimensional staircase-shaped.
Let SP be the set of all probability distributions which satisfy the differ-
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Figure 2.2: Multi-dimensional staircase-shaped probability density function
ential privacy constraint (2.7). Our main result is Theorem 2.3.1.
Theorem 2.3.1 For d = 2 and the cost function L(x) = ‖x‖1,∀x ∈ R2,
then
inf
P∈SP
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)P(dx1dx2) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
We briefly discuss the main proof idea and technique. For the complete
proof, see Appendix A.2. First, by using a combinatorial argument, we show
that given any noise probability distribution satisfying the -differential pri-
vacy constraint, we can discretize the probability distribution by averaging
it over each `1 layer without increasing the cost. Therefore, we only need to
consider those probability distributions with the probability density function
being a piecewise constant function of the `1-norm of the noise. Second, we
show that to minimize the cost, the probability density function as a function
of the `1-norm of the noise should be monotonically and geometrically de-
caying. Lastly, we show that the optimal probability density function should
be staircase-shaped.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential
privacy for multidimensional real-valued query function has a staircase-shaped
probability density function, which is specified by three parameters , ∆ and
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2
L(x1, x2)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
We conjecture that Theorem 2.3.1 holds for arbitrary dimension d. To
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prove this conjecture, one can reuse the whole proof in Appendix A.2 and
only needs to prove that Lemma A.2.1 and Lemma A.2.6 hold for arbitrary
d, which we believe are true. Lemma A.2.1 shows that when d = 2, we
can discretize the probability distribution by averaging it over each `1 layer
without increasing the cost, and the new probability distribution also satis-
fies the differential privacy constraint. We give a constructive combinatorial
argument to prove Lemma A.2.1 for d = 2, and believe it holds for arbitrary
d ≥ 2. We prove Lemma A.2.6 for d = 2 by studying the monotonicity of
the ratio between the cost and volume over each `1 layer. Indeed, to prove
Lemma A.2.6, one only needs to show that hk, which is defined in (A.12),
first decreases and then increases as a function of k, and h0 ≤ hi−1. For fixed
d, one can derive the explicit formula for d and verify whether hk satisfies
this property (we show it is true for d = 2 in our proof).
We also conjecture that Theorem 2.3.1 holds for other cost functions, which
may not be a function only depending on the `1-norm of the noise. Numeric
simulations suggest that for d = 2, the correlated multidimensional staircase
mechanism is optimal for L(x) = ‖x‖22. To prove this conjecture, one has to
use a different proof technique, as Lemma A.2.1 in our proof does not work
for the cost functions that do not depend on the `1-norm of the noise only.
2.3.3 Asymptotic analysis
In this subsection, we study the asymptotic properties and performances of
the correlated staircase mechanism for the `1 cost function.
Note that the closed-form expressions for c0, c1 and c2 are
c0 =
1
1− b,
c1 =
b
(1− b)2 ,
c2 =
b2 + b
(1− b)3 .
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For d = 2, we have
a(γ) =
1
2∆2 (2c1(b+ (1− b)γ) + c0(b+ (1− b)γ2))
=
1
2∆2
(
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
) .
Given the two-dimensional staircase-shaped probability density function
fγ(x), the cost is
V (Pγ) ,
∫ ∫
R2
(|x1|+ |x2|)fγ(x1, x2)P(dx1dx2)
= 4
(
+∞∑
i=0
∫ (i+γ)∆
i∆
tta(γ)e−idt+
+∞∑
i=0
∫ (i+1)∆
(i+γ)∆
tta(γ)e−(i+1)dt
)
=
4a(γ)∆3
3
(
+∞∑
i=0
bi(3i2γ + 3iγ2 + γ3)
+b
+∞∑
i=0
bi(3i2 + 3i+ 1− 3i2γ − 3iγ2 − γ3)
)
=
4a(γ)∆3
3
(
3c2γ + 3c1γ
2 + c0γ
3 + b
(
3(1− γ)c2 + 3(1− γ2)c1
+(1− γ3)c0
))
=
2∆
3
3c2γ + 3c1γ
2 + c0γ
3 + b(3(1− γ)c2 + 3(1− γ2)c1 + (1− γ3)c0)
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
=
2∆
3
c0(1− b)γ3 + 3c1(1− b)γ2 + 3c2(1− b)γ + b(c0 + 3c1 + 3c2)
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
.
=
2∆
3
γ3 + 3b
1−bγ
2 + 3(b
2+b)
(1−b)2 γ + b
1+4b+b2
(1−b)3
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
. (2.9)
Therefore, in the two-dimensional setting, the optimal γ∗ is
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
γ3 + 3b
1−bγ
2 + 3(b
2+b)
(1−b)2 γ + b
1+4b+b2
(1−b)3
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
.
By setting the derivative of (2.9) to be zero, we use Mathematica to get a
closed-form expression for γ∗, which is too complicated to show here. We
plot γ∗ as a function of b in Figure 2.3. The optimal cost V ∗ = V (Pγ∗). We
use Mathematica to analyze the asymptotic behavior of V ∗ as  → 0 and
16
Figure 2.3: The optimal γ∗ as a function of b
→ +∞.
Corollary 2.3.2 In the high privacy regime,
V ∗ =
2∆

− ∆
2
36
√
3
+O(3), → 0,
and in the low privacy regime,
V ∗ = 3
√
2∆e−

3 +
∆e−
2
3
3
√
2
+ o(e−
2
3 ), → +∞.
The Laplacian mechanism adds independent Laplacian noise to each compo-
nent of the query output, and the cost is 2∆

. Therefore, in the high privacy
regime, the gap between optimal cost and the cost achieved by the Lapla-
cian mechanism goes to zero, as → 0, and we conclude that the Laplacian
mechanism is approximately optimal in the high privacy regime. However,
in the low privacy regime (as  → +∞), the optimal cost is proportional to
e−

3 , while the cost of the Laplacian mechanism is proportional to 1

. We
conclude that the gap is significant in the low privacy regime.
It is natural to compare the performance of the optimal multi-dimensional
staircase mechanism and the composite single-dimensional staircase mecha-
nism which adds independent staircase noise to each component of the query
output. If independent staircase noise is added to each component of query
output, to satisfy the -differential privacy constraint, the parameter of the
staircase noise is 
2
instead of , and thus the total cost will be proportional
to e−

4 , which is worse than the optimal cost Θ(e−

3 ).
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2.4 The Composition Theorem in Differential Privacy
In this section, we address how differential privacy guarantees compose when
accessing databases multiple times via differentially private mechanisms, each
of which has its own privacy guarantees. Precisely, we address the following
fundamental question: How much privacy can be guaranteed after multiple
database accesses? To formally define composition, we consider the following
scenario known as the ‘composition experiment’, proposed in [16].
A composition experiment takes as input a parameter b ∈ {0, 1}, and an
adversary A. From the hypothesis testing perspective proposed in the pre-
vious section, b can be interpreted as the hypothesis: null hypothesis for
b = 0 and alternative hypothesis for b = 1. At each time i, a database Di,b is
accessed depending on b. For example, one includes a particular individual
and another does not. For example, D1,0 could be medical records including
a particular individual and D1,1 does not include the person, and D2,0 could
be voter registration database with the same person present and D2,1 with
the person absent. An adversary A is trying to figure out whether or not a
particular individual is in the database by testing the hypotheses on the out-
put of k sequential database accesses via differentially private mechanisms.
In full generality, we allow the adversary to have full control over which pair
of databases to access, which query to ask, and which mechanism to be used
at each repeated access. Further, the adversary is free to make these choices
adaptively based on the previous outcomes. The only restrictions are: (a)
the differentially private mechanisms belong to a family M (e.g., the family
of all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms), (b) the internal randomness
of the mechanisms are independent at each repeated access, and (c) that the
hypothesis b is not known to the adversary.
Compose(A,M, k, b)
Input: A, M, k, b
Output: V b
for i = 1 to k do
A requests (Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi) for some Mi ∈M;
A receives yi = Mi(Di,b, qi);
end for
Output the view of the adversary V b = (Rb, Y b1 , . . . , Y
b
k ).
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The outcome of this k-fold composition experiment is the view of the adver-
sary A: V b ≡ (R, Y b1 , . . . , Y bk ), which is the sequence of random outcomes
Y b1 , . . . , Y
b
k , and the outcome R of any internal randomness of A.
2.4.1 Optimal privacy region under composition
We would like to characterize how much privacy degrades after a k-fold com-
position experiment. It is known that the privacy degrades under compo-
sition by at most the ‘sum’ of the differential privacy parameters of each
access.
Theorem 2.4.1 ([7, 9, 8, 16]) For any ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the class of
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies (kε, kδ)-differential privacy
under k-fold adaptive composition.
In general, one can show that if Mi is (εi, δi)-differentially private, then the
composition satisfies (
∑
i∈[k] εi,
∑
i∈[k] δi)-differential privacy. If we do not
allow for any slack in the δ, this bound cannot be tightened. Precisely,
there are examples of mechanisms which under k-fold composition violate
(ε,
∑
i∈[k] δi)-differential privacy for any ε <
∑
i∈[k] εi. We can prove this
by providing a set S such that the privacy condition is met with equality:
P(V 0 ∈ S) = e
∑
i∈[k] εiP(V 1 ∈ S) + ∑i∈[k] δi. However, if we allow for a
slightly larger value of δ, then Dwork et al. showed in [16] that one can gain
a significantly higher privacy guarantee in terms of ε.
Theorem 2.4.2 ([16, Theorem III.3]) For any ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and δ˜ ∈
(0, 1], the class of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies (ε˜δ˜, kδ+δ˜)-
differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition, for
ε˜δ˜ = kε(e
ε − 1) + ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜). (2.10)
By allowing a slack of δ˜ > 0, one can get a higher privacy of ε˜δ˜ = O(kε
2 +√
kε2), which is significantly smaller than kε. This is the best known guar-
antee so far, and has been used whenever one requires a privacy guarantee
under composition (e.g. [16, 17, 18]). However, the important question of
optimality has remained open. Namely, is there a composition of mechanisms
where the above privacy guarantee is tight? In other words, is it possible to
get a tighter bound on differential privacy under composition?
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We give a complete answer to this fundamental question in the following
theorems. We prove a tighter bound on the privacy guarantee under com-
position. Further, we also prove the achievability of the privacy guarantee:
we provide a set of mechanisms such that the privacy region under k-fold
composition is exactly the region defined by the conditions in (2.11). Hence,
this bound on the privacy region is tight and cannot be improved upon.
Theorem 2.4.3 For any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the class of (ε, δ)-differentially
private mechanisms satisfies
(
(k − 2i)ε , 1− (1− δ)k(1− δi)
)
-differential privacy (2.11)
under k-fold adaptive composition, for all i = {0, 1, . . . , bk/2c}, where
δi =
∑i−1
`=0
(
k
`
)(
e(k−`)ε − e(k−2i+`)ε)
(1 + eε)k
.
Hence, the privacy region of k-fold composition is an intersection of k regions,
each of which is ((k−2i)ε, 1− (1−δ)k(1−δi))-differentially private: R({(k−
2i)ε, 1− (1− δ)k(1− δi)}i∈[k/2]) ≡
⋂b k
2
c
i=0R((k− 2i)ε, 1− (1− δ)k(1− δi)). We
prove this result in Section A.3.1 by constructing an explicit mechanism that
achieves this region under composition. Hence, this bound on the privacy
region is tight, and gives the exact description of how privacy degrades under
k-fold adaptive composition. This settles the question that was left open
in [7, 9, 8, 16] by providing, for the first time, the fundamental limit of
composition and proving a matching mechanism with the worst-case privacy
degradation.
To prove the optimality of our main result in Theorem 2.4.3, namely that
it is impossible to have a privacy worse than (2.11), we rely on the opera-
tional interpretation of the privacy as hypothesis testing. To this end, we
use the new analysis tools (Theorem 2.2.3 and Theorem 2.2.4) provided in
the previous section. Figure 2.4 illustrates how much the privacy region of
Theorem 2.4.3 degrades as we increase the number of composition k. Figure
2.5 provides a comparison of the three privacy guarantees in Theorems 2.4.1,
2.4.2 and 2.4.3 for 30-fold composition of (0.1, 0.001)-differentially private
mechanisms. Smaller region gives a tighter bound, since it guarantees the
higher privacy.
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Figure 2.4: Privacy region R({(k − 2i)ε, δi}) for the class of
(ε, 0)-differentially private mechanisms (left) and (ε, δ)-differentially private
mechanisms (right) under k-fold adaptive composition.
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Figure 2.5: Theorem 2.4.3 provides the tightest bound (left). Given a
mechanism M , the privacy region can be completely described by its
boundary, which is represented by a set of tangent lines of the form
PFA = −eε˜PMD + 1− dε˜(P0, P1) (right).
2.4.2 Simplified privacy region under composition
In many applications of the composition theorems, a closed form expres-
sion of the composition privacy guarantee is required. The privacy guar-
antee in (2.11) is tight, but can be difficult to evaluate. The next the-
orem provides a simpler expression which is an outer bound on the ex-
act region described in (2.11). Compared to (2.10), the privacy guaran-
tee is significantly improved from ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 +
√
kε2 log(1/δ˜)
)
to ε˜δ˜ =
O
(
kε2+min
{√
kε2 log(1/δ˜), ε log(ε/δ˜)
})
, especially when composing a large
number k of interactive queries. Further, the δ-approximate differential pri-
vacy degradation of (1 − (1 − δ)k(1 − δ˜)) is also strictly smaller than the
previous (kδ + δ˜). We discuss the significance of this improvement in the
next section using examples from the existing differential privacy literature.
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Theorem 2.4.4 For any ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and δ˜ ∈ [0, 1], the class of (ε, δ)-
differentially private mechanisms satisfies
(
ε˜δ˜, 1− (1−δ)k(1− δ˜)
)
-differential
privacy under k-fold adaptive composition, for
ε˜δ˜ = min
 kε , (eε − 1)εkeε + 1 + ε
√
2k log
(
e+
√
kε2
δ˜
)
,
(eε − 1)εk
eε + 1
+ ε
√
2k log
(1
δ˜
)}
. (2.12)
In the high privacy regime, where ε ≤ 0.9, this bound can be further simpli-
fied as
ε˜δ˜ ≤ min
{
kε, kε2 + ε
√
2k log
(
e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜ )
)
, kε2 + ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜)
}
.
A proof is provided in Section A.3.2. This privacy guarantee improves over
the existing result of Theorem 2.4.2 when δ˜ = Θ(
√
kε2). Typical regime
of interest is the high-privacy regime for composition privacy guarantee, i.e.
when
√
kε2  1. The above theorem suggests that we only need the extra
slack of approximate privacy δ˜ of order
√
kε2.
2.4.3 Composition theorem for heterogeneous mechanisms
So far, we considered homogeneous mechanisms, where all mechanisms are
(ε, δ)-differentially private. Our analysis readily extends to heterogeneous
mechanisms, where the `-th query satisfies (ε`, δ`)-differential privacy (we
refer to such mechanisms as (ε`, δ`)-differentially private mechanisms).
Theorem 2.4.5 For any ε` > 0, δ` ∈ [0, 1] for ` ∈ {1, . . . . , k}, and δ˜ ∈
[0, 1], the class of (ε`, δ`)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies
(
ε˜δ˜, 1 −
(1− δ˜)∏k`=1(1− δ`))-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition,
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for ε˜δ˜ =
min

k∑
`=1
ε` ,
k∑
`=1
(eε` − 1)ε`
eε` + 1
+
√√√√√ k∑
`=1
2 ε2` log
(
e+
√∑k
`=1 ε
2
`
δ˜
)
,
k∑
`=1
(eε` − 1)ε`
eε` + 1
+
√√√√ k∑
`=1
2 ε2` log
(1
δ˜
) . (2.13)
This tells us that the ε`’s sum up under composition: whenever we have kε
or kε2 in (2.12) we can replace it by the summation to get the general result
for heterogeneous case. We refer the reader to Appendix A.3.3 for the proof
of Theorem 2.4.5.
2.5 Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the fundamental limits of global differential
privacy. In particular, we showed the following key results:
1. Global differential privacy guarantees that the probabilities of false
alarm and missed detection of a binary hypothesis testing problem
involving a specific user presence/absence cannot be simultaneously
small.
2. The correlated multi-dimensional staircase mechanism achieves the op-
timal privacy-utility tradeoff under `1 losses and one/two-dimensional
query functions. We also conjectured that the same mechanism is op-
timal for higher dimensional queries and more general loss function.
3. The composition of k queries, each of which is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate, is at least (ε˜δ˜, kδ + δ˜)-differential private. Here ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 +
ε
√
k log(e+ (ε
√
k/δ˜) )
)
and δ˜ is any nonnegative number.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
3.1 Introduction
In statistical analyses involving data from individuals, there is an increasing
tension between the need to share the data and the need to protect sensitive
information about the individuals. For example, users of social networking
sites are increasingly cautious about their privacy, but still inevitably agree to
share their personal information in order to benefit from customized services
such as recommendations and personalized search [19, 20]. There is a certain
utility in sharing data for both data providers and data analysts, but at the
same time, individuals want plausible deniability when it comes to sensitive
information.
For such applications, there is a natural core optimization problem to be
solved. Assuming both the data providers and analysts want to maximize the
utility of the released data, how can they do so while preserving the privacy
of participating individuals? The formulation and study of a framework
addressing this fundamental tradeoff is the focus of this chapter.
3.1.1 Local differential privacy
The need for data privacy appears in two different contexts: the local pri-
vacy context, as in when individuals disclose their personal information (e.g.,
voluntarily on social network sites), and the global privacy context, as in
when institutions release databases of information of several people or an-
swer queries on such databases (e.g., US Government releases census data,
companies like Netflix release proprietary data for others to test state of the
art data analytics). In both contexts, privacy is achieved by randomizing the
data before releasing it. We study the setting of local privacy, in which data
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providers do not trust the data collector (analyst). Local privacy dates back
to [21], who proposed the randomized response method to provide plausible
deniability for individuals responding to sensitive surveys.
A natural notion of privacy protection is making inference of information
beyond what is released hard. Differential privacy has been proposed in the
global privacy context to formally capture this notion of privacy [6, 7, 8].
In a nutshell, differential privacy ensures that an adversary should not be
able to reliably infer whether or not a particular individual is participating
in the database query, even with unbounded computational power and ac-
cess to every entry in the database except for that particular individual’s
data. Recently, [22] extended the notion of differential privacy to the lo-
cal privacy context. Formally, consider a setting where there are n data
providers each owning a data Xi defined on an input alphabet X . The Xi’s
are independently sampled from some distribution Pν parameterized by ν. A
statistical privatization mechanism Q is a conditional distribution that maps
Xi ∈ X stochastically to Yi ∈ Y , where Y is an output alphabet possibly
larger than X . The Yi’s are referred to as the privatized (sanitized) views of
Xi’s. In a non-interactive setting where all Xi’s are independently sampled
from the same distribution, the same privatization mechanism Q is used by
all individuals. This setting is shown in Figure 3.1 for a special case with
n = 2. For some non-negative ε, we follow the definition of [22] and say that
a mechanism Q is ε-locally differentially private if
sup
S⊂Y,x,x′∈X
Q(S|x)
Q(S|x′) ≤ e
ε , (3.1)
where Q(S|x) = P(Yi ∈ S|Xi = x) represents the privatization mechanism.
This ensures that for small values of ε, given a privatized data Yi, it is
(almost) equally likely to have come from any data, i.e. x or x′. A small
value of ε means that we require a high level of privacy and a large value
corresponds to a low level of privacy. At one extreme, for ε = 0, the privatized
output must be independent of the private data, and on the other extreme,
for ε =∞, the privatized output can be made equal to the private data.
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Figure 3.1: Client server model
3.1.2 Information theoretic utilities for statistical analysis
In analyses of statistical databases, the analyst is interested in the statistics
of the data as opposed to individual records. Naturally, the utility should
also be measured in terms of the distribution rather than sample quantities.
Concretely, consider a client-server setting, where each client with data Xi
sends a privatized version of the data Yi, via a non-interactive ε-locally dif-
ferentially private privatization mechanism Q. Assume all the clients use the
same privatization mechanism denoted by Q, and each client’s data is an
i.i.d. sample from a distribution Pν for some parameter ν. Given the priva-
tized views {Yi}ni=1, the data analyst wants to make inferences based on the
induced marginal distribution
Mν(S) ≡
∑
x∈X
Q(S|x)Pν(x) , (3.2)
for S ⊆ Y . We consider a broad class of convex utility functions, and iden-
tify the class of optimal mechanisms, which we call staircase mechanisms, in
Section 3.3. We apply this framework to two specific applications: (a) hy-
pothesis testing where the utility is measured in Kullback-Leibler divergence
(Section 3.4) and (b) information preservation where the utility is measured
in mutual information (Section 3.5).
In the binary hypothesis testing setting, ν ∈ {0, 1}; therefore, X can be
generated by one of two possible distributions P0 and P1. The power to
discriminate data generated from P0 to data generated from P1 depends on
the ‘distance’ between the marginals M0 and M1. To measure the ability
of such statistical discrimination, our choice of utility of a particular priva-
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tization mechanism Q is an information theoretic quantity called Csisza´r’s
f -divergence defined as
Df (M0||M1) =
∑
x∈X
f
(M0(x)
M1(x)
)
M1(x) , (3.3)
for some convex function f such that f(1) = 0. The Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence Dkl(M0||M1) is a special case with f(x) = x log x, and so is the
total variation ‖M0 −M1‖TV with f(x) = (1/2)|x − 1|. Such f -divergences
capture the quality of statistical inference, such as minimax rates of statistical
estimation or error exponents in hypothesis testing [23]. As a motivating
example, suppose a data analyst wants to test whether the data is generated
from P0 or P1 based on privatized views Y1, . . . , Yn. According to Chernoff-
Stein’s lemma, for a bounded type I error probability, the best type II error
probability scales as e−nDkl(M0||M1). Naturally, we are interested in finding a
privatization mechanism Q that minimizes the probability of error by solving
the following constraint maximization problem
maximize
Q
Dkl(M0||M1)
subject to Q ∈ Dε
, (3.4)
where Dε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms satisfying
(3.1).
In the information preservation setting, X is generated from an underlying
distribution P . We are interested in quantifying how much information can
be preserved when releasing a private view of the data. In other words, the
data provider would like to release an ε-locally differentially private view Y
of X that preserves the amount of information in X as much as possible.
The utility in this case is measured by the mutual information between X
and Y
I (X;Y ) =
∑
X
∑
Y
P (x)Q (y|x) log
(
Q (y|x)∑
l∈X P (l)Q (y|l)
)
. (3.5)
Mutual information, as the name suggests, measures the mutual dependence
between two random variables. It has been used as a criterion for feature
selection and for determining the similarity between two different clusterings
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of a dataset, in addition to many other applications in signal processing and
machine learning. To characterize the fundamental tradeoff between privacy
and information preservation, we solve the following constrained maximiza-
tion problem
maximize
Q
I(X;Y )
subject to Q ∈ Dε
, (3.6)
where Dε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms satisfying
(3.1).
Motivated by such applications in statistical analysis, our goal is to pro-
vide a general framework for finding optimal privatization mechanisms that
maximize information theoretic utilities under local differential privacy. We
demonstrate the power of our techniques in a very general setting that in-
cludes both hypothesis testing and information preservation.
3.1.3 Our contributions
We study the fundamental tradeoff between local differential privacy and a
rich class of convex utility functions. This class of utilities includes several in-
formation theoretic quantities such as mutual information and f -divergences.
The privacy-utility tradeoff is posed as a constrained maximization problem:
maximize utility subject to local differential privacy constraints. This max-
imization problem is (a) nonlinear: the utility functions we consider are
convex in Q; (b) non-standard: we are maximizing instead of minimizing
a convex function; and (c) infinite dimensional: the space of all differen-
tially private mechanisms is uncountable. We show, in Theorem 3.3.2, that
for all utility functions considered and any privacy level ε, a finite family
of extremal mechanisms (a subset of the corner points of the space of pri-
vatization mechanisms), which we call staircase mechanisms, contains the
optimal privatization mechanism. We further prove, in Theorem 3.3.4, that
solving the original problem is equivalent to solving a linear program, the
outcome of which is the optimal staircase mechanism. However, solving this
linear program can be computationally expensive since it has 2|X | variables.
To account for this, we show that two simple staircase mechanisms (the bi-
nary and randomized response mechanisms) are optimal in the high and low
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privacy regimes, respectively, and well approximate the intermediate regime.
This contributes an important advance in the differential privacy area, where
the privatization mechanisms have been few and almost no exact optimal-
ity results are known. As an application, we show that the effective sample
size reduces from n to ε2n under local differential privacy in the context of
hypothesis testing.
We also study the fundamental tradeoff between utility and approximate
differential privacy, a generalized notion of privacy that was first introduced
in [9]. The techniques we develop for differential privacy do not generalize to
approximate differential privacy. To account for this, we use the operational
interpretation of approximate differential privacy (developed in [24]) to prove
that a simple mechanism maximizes utility for all levels of privacy when the
data is binary.
3.1.4 Related work
Our work is closely related to the recent work of [22] where an upper bound
on Dkl(M0||M1) was derived under the same local differential privacy setting.
Precisely, Duchi et al. proved that the KL-divergence maximization problem
in (3.4) is at most 4(eε − 1)2‖P1 − P2‖2TV . This bound was further used to
provide a minimax bound on statistical estimation using information theo-
retic converse techniques such as Fano’s and Le Cam’s inequalities. Such
tradeoffs also provide tools for comparing various notions of privacy [25].
In a similar spirit, we are also interested in maximizing information theo-
retic quantities of the marginals under local differential privacy. We gener-
alize the results of [22], and provide stronger results in the sense that we (a)
consider a broader class of information theoretic utilities; (b) provide explicit
constructions of the optimal mechanisms; and (c) recover the existing result
of [22, Theorem 1] (with a stronger condition on ε).
Our work provides a formal connection to the information-theoretical no-
tion of privacy, where privacy loss is defined as information leakage. Informa-
tion leakage has been widely studied as a practical notion of privacy [26, 27].
Such a connection to differential privacy has been studied only indirectly
through comparisons to how much distortion is incurred under the two no-
tions of privacy [28]. Given a privatization mechanism, mutual information
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privacy is measured by the mutual information between the data and the re-
leased output, i.e. I(X;Y ). We show that under ε-locally differentially, mu-
tual information is bounded by I(X;Y ) = 0.5ε2 maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac)+O(ε3).
Moreover, we provide an explicit privatization mechanism that achieves this
bound.
While there is a vast literature on differential privacy, exact optimality
results are only known for a few cases. The typical recipe is to propose a
differentially private mechanism inspired by the work of [6, 7, 29] and [30],
and then establish its near-optimality by comparing the achievable utility to a
converse, for example in principal component analysis [31, 17, 32, 33], linear
queries [34, 35], logistic regression [36] and histogram release [37]. In this
work, we take a different route and solve the utility maximization problem
exactly.
Optimal differentially private mechanisms are known only in a few cases.
[38] showed that the geometric noise adding mechanism is optimal (under a
Bayesian setting) for monotone utility functions under count queries (sen-
sitivity one). This was generalized by Geng et al. (for a worst-case in-
put setting) who proposed a family of mechanisms and proved its optimal-
ity for monotone utility functions under queries with arbitrary sensitivity
[12, 13, 14]. The family of optimal mechanisms was called staircase mecha-
nisms because for any y and any neighboring x and x′, the ratio of Q(y|x)
to Q(y|x′) takes one of three possible values eε, e−ε, or 1. Since the optimal
mechanisms we develop also have an identical property, we retain the same
nomenclature.
3.1.5 Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we in-
troduce the family of staircase mechanisms, prove its optimality for a broad
class of convex utility functions, and study its combinatorial structure. In
Section 3.4, we study the problem of private hypothesis testing and prove
that two staircase mechanisms, the binary and randomized response mech-
anisms, are optimal for KL-divergence in the high and low privacy regimes,
respectively, and (nearly) optimal the intermediate regime. We show, in Sec-
tion 3.5, similar results for mutual information. In Section 3.6, we study
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approximate local differential privacy, a more general notion of local pri-
vacy. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a few interesting and nontrivial
extensions in Section 3.7.
3.2 Operational Interpretation of Local Differential
Privacy
Given an observation Y = y, consider a binary hypothesis test on whether
X ∈ A or X ∈ B for some A,B ⊂ X such that A ∩ B = ∅. Any binary
hypothesis test is completely described by a, possibly randomized, decision
rule Xˆ : Y → {A,B}. The two types of error associated with Xˆ are false
alarm: Xˆ = A when X ∈ B, and missed detection: Xˆ = B when X ∈ A.
The probability of false alarm is given by PFA = P(Xˆ = A|X ∈ B) while the
probability of miss detection is given by PMD = P(Xˆ = B|X ∈ A). Notice
that PFA and PMD are a function of Q, Xˆ, A and B, and not the distribution
of X. The next theorem provides an equivalent operational definition for
local differential privacy.
Theorem 3.2.1 (Operational Definition of Local Differential Privacy)
A conditional distribution Q is ε-locally differentially private if and only if
for all A,B ⊂ X such that A∩B = ∅ and all decision rules Xˆ : Y → {A,B},
we have that
PFA + e
εPMD ≥ 1
eεPFA + PMD ≥ 1. (3.7)
The proof of the above theorem is found in Appendix B.1. As a corollary
to the above theorem, if you set B = Ac, then local differential privacy
guarantees that upon the observation of Y , the adversary cannot figure out
whether or not X ∈ A reliably for any A ⊂ X .
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3.3 Optimal Mechanisms for Local Differential Privacy
In this section, we provide a formal definition for staircase mechanisms and
show that they are the optimal solutions to optimization problems of the
form (3.9). Using the structure of staircase mechanisms, we propose a com-
binatorial representation of staircase mechanisms. This allows us to reduce
the infinite dimensional nonlinear program of (3.9) to a linear program with
2|X | variables. Potentially, for any instance of the problem, one can solve this
linear program to obtain the optimal privatization mechanism, albeit with
significant computational challenges since the number of variables scales ex-
ponentially in the alphabet size. To address this issue, we prove, in Sections
3.4 and 3.5, that two simple staircase mechanisms, which we call the binary
mechanism and the randomized response mechanism, are optimal in the high
and low privacy regimes, respectively, and well approximate the intermediate
regime.
3.3.1 Optimality of staircase mechanisms
For an input alphabet X with |X | = k, we represent the set of ε-locally
differentially private mechanisms that lead to output alphabets Y with |Y| =
` by
Dε,` = Qk×` ∩
{
Q : ∀ x, x′ ∈ X , S ⊆ Y ,
∣∣∣ ln Q (S|x)
Q (S|x′)
∣∣∣ ≤ ε} ,
where Qk×` denotes the set of all k× ` dimensional conditional distributions.
The set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms is given by
Dε = ∪`∈NDε,`. (3.8)
The set of all conditional distributions acting on X is given by Q = ∪`∈NQk,`.
We consider two types of utility functions, one for the hypothesis testing
setup and another for the mutual information setup. In the hypothesis testing
setup, the utility is a function of the privatization mechanism and two priors
defined on the input alphabet. Namely, U (P0, P1, Q) : Sk × Sk × Q → R+,
where P0 and P1 are positive priors defined on X and Sk is the (k − 1)-
dimensional probability simplex. Pν is said to be positive if Pν (x) > 0 for
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all x ∈ X . In the information preservation setup, the utility is a function
of the privatization mechanism and a prior defined on the input alphabet.
Namely, U (P,Q) : Sk ×Q → R+, where P is a positive prior defined on X .
For notational convenience, we will use U (Q) to refer to both U (P,Q) and
U (P0, P1, Q).
Definition 3.3.1 (Sublinear Functions) A function µ (z) : Rk → R is
said to be sublinear if the following two conditions are met:
1. µ (γz) = γµ (z) for all γ ∈ R+.
2. µ (z1 + z2) ≤ µ (z1) + µ (z2) for all z1, z2 ∈ R.
Let Qy be the column of Q corresponding to Q(y|·) and µ be any sub-
linear function. We are interested in utilities that can be decomposed as a
summation of sublinear functions. We study the fundamental tradeoff be-
tween privacy and utility by solving the following constrained maximization
problem:
maximize
Q
U (Q) =
∑
y∈Y
µ(Qy)
subject to Q ∈ Dε
. (3.9)
This includes maximization over information theoretic quantities of interest
in statistical estimation and hypothesis testing such as mutual information,
total variation, KL-divergence, and χ2-divergence [23]. Since sub-linearity
implies convexity, this is in general a complicated nonlinear program: We
are maximizing (instead of minimizing) a convex function in Q. Further, the
dimension of Q might be unbounded: the optimal privatization mechanism
Q∗ might produce an infinite output alphabet Y . The following theorem
proves that one never needs an output alphabet larger than the input alpha-
bet in order to achieve the maximum utility, and provides a combinatorial
representation of the optimal solution.
Theorem 3.3.2 For any sublinear function µ and any ε ≥ 0, there exists
an optimal mechanism Q∗ maximizing the utility in (3.9) over all ε-locally
differentially private mechanisms, such that
(a) the output alphabet size is at most the input alphabet size, i.e. |Y| ≤
|X |; and
33
(b) for all y ∈ Y, and x, x′ ∈ X∣∣∣ ln Q∗(y|x)
Q∗(y|x′)
∣∣∣ ∈ {0, ε} . (3.10)
The first claim of bounded alphabet size is more generally true for any general
utility U (Q) that is convex in Q (not necessarily decomposing into a sum of
sublinear functions as in (3.9)). The second claim establishes that there is
an optimal mechanism with an extremal structure; the absolute value of the
log-likelihood ratios can only take one of the two extremal values: zero or eε
(see Figure 3.2 for example). We refer to such a mechanism as a staircase
mechanism, and define the family of staircase mechanisms formally as
Sε ≡ {Q | satisfying (3.10)} .
For all choices of U (Q) =
∑
Y µ(Qy) and any ε ≥ 0, Theorem 3.3.2 implies
that the family of staircase mechanisms includes the optimal solutions to
maximization problems of the form (3.9). Notice that staircase mechanisms
are ε-locally differentially private, since any Q satisfying (3.10) implies that
Q(y|x)/Q(y|x′) ≤ eε.
y = 1
2
x = 1 2 3 4 5
eε
1+eε
1
1+eε
QT = 1
1+eε
[
eε eε 1 eε 1
1 1 eε 1 eε
]
y = 1
2
3
4
x = 1 2 3 4
eε
3+eε
1
3+eε
QT = 1
3+eε

eε 1 1 1
1 eε 1 1
1 1 eε 1
1 1 1 eε

Figure 3.2: Examples of staircase mechanisms: the binary (left) and the
randomized response (right) mechanisms.
For global differential privacy, we can generalize the definition of staircase
mechanisms to hold for all neighboring database queries x, x′ (or equiva-
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lently within some sensitivity), and recover all known existing optimal mech-
anisms. Precisely, the geometric mechanism shown to be optimal in [38],
and the mechanisms shown to be optimal in [12, 13] (also called staircase
mechanisms) are special cases of the staircase mechanisms defined above.
We believe that the characterization of these extremal mechanisms and the
analysis techniques developed in this chapter can be of independent interest
to researchers interested in optimal mechanisms for global privacy and more
general utilities.
3.3.2 Combinatorial representation of staircase mechanisms
Now that we know staircase mechanisms are optimal, we can try to com-
binatorially search for the best staircase mechanism for an instance of the
function µ and a fixed ε. To this end, we give a simple representation of
all staircase mechanisms, exploiting the fact that they are scaled copies of a
finite number of patterns.
Let Q ∈ R|X |×|Y| be a staircase mechanism, and k = |X | denote the
input alphabet size. Then, from the definition of staircase mechanisms,
Q(y|x)/Q(y|x′) ∈ {e−ε, 1, eε} and each column Q(y|·) must be proportional
to one of the canonical staircase patterns we define next.
Definition 3.3.3 (Staircase Pattern Matrix) Let bj be the k-dimensional
binary vector corresponding to the binary representation of j for j ≤ 2k − 1.
A matrix S(k) ∈ {1, eε}k×2k is called a staircase pattern matrix if the j-th
column of S(k) is S
(k)
j = (e
ε − 1) bj−1 + 1, for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}. Each column
of S(k) is a staircase pattern.
When k = 3, there are 2k = 8 staircase patterns and the staircase pattern
matrix is given by
S(3) =
1 1 1 1 e
ε eε eε eε
1 1 eε eε 1 1 eε eε
1 eε 1 eε 1 eε 1 eε
 .
For all values of k, there are exactly 2k such patterns, and any column Q(y|·)
of Q, a staircase mechanism, is a scaled version of one of the columns of S(k).
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Using this pattern matrix, we will show that we can represent (an equivalence
class of) any staircase mechanism Q as
Q = S(k)Θ , (3.11)
where Θ = diag(θ) is a 2k × 2k diagonal matrix and θ is a 2k-dimensional
vector representing the scaling of the columns of S(k). We can now formulate
the problem of maximizing the utility as a linear program and prove their
equivalence.
Theorem 3.3.4 For any sublinear function µ and any ε ≥ 0, the nonlinear
program of (3.9) and the following linear program have the same optimal
value:
maximize
θ∈R2k
2k∑
j=1
µ(S
(k)
j )θj = µ
T θ (3.12)
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0 ,
and the optimal solutions are related by (3.11).
The infinite dimensional nonlinear program of (3.9) is now reduced to a finite
dimensional linear program. The constraints in (3.12) ensure that we get a
valid probability matrix Q = S(k)Θ with rows that sum to one. One could
potentially solve this LP with 2k variables but its computational complexity
scales exponentially in the alphabet size k = |X |. For practical values of k
this might not always be possible. However, in the following sections, we
prove that in the high privacy regime (ε ≤ ε∗ for some positive ε∗), there
is a single optimal mechanism, which we call the binary mechanism, which
dominates over all other mechanisms in a very strong sense for all utility
functions of practical interest.
In order to understand the above theorem, observe that both the objective
function and differential privacy constraints are invariant under permutation
(or relabelling) of the columns of a privatization mechanism Q. Similarly,
both the objective function and differential privacy constraints are invariant
under merging/splitting of outputs with the same pattern. To be specific,
consider a privatization mechanism Q and suppose there exist two outputs y
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and y′ that have the same pattern, i.e. Q(y|·) = C Q(y′|·) for some positive
constant C. Then, we can consider a new mechanism Q′ by merging the two
columns corresponding to y and y′. Let y′′ denote this new output. It follows
that Q′ satisfies the differential privacy constraints and the resulting utility
is also preserved. Precisely, using the fact that Q(y|·) = C Q(y′|·), it follows
that
µ(Qy) + µ(Qy′) = µ((1 + C)Qy) = µ(Q
′
y′′) ,
by the homogeneity of µ. We can naturally define equivalence classes for
staircase mechanisms that are equivalent up to a permutation of columns
and merging/splitting of columns with the same pattern:
[Q] = {Q′ ∈ Sε | ∃a sequence
of permutations and merge/split of columns from Q′ to Q} .
To represent an equivalence class, we use a mechanism in [Q] that is or-
dered and merged to match the patterns of the pattern matrix S(k). For any
staircase mechanism Q, there exists a possibly different staircase mechanism
Q′ ∈ [Q] such that Q′ = S(k)Θ for some diagonal matrix Θ with nonnegative
entries. Therefore, to solve optimization problems of the form (3.9), we can
restrict our attention to such representatives of equivalent classes. Further,
for privatization mechanisms of the form Q = S(k)Θ, the objective function
takes the form
∑
j µ(S
(k)
j )θj, a simple linear function of Θ.
3.4 Private Hypothesis Testing
In this section, we study the fundamental tradeoff between local privacy and
hypothesis testing. In this setting, there are n individuals each with data
Xi from a distribution Pν for a fixed ν ∈ {0, 1}. Let Q be a non-interactive
privatization mechanism guaranteeing ε-local differential privacy. The out-
put of the privatization mechanism Yi is distributed according to the induced
marginal Mν defined in (3.2). With a slight abuse of notation, we will use
Mν and Pν to represent both probability distributions and probability mass
functions. The power to discriminate data from P0 to the data from P1
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depends on the ‘distance’ between the marginals M0 and M1. To measure
the ability of such statistical discrimination, our choice of utility of a priva-
tization mechanism Q is an information theoretic quantity called Csisza´r’s
f -divergence defined as
Df (M0||M1) =
∑
Y
M1(y)f
(M0(y)
M1(y)
)
= U (P0, P1, Q) = U (Q) , (3.13)
for some convex function f such that f(1) = 0. The Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence Dkl(M0||M1) is a special case of f -divergence with f(x) = x log x,
and total variation ‖M0 −M1‖TV is a special case with f(x) = (1/2)|x− 1|.
Note that the f -divergence is not a distance since it might not be symmet-
ric or satisfy triangular inequality. We are interested in characterizing the
optimal solution to
maximize
Q∈Dε
Df (M0||M1) , (3.14)
where Dε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms defined
in (4.7).
A motivating example for this choice of utility is the Neyman-Pearson
hypothesis testing framework [39]. Given the privatized views {Yi}ni=1, the
data analyst wants to test whether they are generated from M0 or M1. Let
the null hypothesis be H0 : Yi’s are generated from M0, and the alternative
hypothesis H1 : Yi’s are generated from M1. For a choice of rejection region
R ⊆ Yn, the probability of false alarm (type I error) is α = Mn0 (R) and
the probability of missed detection (type II error) is β = Mn1 (Yn \ R). Let
βδ = minR⊆Yn,α<α∗ β denote the minimum type II error achievable while
keeping type I error rate at most α∗. According to Chernoff-Stein lemma
[39], we know that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log βα
∗
= −Dkl(M0||M1) .
Suppose the analyst knows P0, P1, and Q. Then in order to achieve optimal
asymptotic error rate, one would want to maximize the KL divergence of
the induced marginals, over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms
Q. The results we present in this section (Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.4 to be
precise) provide an explicit construction of optimal mechanisms in high and
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low privacy regimes. Using those optimality results, we prove a fundamental
limit on the achievable error rates under differential privacy. Precisely, with
data collected from an ε-locally differentially privatization mechanism, one
cannot achieve an asymptotic type II error smaller than
lim
n→∞
1
n
log βα
∗ ≥ −(1 + δ)(e
ε − 1)2
(eε + 1)
‖P0 − P1‖2TV
≥ −(1 + δ)(e
ε − 1)2
2(eε + 1)
Dkl(P0||P1) ,
whenever ε ≤ ε∗, where ε∗ is dictated by Theorem 3.4.1 and δ > 0 is some
positive constant. In the equation above, the second inequality follows from
Pinsker’s inequality. Since (eε− 1)2 = O(ε2) for small ε, the effective sample
size is now reduced from n to ε2n. This is the price of privacy. In the low
privacy regime where ε ≥ ε∗, for ε∗ dictated by Theorem 3.4.4, one cannot
achieve an asymptotic type II error smaller than
lim
n→∞
1
n
log βα
∗ ≥ −Dkl(P0||P1) + (1− δ)G(P0, P1)e−ε .
3.4.1 Optimal staircase mechanisms
From the definition of Df (M0||M1), we have that
Df (M0||M1) =
∑
Y
(P T1 Qy)f(P
T
0 Qy/P
T
1 Qy) =
∑
Y
µ (Qy) ,
where P Tν Qy =
∑
X Pν (x)Q (y|x) and µ (Qy) = (P T1 Qy)f(P T0 Qy/P T1 Qy). For
any γ > 0,
µ (γQy) =
(
P T1 (γQy)
)
f
(
P T0 (γQy) /P
T
1 (γQy)
)
= γ
(
P T1 Qy
)
f
(
P T0 Qy/P
T
1 Qy
)
= γµ (Qy) .
Moreover, since the function φ(z, t) = tf
(
z
t
)
is convex in (z, t) for 0 ≤
z, t ≤ 1, then µ is convex in Qy. Convexity and homogeneity together imply
sublinearity. Therefore, Theorems 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 apply to Df (M0||M1) and
we have that staircases are optimal.
For a given P0 and P1, the binary mechanism is defined as a staircase
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mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying (see Figure 3.2)
Q(0|x) =

eε
1 + eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) ,
1
1 + eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) .
Q(1|x) =

eε
1 + eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) ,
1
1 + eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) . (3.15)
Although this mechanism is extremely simple, perhaps surprisingly, we will
establish that this is the optimal mechanism when a high level of privacy is
required. Intuitively, the output is very noisy in the high privacy regime, and
we are better off sending just one bit of information that tells you whether
your data is more likely to have come from P0 or P1.
Theorem 3.4.1 For any pair of distributions P0 and P1, there exists a pos-
itive ε∗ that depends on P0 and P1 such that for any f -divergences and any
positive ε ≤ ε∗, the binary mechanism maximizes the f -divergence between
the induced marginals over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
This implies that in the high privacy regime, which is a typical setting studied
in much of differential privacy literature, the binary mechanism is a univer-
sally optimal solution for all f -divergences in (3.14). In particular this thresh-
old ε∗ is universal, in that it does not depend on the particular choice of which
f -divergence we are maximizing. This is established by proving a very strong
statistical dominance using Blackwell’s celebrated result on comparisons of
statistical experiments [11]. In a nutshell, we prove that any ε-differentially
private mechanism for sufficiently small ε can be simulated from the output
of the binary mechanism. Hence, the binary mechanism dominates over all
other mechanisms and at the same time achieves the maximum divergence.
A similar idea has been used previously in [24] to exactly characterize how
much privacy degrades under composition.
The optimality of binary mechanisms is not just for high privacy regimes.
The next theorem shows that it is the optimal solution of (3.14) for all ε, when
the objective function is the total variation Df (M0||M1) = ‖M0 −M1‖TV.
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Theorem 3.4.2 For any pair of distributions P0 and P1, and any ε ≥ 0, the
binary mechanism maximizes total variation of the induced marginals M0 and
M1 among all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
When maximizing the KL divergence between the induced marginals, we
show that the binary mechanism still achieves good performance for ε ≤ C
where C now does not depend on P0 and P1. For a special case of KL
divergence, let OPT denote the maximum value of (3.14) and BIN denote
the KL divergence when the binary mechanism is used. The next theorem
shows that
BIN ≥ 1
2(eε + 1)2
OPT .
Theorem 3.4.3 For any ε and for any pair of distributions P0 and P1, the
binary mechanism is an 1/(2(eε + 1)2) approximation of the maximum KL
divergence of the induced marginals M0 and M1 among all ε-locally differen-
tially private mechanisms.
Note that 2(eε + 1)2 ≤ 32 for ε ≤ 1, and for any ε ≤ 1 which is the typical
regime of interest in differential privacy, we can always use the simple binary
mechanism and the resulting divergence is at most a constant factor away
from the optimal.
The randomized response mechanism is defined as a staircase mechanism
with the same set of outputs as the input, Y = X , satisfying (see Figure 3.2)
Q(y|x) =

eε
|X | − 1 + eε if y = x ,
1
|X | − 1 + eε if y 6= x .
(3.16)
It is a randomization over the same alphabet, and we are more likely to
give an honest response. We view it as a multiple choice generalization of
the randomized response method proposed by [21], assuming equal level of
sensitivity for all choices. We establish that this is the optimal mechanism
when a low level of privacy is required. Intuitively, the noise is small in the
low privacy regime, and we want to send as much information about our
current data as allowed, but no more. For a special case of maximizing KL
divergence, we show that the randomized response mechanism is the optimal
solution of (3.14) in the low privacy regime (ε ≥ ε∗).
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Theorem 3.4.4 There exists a positive ε∗ that depends on P0 and P1 such
that for any P0 and P1, and all ε ≥ ε∗, the randomized response mechanism
maximizes the KL divergence between the induced marginals over all ε-locally
differentially private mechanisms.
3.4.2 Numerical experiments
A typical approach for achieving ε-local differential privacy is to add geo-
metric noise with appropriately chosen variance. For an input with alphabet
size |X | = k, this amounts to relabelling the input as integers {1, . . . , k} and
adding geometric noise, i.e., Q(y|x) = ((1−ε1/(k−1))/(1+ε1/(k−1)))ε|y−x|/(k−1).
The output is then truncated at 1 and k to preserve the support.
For 100 instances of randomly chosen P0 and P1 over input alphabet of
size |X | = 6, we compare the average performance of the binary, randomized
response, and the geometric mechanisms to the optimal staircase mechanism.
The optimal staircase mechanism is computed by solving the linear program
in Equation (3.12) for each fixed pair (P0, P1) and ε. We plot (in Figure
3.3, left) the average performance measured by the normalized divergence
Dkl(M0||M1)/Dkl(P0||P1) for all 4 mechanisms. The average is taken over
the 100 instances of P0 and P1. In the low privacy (large ε) regime, the
randomized response achieves optimal performance as predicted, which con-
verges to one. In the high privacy regime (small ε), the binary mechanism
achieves optimal performance as predicted. In all regimes, both mechanisms
significantly improve over the geometric mechanism.
To illustrate how much worse the binary and the randomized response
mechanisms can be (relative to the optimal extremal mechanism), we plot
(in Figure 3.3, right) the divergence under each mechanism normalized by the
divergence under the optimal mechanism. This is done for all 100 instances
of P0 and P1. In all instances, the binary mechanism is optimal for small
ε and the randomized response mechanism is optimal for large ε. However,
Dkl(M0||M1) under the randomized response mechanism can be as bad as
10% of the optimal one (for small ε). Similarly, Dkl(M0||M1)) under the
binary mechanism can be as bad as 25% of the optimal one (for large ε). To
overcome this issue, we propose the following simple strategy: use the better
among these two mechanisms. The performance of this strategy is illustrated
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Figure 3.3: The binary and randomized response mechanisms are optimal
in the high-privacy (small ε) and low-privacy (large ε) regimes, respectively,
and improve over the geometric mechanism significantly (left). When the
regimes are mismatched, Dkl(M0||M1) under these mechanisms can be as
bad as 10% of the optimal one (right).
in Figure 3.4. For various input alphabet size |X | ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, we plot the
performance of this mixed strategy for each value of ε and each of the 100
randomly generated instances of P0 and P1. This mixed strategy achieves
60% of the optimal divergence for all instances. Further, it is not sensitive
to the size of the alphabet k. This strategy provides a good mechanism that
can be readily used in practice for any value of ε.
3.4.3 Lower bounds
In this section, we provide converse results on the fundamental limit of dif-
ferentially private mechanisms; these results follow from our main theorems
and are of independent interest in other applications where lower bounds in
statistical analysis are studied [40, 34, 41, 42]. For example, a bound similar
to the one we present next was used to provide converse results on the sample
complexity for statistical estimation with differentially private data in [22].
Corollary 3.4.5 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P0
and P1 and any positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε
∗ that depends on P0
and P1 and δ such that for any ε ≤ ε∗ the induced marginals M0 and M1
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Figure 3.4: For varying input alphabet size |X | ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, at least 60%
of the optimal divergence can be achieved by taking the better one between
the binary and the randomized response mechanisms.
satisfy the bound
Dkl
(
M0||M1
)
+Dkl
(
M1||M0
) ≤ 2(1 + δ)(eε − 1)2
(eε + 1)
∥∥P0 − P1∥∥2TV .
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This follows from Theorem 3.4.1 and observing that the binary mechanism
achieves
Dkl
(
M0||M1
)
=
(eε − 1)P0(T ) + 1
eε + 1
log
(1 + (eε − 1)P0(T )
1 + (eε − 1)P1(T )
)
+
(eε − 1)P0(T c) + 1
eε + 1
log
(1 + (eε − 1)P0(T c)
1 + (eε − 1)P1(T c)
)
=
(eε − 1)2
eε + 1
(P0(T )− P1(T )) +O(ε3)
=
(eε − 1)2
eε + 1
∥∥P0 − P1∥∥2TV +O(ε3) , (3.17)
where T ⊆ X is the set of x such that P0(x) ≥ P1(x). Compared to [22,
Theorem 1], we recover their bound of 4(eε − 1)2‖P0 − P1‖2TV with a smaller
constant. We want to note that Duchi et al.’s bound holds for all values of
ε and uses a different technique of bounding the KL divergence directly, but
no achievable mechanism has been provided. We instead provide an explicit
mechanism that is optimal in the high privacy regime.
Similarly, in the low privacy regime, we can show the following converse
result.
Corollary 3.4.6 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P0
and P1 and any positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε
∗ that depends on P0
and P1 and δ such that for any ε ≥ ε∗ the induced marginals M0 and M1
satisfy the bound
Dkl
(
M0||M1
)
+Dkl
(
M1||M0
) ≤ Dkl(P0||P1)− (1− δ)G(P0, P1)e−ε ,
where G(P0, P1) =
∑
X (1− P0(x)) log(P1(x)/P0(x)).
This follows directly from Theorem 3.4.4 and observing that the randomized
response mechanism achieves
Dkl(M0||M1) = Dkl(P0||P1)−G(P0, P1)e−ε +O(e−2ε) . (3.18)
Similarly, for total variation, we can get the following converse result.
This follows from Theorem 3.4.2 and explicitly computing the total variation
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achieved by the binary mechanism.
Corollary 3.4.7 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any pair of distributions P0
and P1, the induced marginals M0 and M1 satisfy the bound
∥∥M0−M1∥∥TV ≤
((eε − 1)/(eε + 1)) ∥∥P0−P1∥∥TV , and equality is achieved by the binary mech-
anism.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the gap between the divergence achieved by the geo-
metric mechanism described in the previous section and the optimal mecha-
nisms (the binary mechanism for the high privacy regime and the randomized
response mechanism for the low privacy regime). For each instance of the
100 randomly generated P0 and P1 over input of size k = 6, we plot the
resulting divergence Dkl(M0||M1) as a function of ‖P0 − P1‖TV for ε = 0.1,
and as a function of Dkl(P0||P1) for ε = 10. The binary and the randomized
response mechanisms exhibit the scaling predicted by Equation (3.17) and
(3.18), respectively.
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Figure 3.5: For small ε = 0.1 (left) the binary mechanism achieves the
optimal KL divergence, which scales as Equation (3.17). For large ε = 10
(right) the randomized response achieves the optimal KL divergence, which
scales as Equation (3.18). Both mechanisms improve significantly over the
geometric mechanism.
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3.5 Information Preservation
In this section, we study the fundamental tradeoff between local privacy and
mutual information. Consider a random variable X distributed according to
P . The information content in X is captured by entropy
H (X) = −
∑
X
P (x) logP (x) .
We are interested in releasing a differentially private version of X represented
by Y . The random variable Y should preserve the information content of X
as much as possible while meeting the local differential privacy constraints.
Similar to the hypothesis testing setting, we will show that a variant of the
binary mechanism is optimal in the high privacy regime and the randomized
response mechanism is optimal in the low privacy regime.
Let Q be a non-interactive privatization mechanism guaranteeing ε-local
differential privacy. The output of the privatization mechanism Y is dis-
tributed according to the induced marginal M given by
M(S) =
∑
x∈X
Q(S|x)P (x) ,
for S ⊆ Y . With a slight abuse of notation, we will use M and P to represent
both probability distributions and probability mass functions. The informa-
tion content in Y about X is captured by the well celebrated information
theoretic quantity called mutual information. The mutual information be-
tween X and Y is given by
I (X;Y ) =
∑
X
∑
Y
P (x)Q (y|x) log
(
Q (y|x)∑
l∈X P (l)Q (y|l)
)
= U (Q) . (3.19)
Notice that I (X;Y ) ≤ H (X) and I (X;Y ) is convex in Q [39]. To preserve
the information context in X, we wish to choose a privatization mechanism
Q such that the mutual information between X and Y is maximized sub-
ject to differential privacy constraints. In other words, we are interested in
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characterizing the optimal solution to
maximize
Q
I (X;Y )
subject to Q ∈ Dε
, (3.20)
where Dε is the set of all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms defined in
(4.7). The above mutual information maximization problem can be thought
of as a conditional entropy minimization problem since I (X;Y ) = H (X)−
H (X|Y ).
3.5.1 Optimal staircase mechanisms
From the definition of I (X;Y ), we have that
I (X;Y ) =
∑
Y
∑
X
P (x)Q (y|x) log
(
Q (y|x)
P TQy
)
=
∑
Y
µ (Qy) ,
where P TQy =
∑
X P (x)Q (y|x) and
µ (Qy) =
∑
X
P (x)Q (y|x) log (Q (y|x) /P TQy) .
Notice that µ (γQy) = γµ (Qy), and by the log-sum inequality, µ is convex.
Convexity and homogeneity together imply sublinearity. Therefore, Theo-
rems 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 apply to I (X;Y ) and we have that staircase mechanisms
are optimal.
For a given P , the binary mechanism for mutual information is defined as
a staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} (see Figure 3.2). Let
T ⊆ X be the set that partitions X into two partitions, T and T c, such that
|P (T )− P (T c)| is minimized. Precisely,
T ∈ arg min
A⊆X
∣∣∣P (A)− 1
2
∣∣∣ . (3.21)
Observe that there are always multiple choices for T . Indeed, for any mini-
mizing set T , T c is also a minimizing set since |P (T )− 1/2| = |P (T c)− 1/2|.
When there is only one such pair, the binary mechanism is uniquely defined
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as
Q(0|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if x ∈ T ,
1
1+eε
if x /∈ T . Q(1|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if x /∈ T ,
1
1+eε
if x ∈ T . (3.22)
When there are multiple pairs, any pair (T, T c) can be chosen to define the
binary mechanism. All resulting binary mechanisms are equivalent from a
utility maximization perspective.
In what follows, we will establish that this simple mechanism is the optimal
mechanism in the high privacy regime. Intuitively, in the high privacy regime,
we cannot release more than one bit of information, and hence, the input al-
phabet is reduced to a binary output alphabet. In this case we have to maxi-
mize the information contained in the released bit by maximizing its entropy:
T ∈ arg max
A⊆X
(− P (A) logP (A)− P (Ac) logP (Ac)) = arg max
A⊆X
|P (A)− 1/2|.
Theorem 3.5.1 For any distribution P , there exists a positive ε∗ that de-
pends on P such that for any positive ε ≤ ε∗, the binary mechanism maxi-
mizes the mutual information between the input and the output of a privati-
zation mechanism over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
This implies that in the high privacy regime, the binary mechanism is the
optimal solution for (3.20).
Next, we show that the binary mechanism achieves near-optimal perfor-
mance for all (X , P ) and ε ≤ 1 even when ε∗ < 1. Let OPT denote the
maximum value of (3.20) and BIN denote the mutual information achieved
by the binary mechanism given in (3.22). The next theorem shows that
BIN ≥ 1
1 + eε
OPT .
Theorem 3.5.2 For any ε ≤ 1 and any distribution P , the binary mech-
anism is an (1 + eε)-approximation of the maximum mutual information
between the input and the output of a privatization mechanism among all
ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
Note that 1 + eε ≤ 4 for ε ≤ 1 which is a commonly studied regime in
differential privacy applications. Therefore, we can always use the simple
binary mechanism and the resulting mutual information is at most a constant
factor away from the optimal.
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Figure 3.6: The binary and randomized response mechanisms are optimal
in the high-privacy (small ε) and low-privacy (large ε) regimes, respectively,
and improve over the geometric mechanism significantly (left). When the
regimes are mismatched, I (X;Y ) under these mechanisms can each be as
bad as 35% of the optimal one (right).
In the low privacy regime (ε ≥ ε∗), the randomized response mechanism
defined in(3.16) is optimal.
Theorem 3.5.3 There exists a positive ε∗ that depends on P such that for
any distribution P and all ε ≥ ε∗, the randomized response mechanism max-
imizes the mutual information between the input and the output of as priva-
tization mechanism over all ε-locally differentially private mechanisms.
3.5.2 Numerical experiments
For 100 instances of randomly chosen P defined over input alphabet of size
|X | = 6, we compare the average performance of the binary, randomized
response, and the geometric mechanisms to the optimal mechanism. We plot
(in Figure 3.6, left) the average performance measured by the normalized
mutual information I (X;Y )/H (X) for all 4 mechanisms. The average is
taken over the 100 instances of P . In the low privacy (large ε) regime,
the randomized response achieves optimal performance as predicted, which
converges to one. In the high privacy regime (small ε), the binary mechanism
achieves optimal performance as predicted. In all regimes, both mechanisms
significantly improve over the geometric mechanism. To illustrate how much
worse the binary and randomized response mechanisms can be (relative to
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the optimal staircase mechanism), we plot (in Figure 3.6, right) the mutual
information under each mechanism normalized by the mutual information
under the optimal staircase mechanism. This is done for all 100 instances
of P . In all instances, the binary mechanism is optimal for small ε and the
randomized response mechanism is optimal for large ε. However, I (X;Y )
under the randomized response mechanism can be as bad as 35% of the
optimal one (for small ε). Similarly, I (X;Y ) under the binary mechanism
can be as bad as 40% of the optimal one (for large ε).
For |X | ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, we plot (in Figure 3.7) the performance of the better
between the binary and randomized response mechanisms normalized by the
optimal mechanism for all 100 randomly generated instances of P . This
mixed strategy achieves at least 75% of the optimal mutual infirmation for
all instances of P . Moreover, it is not sensitive to the size of the alphabet
|X |.
3.5.3 Lower bounds
In this section, we provide converse results on the fundamental limit of lo-
cally differentially private mechanisms when utility is measured via mutual
information.
Corollary 3.5.4 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any distribution P and any
positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε∗ that depends on P and δ such that
for any ε ≤ ε∗ the following bound holds:
I (X;Y ) ≤ (1 + δ)1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2,
where T is defined in (3.21).
This follows from Theorem 3.5.1 (optimality of the binary mechanism) and
observing that the binary mechanism achieves I (X;Y ) equal to
1
eε + 1
{
P (T ) eε log
eε
P (T c) + eεP (T )
+ P (T c) log
1
P (T c) + eεP (T )
}
+
1
eε + 1
{
P (T c) eε log
eε
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
+ P (T ) log
1
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
}
=
1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
. (3.23)
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Figure 3.7: For varying input alphabet size |X | ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}, at least 75%
of the maximum mutual information can be achieved by taking the better
one between the binary and the randomized response mechanisms.
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Similarly, in the low privacy regime, we can show the following converse
result.
Corollary 3.5.5 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε-local differential privacy. Then, for any distributions P and any
positive δ > 0, there exists a positive ε∗ that depends on P and δ such that
for any ε ≥ ε∗ the following bound holds
I (X;Y ) ≤ H (X)− (1− δ) (k − 1) εe−ε.
This follows directly from Theorem 3.5.3 (optimality of the randomized re-
sponse mechanism) and observing that the randomized response mechanism
achieves
I (X;Y ) = H (X)− (k − 1) εe−ε +O(e−2ε). (3.24)
Figure 3.8 illustrates the gap between the mutual information achieved by
the geometric mechanism and the optimal mechanisms (the binary mecha-
nism for the high privacy regime and the randomized response mechanism
for the low privacy regime). For each instance of the 100 randomly generated
P over input of size k = 6, we plot the resulting mutual information I (X;Y )
as a function of P (T )P (T c) for ε = 0.1, and as a function of H (X) for
ε = 10. The binary and the randomized response mechanisms exhibit the
scaling predicted by Equations (3.23) and (3.24), respectively.
3.6 Approximate Local Differential Privacy
In this section, we generalize the results of the previous sections in the fol-
lowing ways:
1. We consider the class of utility functions that obey the data processing
inequality. Consider the composition of two privatization mechanisms
QW = Q ◦W where the output of the first mechanism Q is applied
to another mechanism W . We say that a utility function U(·) obeys
the data processing inequality if the following inequality holds for all
53
 0
 0.0002
 0.0004
 0.0006
 0.0008
 0.001
 0.0012
 0.0014
 0.0016
 0.0018
 0.002
 0.16  0.17  0.18  0.19  0.2  0.21  0.22  0.23  0.24  0.25
binary mechanism
geometric mechanism
I (X;Y )
P (T )P (T c)
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 2
 2.2
 2.4
 2.6
 0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2  2.2  2.4  2.6
randomized response
geometric mechanism
I (X;Y )
H (X)
Figure 3.8: For small ε = 0.1 (left) the binary mechanism achieves the
optimal mutual information, which scales as Equation (3.23). For large
ε = 10 (right) the randomized response mechanism achieves the optimal
mutual information, which scales as Equation (3.24). Both mechanisms
improve significantly over the geometric mechanism.
Q and W :
U(QW ) ≤ U(Q) .
The following proposition, proved in [43], shows that the class of utili-
ties obeying the data processing inequality includes all the utility func-
tions we studied in Section 3.3.
Proposition 3.6.1 Any utility function that can be written in the form
of U (Q) =
∑
Y µ(Qy), where µ is any sublinear function, obeys the data
processing inequality.
2. We consider (ε, δ)-differential privacy which generalizes the notion of
ε-differential privacy. (ε, δ)-differential privacy is commonly referred to
as approximate differential privacy and it was first introduced in [9].
For the release of a random variable X ∈ X , we say that a mechanism
Q is (ε, δ)-locally differentially private if
Q (S|x) ≤ eεQ (S|x′) + δ, (3.25)
for all S ⊆ Y and all x, x′ ∈ X . Note that ε-local differential privacy is
a special case of (ε, δ)-local differential privacy where δ = 0.
54
3. We prove that the quaternary mechanism, defined in Equation (3.26),
is optimal for any ε and any δ. This is different from the treatment
conducted in the previous sections where we proved the optimality
of the binary (randomized response) mechanism for sufficiently small
(large) ε and δ = 0.
The treatment in this section, even though more general than the one in pre-
vious sections in the ways described above, holds only for binary alphabets
(i.e., |X | = 2). Finding optimal privatization mechanisms under (ε, δ)-local
differential privacy for larger input alphabets (i.e., |X | > 2) is an interest-
ing open question. Unlike ε-local differential privacy, the privacy constraints
under (ε, δ)-local differential privacy no longer decompose into separate con-
straints on each output y. This makes it difficult to generalize the techniques
developed in previous sections of this chapter. However, for the special case
of binary input alphabets, we can prove the optimality of one mechanism
for all values of (ε, δ) and all utility functions that obey the data processing
inequality.
For a binary random variable X ∈ X = {0, 1}, the quaternary mechanism
maps X to a quaternary random variable Y ∈ Y = {0, 1, 2, 3} and is defined
as
QQT(0|x) =
{
δ if x = 0 ,
0 if x = 1 ,
QQT(1|x) =
{
0 if x = 0 ,
δ if x = 1 ,
QQT(2|x) =

(1− δ) 1
1 + eε
if x = 0 ,
(1− δ) e
ε
1 + eε
if x = 1 ,
QQT(3|x) =

(1− δ) e
ε
1 + eε
if x = 0 ,
(1− δ) 1
1 + eε
if x = 1 .
(3.26)
In other words, the quaternary mechanism passes X unchanged with prob-
ability δ and applies the binary mechanism (defined in previous sections) with
probability 1 − δ. The main result of this section can be stated formally as
follows.
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Figure 3.9: The quaternary mechanism
Theorem 3.6.1 If |X | = 2, then for any ε, any δ, and any U (Q) that
obeys the data processing inequality, the quaternary mechanism maximizes
U (Q) subject to Q ∈ D(ε,δ), the set of all (ε, δ)-locally differentially private
mechanism.
The proof of Theorem 3.6.1 depends on an operational definition of differ-
ential privacy which we describe next. Consider a privatization mechanism
Q that maps X ∈ {0, 1} stochastically to Y ∈ Y . Given Y , construct a
binary hypothesis test on whether X = 0 or X = 1. Any binary hypoth-
esis test is completely described by a (possibly randomized) decision rule
Xˆ : Y → {0, 1}. The two types of error associated with Xˆ are false alarm:
Xˆ = 1 when X = 0, and missed detection: Xˆ = 0 when X = 1. The proba-
bility of false alarm is given by PFA = P(Xˆ = 1|X = 0) while the probability
of missed detection is given by PMD = P(Xˆ = 0|X = 1). For a fixed Q,
the convex hull of all pairs (PMD, PFA) for all decision rules Xˆ defines a two-
dimensional error region where PMD is plotted against PFA. For example, the
quaternary mechanism given in Figure 3.9a has an error region RQQT shown
in Figure 4.1.
It turns out that (ε, δ)-local differential privacy imposes the following con-
ditions on the error region of all (ε, δ)-locally differentially private mecha-
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nisms:
PFA + e
εPMD ≥ 1− δ , and eεPFA + PMD ≥ 1− δ ,
for any decision rule Xˆ. These two conditions define an error region Rε,δ
shown in Figure 4.1. Interestingly, the next theorem shows that the converse
result is also true.
Theorem 3.6.2 A mechanism Q is (ε, δ)-locally differentially private if and
only if RQ ⊆ Rε,δ.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in [24]. Notice that it is no
coincidence that RQQT = Rε,δ. This property will be essential to proving the
optimality of the quaternary mechanism.
Theorem 3.6.2 allows us to benefit from the data processing inequality
(DPI) and its converse, which follows from a celebrated result by [11]. These
inequalities, while simple by themselves, lead to surprisingly strong technical
results. Indeed, there is a long line of such a tradition in the information
theory literature (see Chapter 17 of [39]). Consider two privatization mech-
anisms, Q(1) and Q(2). Let Y and Z denote the output of the mechanisms
Q(1) and Q(2), respectively. We say that Q(1) dominates Q(2) if there exists
a coupling of Y and Z such that X–Y –Z forms a Markov chain. In other
words, we say Q(1) dominates Q(2) if there exists a stochastic mapping Q
such that Q(2) = Q(1) ◦Q.
Theorem 3.6.3 A mechanism Q(1) dominates a mechanism Q(2) if and only
if RQ(2) ⊆ RQ(1).
The proof of the above theorem can be found in [11]. Observe that by
Theorems 3.6.3 and 3.6.2, and the fact that RQQT = Rε,δ, the quaternary
mechanism dominates any other differentially private mechanism. In other
words, for any differentially private mechanism Q, there exists a stochastic
mapping W such that Q = W ◦ QQT. Therefore, for any (ε, δ) and any
utility function U(.) obeying the data processing inequality, we have that
U(Q) ≤ U(QQT). This finishes the proof of Theorem 3.6.1.
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3.7 Conclusions and Summary
In this chapter, we have considered a broad class of convex utility functions
and assumed a setting where individuals cannot collaborate (communicate
with each other) before releasing their data. We showed that staircase mech-
anisms are optimal for a broad class of information theoretic utility functions
such as mutual information and f -divergences. We also considered private bi-
nary hypothesis testing and information preservation, two canonical problems
with a wide range of applications. Binary hypothesis testing and information
preservation are two canonical problems with a wide range of applications.
However, there are a number of non-trivial and interesting extensions to our
work. These extensions are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
It turns out that the techniques we have developed in this chapter can
be generalized to find optimal privatization mechanisms in a setting where
different individuals can collaborate interactively and each individual can be
an analyst. This is precisely the topic of Chapter 4
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CHAPTER 4
MULTI-PARTY DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
4.1 Introduction
Multi-party computation (MPC) is a generic framework where multiple par-
ties share their information in an interactive fashion towards the goal of com-
puting some functions, potentially different at each of the parties. In many
situations of common interest, the key challenge is in computing the functions
as privately as possible, i.e., without revealing much about one’s information
to the other (potentially colluding) parties. For instance, an interactive vot-
ing system aims to compute the majority of (say, binary) opinions of each of
the parties, with each party being averse to declaring their opinion publicly.
Another example involves banks sharing financial risk exposures – the banks
need to agree on quantities such as the overnight lending rate which depends
on each bank’s exposure, which is a quantity the banks are naturally loath to
truthfully disclose [44]. A central learning theory question involves character-
izing the fundamental limits of interactive information exchange such that a
strong (and suitably defined) adversary only learns as little as possible while
still ensuring that the desired functions can be computed as accurately as
possible.
One way to formulate the privacy requirement is to ensure that each party
learns nothing more about the others’ information than can be learned from
the output of the function computed. This topic is studied under the rubric
of secure function evaluation (SFE); the SFE formulation has been exten-
sively studied with the goal of characterizing which functions can be securely
evaluated [45, 46, 47, 48]. One drawback of SFE is that depending on what
auxiliary information the adversary might have, disclosing the exact function
output might reveal each party’s data. For example, consider computing the
average of the data owned by all the parties. Even if we use SFE, a party’s
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data can be recovered if all the other parties collaborate. To ensure protec-
tion of the private data under such a strong adversary, we want to impose
the stronger privacy guarantee of differential privacy. Recent breaches of
sensitive information about individuals due to linkage attacks prove the vul-
nerability of existing ad-hoc privatization schemes, such as anonymization
of the records. In linkage attacks, an adversary matches up anonymized
records containing sensitive information with public records in a different
dataset. Such attacks have revealed the medical record of a former governor
of Massachusetts [49], the purchase history of Amazon users [50], genomic
information [51], and movie viewing history of Netflix users [52].
An alternative formulation is differential privacy, a relatively recent for-
mulation that has received considerable attention as a formal mathematical
notion of privacy that provides protection against such strong adversaries
(a recent survey is available at [53]). The basic idea is to introduce enough
randomness in the communication so that an adversary possessing arbitrary
side information and access to the entire transcript of the communication
will still have some residual uncertainty in identifying any of the bits of the
parties. This privacy requirement is strong enough that non-trivial func-
tions will be computed only with some error. Thus, there is a great need
for understanding the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and accuracy,
and for designing privatization mechanisms and communication protocols
that achieve the optimal tradeoffs. The formulation and study of an optimal
framework addressing this tradeoff is the focus of this chapter.
We study the following problem of multi-party computation under dif-
ferential privacy: each party possesses a single bit of information and the
information bits are statistically independent. Each party is interested in
computing a function, which could differ from party to party, and there
could be a central observer (observing the entire transcript of the interac-
tive communication protocol) interested in computing a separate function.
Performance at each party and the central observer is measured via the ac-
curacy of the function to be computed. We allow an arbitrary cost metric to
measure the distortion between the true and the computed function values.
Each party imposes a differential privacy constraint on its information bit
(the privacy level could be different from party to party) – i.e., there remains
an uncertainty in any specific party’s bit even to an adversary that has access
to the transcript of interactions and all the other parties’ bits. The inter-
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active communication is achieved via a broadcast channel that all parties
and the central observer can hear (this modeling is without loss of generality
since differential privacy protects against an adversary that can listen to the
entire transcript, the communication between any two parties might as well
be revealed to all the others). It is useful to distinguish between two types
of communication protocols: interactive and non-interactive. We say a com-
munication protocol is non-interactive if a message broadcasted by one party
does not depend on the messages broadcasted by other parties. In contrast,
interactive protocols allow the messages at any stage of the communication
to depend on all the previous messages.
4.1.1 Our contributions
Our main result is the exact optimality of a simple non-interactive protocol
in terms of maximizing accuracy for any given privacy levels: each party
randomizes (sufficiently) its own bit and broadcasts the noisy version. Each
party and the central observer then separately compute their respective deci-
sion functions to maximize the appropriate notion of their accuracy measure.
The optimality is general: it holds for all types of functions, heterogeneous
privacy conditions on the parties, all types of cost metrics, and both average
and worst-case (over the inputs) measures of accuracy. Finally, the optimal-
ity result is simultaneous, in terms of maximizing accuracy at each of the
parties and the central observer. Each party only needs to know its own
desired level of privacy, its own function to be computed, and its measure of
accuracy. Optimal data release and optimal decision making are naturally
separated.
4.1.2 Related work
Private MPC was first addressed in [54]. The study of accuracy-privacy
tradeoffs in the MPC context was first initiated by [40], which studies a
paradigm where differential privacy and secure function evaluation (SFE) co-
exist: the function to be computed is decided on using differentially private
schemes and the method to compute it is decided on using SFE. Specific
functions, such as the SUM function, were studied under this setting, but no
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exact optimality results were provided.
In the context of two parties, privacy-accuracy tradeoffs have been studied
in [55, 56] where a single function is computed by a “third-party” observing
the transcript of the interactive protocol. [55] constructs natural functions
that can only be computed very coarsely (using a natural notion of accuracy)
when compared to a client-server model (which is essentially the single party
setting). [56] shows that every any non-trivial privacy setting incurs some
loss in the accuracy of a non-trivial Boolean function. Further, focusing on
the specific scenario where each one of the two parties has a single bit of
information, [56] characterizes the exact accuracy-privacy tradeoff for AND
and XOR functions; the corresponding optimal protocol turns out to be non-
interactive. However, this result was derived under some assumptions: only
two parties are involved, the central observer is the only entity that computes
a function, the function has to be either XOR or AND, symmetric privacy
conditions are used for both parties, and accuracy is measured only as worst-
case over the four possible inputs. Further, their analysis techniques do not
generalize to the case when there are more than two parties.
Function approximation has been widely studied in the differential privacy
literature under a centralized model where there is a single trusted entity
owning a statistical database over a large number of individuals. In the cen-
tralized model, an algorithm is called interactive if it involves multiple rounds
of communications between the server and the client. Under this centralized
model, statistical learning has also been widely studied in differential privacy,
e.g., classification [57, 58], k-means clustering [59], and principal component
analysis [31, 60, 32, 33]. In particular, it has been shown in [57] that under
the centralized setting, there exists a class of concepts that is efficiently learn-
able by interactive algorithms whereas a non-interactive algorithm requires
exponential number of samples. In contrast, we consider a multi-party set-
ting where the privacy barrier is place before each individual. In multi-party
computation, all communication happens in multiple rounds, and a protocol
is called interactive if one party’s message depends on other party’s previous
messages. In this sense, the notion of interaction in multi-party computa-
tion is significantly different from what has been previously studied under
centralized client-server settings.
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4.2 Private Multi-Party Computation
Consider the setting where there are k parties, each with its own private
binary data xi ∈ {0, 1} generated independently. The independence assump-
tion here is necessary because without it each party can learn something
about others, which violates differential privacy, even without revealing any
information. Differential privacy implicitly imposes independence in a multi-
party setting. The goal of each party i ∈ [k] is to compute an arbitrary
function fi : {0, 1}k → Y of interest by interactively broadcasting messages.
There might be a central observer who listens to all the messages being broad-
casted, and wants to compute another arbitrary function f0 : {0, 1} → Y .
The k parties are honest in the sense that once they agree on what protocol
to follow, every party follows the rules. At the same time, they can be cu-
rious, and each party needs to ensure that other parties cannot learn its bit
with sufficient confidence. This is done by imposing local differential privacy
constraints. This setting is similar to the one studied in [22] in the sense
that there are multiple privacy barriers, each one separating an individual
party from the rest of the world. However, the main difference is that we
consider multi-party computation, where there are multiple functions to be
computed, and each node might possess a different function to be computed.
Let x = [x1, . . . , xk] ∈ {0, 1}k denote the vector of k bits, and x−i =
[x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xk] ∈ {0, 1}k−1 be the vector of bits except for the
ith bit. The parties agree on an interactive protocol P to achieve the goal of
multi-party computation. A ‘transcript’ τ is the output of P , and it contains
the sequence of messages exchanged between the parties. Let the probability
that a transcript τ is broadcasted (via a series of interactive communica-
tions) when the data is x be denoted by Px,τ = P(τ |x) for x ∈ {0, 1}k
and for τ ∈ T . Then, a protocol can be represented as a matrix denoting
the probability distribution over a set of transcripts T conditioned on x:
P = [Px,τ ] ∈ [0, 1]2k×|T |.
In the end, each party makes a decision on what the value of function fi is,
based on its own bit xi and the transcript τ that was broadcasted. A decision
rule is a mapping from a transcript τ ∈ T and private bit xi ∈ {0, 1} to a
decision y ∈ Y represented by a function fˆi(τ, xi). We allow randomized
decision rules, in which case fˆi(τ, xi) can be a random variable. For the
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central observer, a decision rule is a function of just the transcript, denoted
by a function fˆ0(τ).
We consider two notions of accuracy: the average accuracy and the worst-
case accuracy. For the ith party, consider an accuracy measure wi : Y ×
Y → R (or equivalently a negative cost function) such that wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))
measures the accuracy when the function to be computed is fi(x) and the
approximation is fˆi(τ, xi). Then the average accuracy for this i
th party is
defined as
ACCave(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ (4.1)
1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] ,
where the expectation is taken over the random transcript τ and any ran-
domness in the decision function fˆi. For example, if the accuracy measure is
an indicator such that wi(y, y
′) = I(y=y′), then ACCave measures the average
probability of getting the correct function output. For a given protocol P , it
takes (2k |T |) operations to compute the optimal decision rule:
f ∗i,ave(τ, xi) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y) , (4.2)
for each i ∈ [k]. The computational cost of (2k |T |) for computing the optimal
decision rule is unavoidable in general, since that is the inherent complexity of
the problem: describing the distribution of the transcript requires the same
cost. We will show that the optimal protocol requires a set of transcripts
of size |T | = 2k, and the computational complexity of the decision rule for
a general function is 22k. However, for a fixed protocol, this decision rule
needs to be computed only once before any message is transmitted. Further,
it is also possible to find a closed form solution for the decision rule when f
has a simple structure. One example is the XOR function where the optimal
decision rule is as simple as evaluating the XOR of all the received bits,
which requires O(k) operations. When there are multiple maximizers y, we
can choose either one of them arbitrarily, and it follows that there is no gain
in randomizing the decision rule for average accuracy.
64
Similarly, the worst-case accuracy is defined as
ACCwc(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ (4.3)
min
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] .
For worst-case accuracy, given a protocol P , the optimal decision rule of
the ith party with a bit xi can be computed by solving the following convex
program:
Q(xi) = (4.4)
arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y)Qτ,y
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0.
The optimal (random) decision rule f ∗i,wc(τ, xi) is to output y given transcript
τ according to P(y|τ, xi) = Q(xi)τ,y . This can be formulated as a linear program
with |T | × |Y| variables and 2k+ |T | constraints. Again, it is possible to find
a closed form solution for the decision rule when f has a simple structure:
for the XOR function, the optimal decision rule is again evaluating the XOR
of all the received bits requiring O(k) operations.
For a central observer, the accuracy measures are defined similarly, and the
optimal decision rule is now
f ∗0,ave(τ) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y) , (4.5)
and for worst-case accuracy the optimal (random) decision rule f ∗0,wc(τ) is to
output y given transcript τ according to P(y|τ) = Q(0)τ,y.
Q(0) = (4.6)
arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x∈{0,1}k
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y)Qτ,y
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0,
where w0 : Y × Y → R is the measure of accuracy for the central observer.
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4.3 Differentially Private Multi-Party Computation
Privacy is measured by approximate differential privacy [6, 7]. Since we allow
for heterogeneous privacy constraints across parties, we use (εi, δi) to denote
the desired privacy level of the ith party. We say that a protocol P is (εi, δi)-
differentially private for the ith party if for xi, x
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, x−i ∈ {0, 1}k−1,
and S ⊆ T , we have that
P(τ ∈ S|xi, x−i) ≤ eεi P(τ ∈ S|x′i, x−i) + δi . (4.7)
A mechanism P is differentially private if it is (εi, δi)-differentially private for
all i ∈ [k]. Differential privacy ensures that no adversary can infer the private
data xi with high enough confidence, no matter what auxiliary information
or computational power she might have.
Consider the following simple protocol known as the randomized response,
which is a term first coined by [21] and commonly used in many private com-
munications including the multi-party setting [55]. We will show in Section
4.4 that this is the optimal protocol that simultaneously maximizes the ac-
curacy for all the parties. Each party broadcasts a randomized version of its
bit denoted by x˜i such that
x˜i =

0 if xi = 0 with probability δi ,
1 if xi = 0 with probability
(1− δi)eεi
1 + eεi
,
2 if xi = 0 with probability
(1− δi)
1 + eεi
,
3 if xi = 0 with probability 0 ,
x˜i =

0 if xi = 1 with probability 0 ,
1 if xi = 1 with probability
(1− δi)
1 + eεi
,
2 if xi = 1 with probability
(1− δi)eεi
1 + eεi
,
3 if xi = 1 with probability δi .
(4.8)
The proof of optimality of this randomized response depends on an opera-
tional definition of differential privacy which we now present.
66
FAP
MDP
1 i
1
0
10 1 i
1
1 i
i
e


1
1 i
i
e


0.5
0.5
R(PRR, xi = 0, xi = 1)
=
R(εi, δi)
Figure 4.1: Error region dictated by (εi, δi)-differential privacy
Given a broadcasted transcript τ and x−i (all private bits except for xi),
construct a binary hypothesis test on whether xi = 0 or xi = 1. A binary
hypothesis test is completely characterized by a (possibly randomized) deci-
sion rule xˆi : (τ, x−i)→ {0, 1}. The two types of error associated with xˆi are:
(1) false alarm: xˆi = 1 when xi = 0, and (2) missed detection: xˆi = 0 when
xi = 1. The probability of false alarm is given by PFA = P(xˆi = 1|xi = 0)
while the probability of missed detection is given by PMD = P(xˆi = 0|xi = 1).
For a fixed privacy protocol P , the convex hull of all pairs (PMD, PFA) for all
decision rules xˆi defines a two-dimensional error region where PMD is plotted
against PFA. For example, the randomized response mechanism PRR given
in (4.8) has an error region R(PRR, xi = 0, xi = 1) shown in Figure 4.1.
The differential privacy constraints in Equation (4.7) impose the following
conditions on the error regions of all (εi, δi)-differentially private protocols:
PFA + e
εiPMD ≥ 1− δi,
eεiPFA + PMD ≥ 1− δi,
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for any decision rule xˆi and any i ∈ [k]. The above two conditions define an
error region R(εi, δi) shown in Figure 4.1. Interestingly, the next theorem
shows that the converse result is also true.
Lemma 4.3.1 A mechanism P is differentially private if and only ifR(P, xi =
0, xi = 1) ⊆ R(εi, δi) for all i ∈ [k].
The proof of the above lemma can be found in [43] (see Corollary 2.3 on page
4). Notice that it is no coincidence that R(PRR, xi = 0, xi = 1) = R(εi, δi)
(see Figure 4.1). This property will be essential in proving the optimality of
the randomized response.
Lemma 4.3.1 allows us to benefit from the data processing inequality (DPI)
and its converse, which follows from a celebrated result by [11]. These in-
equalities, while simple by themselves, lead to surprisingly strong technical
results. Indeed, there is a long line of such a tradition in the information
theory literature (see Chapter 17 of [39]).
Recall that τ contains the sequence of messages broadcasted by all k parties.
Let τ(i) represent the messages broadcasted by the ith party and observe
that τ = {τ(1), · · · , τ(k)}. Consider two privatization protocols, P1 and
P2, and let τ1 and τ2 denote the output transcripts under protocols P1 and
P2, respectively. We say that P1 dominates P2 if there exists a sequence of
stochastic transformations {W1, · · · ,Wk} such that for all i ∈ [k], given x−i,
τ2 can be simulated by applying Wi to τ1(i) and x−i. In other words, given
x−i, Wi(τ1(i), x−i) has the same distribution as τ2 .
Lemma 4.3.2 A multi-party privacy protocol P1 dominates a protocol P2 if
and only if R(P2, xi = 0, xi = 1) ⊆ R(P1, xi = 0, xi = 1) for all i ∈ [k].
The proof of the above lemma can be found in [11]. Lemma 4.3.2 will be
critical in proving the optimality of the randomized response.
Corollary 4.3.3 Any differentially private protocol P is dominated by the
randomized response PRR given in Equation (4.8). Therefore, there exists a
sequence of stochastic transformations {W1, · · · ,Wk} such that Wi(x˜i, x−i)
has the same distribution as τ for all i ∈ [k].
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Corollary 4.3.3 follows from Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.2, and the fact that
R(εi, δi) = R(PRR, xi = 0, xi = 1) for all i ∈ [k].
4.4 Optimal Mechanisms for Multi-Party Differential
Privacy
We show, perhaps surprisingly, that the simple randomized response pre-
sented in (4.8) is the unique optimal protocol in a very general sense.
Theorem 4.4.1 Let the optimal decision rule be defined as in (4.2) for the
average accuracy and (4.5) for the worst-case accuracy. Then, for any pri-
vacy levels (εi, δi), any function fi : {0, 1}k → Y, and any accuracy measure
wi : Y × Y → R for i ∈ [k], together with the optimal decision rule, the
randomized response achieves the maximum accuracy for the ith party among
all differentially private interactive and non-interactive protocols. For the
central observer, the randomized response with the optimal decision rule de-
fined in (4.5) and (4.7) achieves the maximum accuracy among all {(εi, δi)}-
differentially private interactive protocols and all decision rules for any arbi-
trary function f0 and any measure of accuracy w0.
This is a strong optimality result. Every party and the central observer can
simultaneously achieve the optimal accuracy, using a universal randomized
response. Each party only needs to know its own desired level of privacy, its
own function to be computed, and its measure of accuracy. Optimal data re-
lease and optimal decision making are naturally separated. It does not follow
immediately that such a simple non-interactive randomized response mech-
anism would achieve the maximum accuracy. The proof critically harnesses
the data processing inequalities and is provided in Appendix C.1.
4.5 Private Multi-Party XOR Computation
For a given function and a given accuracy measure, analyzing the perfor-
mance of the optimal protocol provides the exact nature of the privacy-
accuracy tradeoff. Consider a scenario where a central observer wants to
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compute the XOR of all the k-bits, each of which is ε-differentially private.
In this special case, we can apply our main theorem to analyze the accuracy
exactly in a combinatorial form.
Corollary 4.5.1 Consider k-party computation for f0(x) = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xk,
and the accuracy measure is one if correct and zero if not, i.e. w0(0, 0) =
w0(1, 1) = 1 and w0(0, 1) = w0(1, 0) = 0. For any {λ = eε}-differentially
private protocol P and any decision rule fˆ , the average and worst-case accu-
racies are bounded by
ACCave(P,w0, f0, fˆ0) ≤
∑bk/2c
i=0
(
k
2i
)
λk−2i
(1 + λ)k
,
ACCwc(P,w0, f0fˆ0) ≤
∑bk/2c
i=0
(
k
2i
)
λk−2i
(1 + λ)k
,
and the equality is achieved by the randomized response and optimal decision
rules in (4.5) and (4.7).
We prove the above corollary in Section C.2. The optimal decision for
both accuracies is simply to output the XOR of the received privatized bits.
This is a strict generalization of a similar result in [56], where XOR com-
putation was studied but only for a two-party setting. In the high pri-
vacy regime, where ε ' 0 (equivalently λ = eε ' 1), this implies that
ACCave = 0.5+2
−(k+1)εk+O(εk+1) . The leading term is due to the fact that
we are considering an accuracy measure of a Boolean function. The second
term of 2−(k+1)εk captures the effect that we are essentially observing the
XOR through k consecutive binary symmetric channels with flipping prob-
ability λ/(1 + λ). Hence, the accuracy gets exponentially worse in k. On
the other hand, if those k-parties are allowed to collaborate, then they can
compute the XOR in advance and only transmit the privatized version of the
XOR, achieving accuracy of λ/(1+λ) = 0.5+(1/4)ε2 +O(ε3). This is always
better than not collaborating, which is the bound in Corollary 4.5.1.
4.6 Generalization to Multiple Bits
As an example, consider the first party with one bit x and the second party
with two bits y1 and y2. Each bit needs to be protected as per ε-differential
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privacy. A central observer wishes to compute the following function:
f(x, y1, y2) =
{
y1 ⊕ y2 if x = 0 ,
y1 ∧ y2 if x = 1 .
Randomized response would publish privatized versions of x, y1, and y2 ac-
cording to (4.8). In an interactive scheme, looking at x˜, the second party
publishes (the privatized version of) either y1 ⊕ y2 (if x˜ = 0) or y1 ∧ y2 (if
x˜ = 1). Upon receiving the privatized data, the central observer makes op-
timal decisions in each case. Figure 4.2 illustrates how these two protocols
compare in terms of average accuracy, where the accuracy is one if the ap-
proximation is correct and zero if the approximation is incorrect. For ε = 0,
both protocols cannot do better than the best random guess of zero, which
achieves average accuracy of 5/8 = 0.625. For large ε, both protocols achieve
the best accuracy of one.
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Figure 4.2: Interactive protocols can improve over the randomized response,
when each party owns multiple bits, for computing XOR or AND (left) and
computing the Hamming distance (right).
Another example of multiple bit multi-party computation is studied in
[55]. There are two parties each owning two bits of data x ∈ {0, 1}2 and
y ∈ {0, 1}2, and a third party wants to compute the Hamming distance
dH(x, y) =
∑2
i=1 |xi − yi|. Assuming each bit needs to be protected, the
randomized response would reveal each bit via Equation 4.8. On the other
hand, we can design an interactive scheme where one party reveals its two
bits via the randomized response, and the other party then outputs its best
estimate of the Hamming distance obeying differential privacy guarantees.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates how these two protocols compare in terms of average
accuracy, where the accuracy is 2 − |dH(x, y) − dˆ| where dˆ is the optimal
decision made by the third party; the Hamming distance dH is one if the
approximation is correct and zero if the approximation is incorrect. For
ε = 0, both protocols cannot do better than the best random guess of zero.
which achieves average accuracy of 5/8 = 0.625. For large ε, both protocols
achieve the best accuracy of one.
4.7 Conclusions and Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the problem of differentially private multi-
party computation. We showed that a simple non-interactive randomized
response is optimal for all privacy levels (all values of ε and δ), heterogeneous
privacy levels across parties, all types of functions to be computed, all types
of cost metrics, and both average and worst-case (over the inputs) measures
of accuracy. Though our results are general, they only handle settings where
each party possesses a single bit. In the more general scenario where parties
can have multiple bits, interaction might be critical to achieving the optimal
privacy-utility tradeoffs.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we have addressed the fundamental limits of differential privacy
in three canonical privacy contexts (global, local, and multi-party). This
chapter provides a quick recap of the main results presented in this thesis,
and includes a discussion of important future work.
5.1 Global Privacy
In the global privacy context, trusted institutions want to release sensitive
information about individuals. Differential privacy provides a formal guar-
antee on the anonymity level of an individual user with respect to a data
release. However, such guarantees come at the expense of utility. The more
the privacy demanded, the lesser the utility of the released data. In Chapter
2, we studied the fundamental tradeoff between global differential privacy
and utility. Precisely, we showed that the correlated multi-dimensional stair-
case mechanism achieves the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff under `1 losses
and two-dimensional query functions. We believe that the muti-dimensional
staircase mechanism is universally optimal: it achieves the best privacy-
utility tradeoff for higher dimensional queries and more general loss function.
Even though this conjecture is backed by numerical evidence, it has yet to
be proven rigorously.
5.2 Local Privacy
In the local privacy context, data providers trust no one, not even the service
providers collecting their data. In this context, privacy is achieved by ran-
domizing the data before releasing it. This leads to a fundamental tradeoff
between privacy and utility. In Chapter 3, we studied the aforementioned
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privacy-utility tradeoff and showed that staircase mechanisms are optimal
for a broad class of information theoretic utility functions such as mutual
information and f -divergences. We also considered private binary hypothe-
sis testing and information preservation, two canonical problems with a wide
range of applications. Despite the generality of our local privacy framework,
it can be extended in several important and non-trivial ways.
Correlation among data
In some scenarios theXi’s could be correlated (e.g., when different individuals
observe different functions of the same random variable). In this case, the
data analyst is interested in inferring whether the data was generated from
P n0 or P
n
1 , where P
n
ν is one of two possible joint priors on X1, ..., Xn. This
is a challenging problem because knowing Xi reveals information about Xj,
j 6= i. Therefore, the utility maximization problems for different individuals
are coupled in this setting.
Robust and m-ary hypothesis testing
In some cases the data analyst need not have access to P0 and P1, but
rather two classes of prior distribution Pθ0 and Pθ1 for θ0 ∈ Λ0 and θ1 ∈
Λ1. Such problems are studied under the rubric of universal hypothesis
testing and robust hypothesis testing. One possible direction is to select
the privatization mechanism that maximizes the worst case utility: Q∗ =
arg maxQ∈Dε minθ0∈Λ0,θ1∈Λ1 Df (Mθ0||Mθ1), where Mθν is the induced marginal
under Pθν .
The more general problem of private m-ary hypothesis testing is also an
interesting but challenging one. In this setting, the Xi’s can follow one of m
distributions P0, P1, ..., Pm−1. Consequently, the Yi’s can follow one of m
distributions M0, M1, ..., Mm−1. The utility can be defined as the average
f -divergence between any two distributions: 1/(m(m−1))∑i 6=j Df (Mi||Mj),
or the worst case one: mini 6=j Df (Mi||Mj).
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Non-exchangeable utility functions
The utility studied in this chapter was measured by functions that are ex-
changeable, i.e. the utility did not depend on the naming (labelling) of
the private and privatized data (X and Y ). This made sense for statistical
learning applications that depend on information theoretic quantities such as
f -divergences and mutual information. However, in some other applications,
the utility might be defined over X ∪Y in a metric space, where there exists
a natural measure of distance (or distortion) between the data points. In
this case, we can formulate the problem as a distortion minimization one
minimizeQ∈Dε
∑
x,y
d(x, y)P (x)Q(y|x) ,
where d(x, y) is some distortion metric. [28] studied this problem, and showed
that the mechanism Q(y|x) ∝ eε(1−d(x,y))/(k − 1 + eε) achieves near optimal
performance when ε is large enough, which is the low privacy regime. Notice
that when Hamming distance is used, d(x, y) = I(x 6= y), this recovers
the randomized response mechanism exactly. This provides a starting point
for generalizing the search for optimal mechanisms under non-exchangeable
utility functions.
5.3 Multi-Party Privacy
In the multi-party context, different parties interact to compute a joint func-
tion on their private data. In this context, differential privacy allows users
to interactively compute their functions while preventing them from learn-
ing each other’s information. In Chapter 4, we studied the privacy-utility
tradeoff in context where each individual possesses a single bit. Precisely,
we showed the optimality of a simple non-interactive protocol: each party
randomizes its bit (sufficiently) and shares the privatized version with the
other parties. This optimality result is very general: it holds for all types
of functions, heterogeneous privacy conditions on the parties, all types of
cost metrics, and both average and worst-case (over the inputs) measures of
accuracy.
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Generalization to multiple bits
When each party owns multiple bits, it is possible that interactive protocols
improve over the randomized response protocol. This issue was briefly dis-
cussed with examples in Section 4.6. As argued in Section 4.6, interaction
will be useful in settings where parties have more than just one bit. We
believe that simple non-interactive mechanisms are not optimal in this more
general setting. However, this results is yet to be proven.
Correlated sources
When the data xi’s are correlated (e.g. each party observe a noisy version
of the state of the world), knowing xi reveals some information about other
parties’ bits. In general, revealing correlated data requires careful coordi-
nation between multiple parties. The analysis techniques developed in this
thesis do not generalize to correlated data, since the crucial rank-one tensor
structure of S
(y)
τ is no longer present.
Extensions to general utility functions
A surprising aspect of the main result is that even though the worst-case
accuracy is a concave function over the protocol P , the maximum is achieved
at an extremal point of the manifold of rank-1 tensors. This suggests that
there is a deeper geometric structure of the problem, leading to possible
universal optimality of the randomized response for a broader class of utility
functions. It is an interesting task to understand the geometric structure of
the problem, and to ask what class of utility functions lead to optimality of
the randomized response.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR GLOBAL DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
A.1 Operational Interpretation of Differential Privacy
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.1
First we prove that (ε, δ)-differential privacy implies (2.1). From the def-
inition of differential privacy, we know that for all rejection set S ⊆ X ,
P(M(D0) ∈ S¯) ≤ eεP(M(D1) ∈ S¯)+δ. This implies 1−PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≤
eεPMD(D0, D1,M, S) + δ. This implies the first inequality of (2.1), and the
second one follows similarly.
The converse follows analogously. For any set S, we assume
1− PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≤ eεPMD(D0, D1,M, S) + δ.
Then, it follows that P(M(D0) ∈ S¯) ≤ eεP(M(D1) ∈ S¯) + δ for all choices
of S ⊆ X . Together with the symmetric condition P(M(D1) ∈ S¯) ≤
eεP(M(D0) ∈ S¯) + δ , this implies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
A.1.2 Proof of Remark 1
We have a decision rule γ represented by a partition {Si}i∈{1,...,N} and cor-
responding accept probabilities {pi}i∈{1,...,N}, such that if the output is in a
set Si, we accept with probability pi. We assume the subsets are sorted such
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that 1 ≥ p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pN ≥ 0. Then, the probability of false alarm is
PFA(D0, D1,M, γ) =
N∑
i=1
pi P(M(D0) ∈ Si)
= pN +
N∑
i=2
(pi−1 − pi)P(M(D0) ∈ ∪j<iSj) .
and similarly, PMD(D0, D1,M, γ) = (1 − p1) +
∑N
i=2(pi−1 − pi)P(M(D1) /∈
∪j<iSj). Recall that
PFA(D0, D1,M, S) = P(M(D0) ∈ S),
PMD(D0, D1,M, S) = P(M(D1) ∈ S¯).
So for any decision rule γ, we can represent the pair (PMD, PFA) as a convex
combination:
(
PMD(D0, D1,M, γ), PFA(D0, D1,M, γ)
)
=
N+1∑
i=1
(pi−1 − pi)
(
PMD(D0, D1,M,∪j<iSj), PFA(D0, D1,M,∪j<iSj)
)
,
where we used p0 = 1 and pN+1 = 0, and hence it is included in the convex
hull of the privacy region achieved by decision rules with hard thresholding.
A.1.3 Examples illustrating the strengths of the operational
interpretation of differential privacy
Remark 2 The following statements are true:
(a) If a mechanism is (ε, δ)-differentially private, then it is (ε˜, δ˜)-differentially
private for all pairs of ε˜ and δ˜ ≥ δ satisfying
1− δ
1 + eε
≥ 1− δ˜
1 + eε˜
.
(b) For a pair of neighboring databases D and D′, and all (ε, δ)-differentially
private mechanisms, the total variation distance defined as ‖M(D) −
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M(D′)‖TV = maxS⊆X P(M(D′) ∈ S)− P(M(D) ∈ S) is bounded by
sup
(ε, δ)-differentially private M
‖M(D)−M(D′)‖TV ≤ 1− 2(1− δ)
1 + eε
.
Proof 1 Proof of (a). From Figure 2.1, it follows immediately thatR(ε, δ) ⊆
R(ε˜, δ˜) when the conditions are satisfied. Then, for a (ε, δ)-private M , it fol-
lows from R(M) ⊆ R(ε, δ) ⊆ R(ε˜, δ˜) that M is (ε˜, δ˜)-differentially private.
Proof of (b). By definition, ‖M(D) −M(D′)‖TV = maxS⊆X P(M(D′) ∈
S)−P(M(D) ∈ S). Letting S be the rejection region in our hypothesis testing
setting, the total variation distance is defined by the following optimization
problem:
max
S
1− PMD(S)− PFA(S) (A.1)
subject to (PMD(S), PFA(S)) ∈ R(ε, δ), for all S ⊆ X .
From Figure 2.1 it follows immediately that the total variation distance can-
not be larger than δ + (1− δ)(eε − 1)/(eε + 1).
A.1.4 Proof of Theorem 2.2.3
Consider hypothesis testing betweenD0 andD1. If there is a point (PMD, PFA)
achieved by M ′ but not by M , then we claim that this is a contradiction to
the assumption that D–X–Y forms a Markov chain. Consider a decision
maker who only has access to the output of M . Under the Markov chain
assumption, we can simulate the output of M ′ by generating a random vari-
able Y conditioned on M(D) and achieve every point in the privacy region
of M ′ (see Remark 1 that follows Theorem 2.2.1 in Chapter 2). Hence, the
privacy region of M ′ must be included in the privacy region of M .
A.2 Optimal Mechanisms for Differential Privacy
In this section, we provide a detailed proof for Theorem 2.3.1.
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A.2.1 Proof outline
The key idea of the proof is to use a sequence of probability distributions
with piecewise constant probability density functions to approximate any
probability distribution satisfying the differential privacy constraint (2.7).
The proof consists of 4 steps in total, and in each step we narrow down the
set of probability distributions in which the optimal probability distribution
should lie:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider probability distributions
which have symmetric piecewise constant probability density functions.
• Step 2 proves that we only need to consider those symmetric piece-
wise constant probability density functions which are monotonically
decreasing.
• Step 3 proves that optimal probability density function should period-
ically decay.
• Step 4 proves that the optimal probability density function is staircase-
shaped in the multidimensional setting, and it concludes the proof of
Theorem 2.3.1.
A.2.2 Step 1
Given P ∈ SP , define
V (P) ,
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd).
Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
V (P). (A.2)
Our goal is to prove that V ∗ = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd.
If V ∗ = +∞, then due to the definition of V ∗, we have
inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd ≥ V ∗ = +∞,
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and thus infγ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd = V ∗ = +∞. So we
only need to consider the case V ∗ < +∞, i.e., V ∗ is finite. Therefore, in the
rest of the proof, we assume V ∗ is finite.
First we show that given any probability measure P ∈ SP , we can use a
sequence of probability measures with multidimensionally piecewise constant
probability density functions to approximate P .
Given i ∈ N and k ∈ N, define
Ai(k) = {x ∈ Rd|k∆
i
≤ ‖x‖1 < (k + 1)∆
i
} ⊂ Rd.
It is easy to calculate the volume of Ai(k), which is
Vol(Ai(k)) =
2d
d!
(
(k + 1)d − kd) ∆d
id
.
.
Lemma A.2.1 Given P ∈ SP with V (P) < +∞, any positive integer i ∈ N,
define Pi as the probability distribution with probability density function fi(x)
defined as
fi(x) = ai(k) ,
P(Ai(k))
Vol(Ai(k))
x ∈ Ai(k) for k ∈ N. (A.3)
Then Pi ∈ SP and
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
We conjecture that Lemma A.2.1 holds for arbitrary dimension d, and
prove it for the case d = 2.
Before proving Lemma A.2.1 for d = 2, we prove an auxiliary Lemma which
shows that for probability mass function over Z2 satisfying -differential pri-
vacy constraint, we can construct a new probability mass function by averag-
ing the old probability mass function over each `1 ball and the new probability
mass function still satisfies the -differential privacy constraint.
Lemma A.2.2 For any given probability mass function P defined over the
set Z2 satisfying that
P(i1, j1) ≤ eP(i2, j2),∀|i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| ≤ ∆, (A.4)
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define the probability mass function P˜ via
P˜(i, j) =
P(0, 0) (i, j) = (0, 0)p|i|+|j| (i, j) 6= (0, 0)
where pk ,
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k P(i′,j′)
4k
, ∀k ≥ 1.
Then P˜ is also a probability mass function satisfying the differential privacy
constraint, i.e.,
P˜(i1, j1) ≤ eP˜(i2, j2),∀|i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| ≤ ∆. (A.5)
Proof 2 Due to the way how we define P˜, we have∑
(i,j)∈Z2
P˜(i, j) =
∑
(i,j)∈Z2
P(i, j) = 1,
and thus P˜ is a valid probability mass function defined over Z2.
Next we prove that P˜ satisfies (A.5). To simplify notation, define p0 ,
P(0, 0). Then we only need to prove that for any k1, k2 ∈ N such that |k1 −
k2| ≤ ∆, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 .
Due to the symmetry property, without loss of generality, we can assume
k1 < k2.
The easiest case is k1 = 0. When k1 = 0, we have k2 ≤ ∆ and
P(0, 0) ≤ eP(i, j),∀|i|+ |j| = k2. (A.6)
The number of distinct pairs (i, j) satisfying |i| + |j| = k is 4k for k ≥ 1.
Sum up all inequalities in (A.6), and we get
4k2P(0, 0) ≤ e
∑
(i,j)∈Z2:|i|+|j|=k2
P(i, j)
⇔P(0, 0) ≤ e
∑
(i,j)∈Z2:|i|+|j|=k2 P(i, j)
4k2
⇔p0 ≤ epk2 .
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For general 0 < k1 < k2, let D
′ , k2 − k1 ≤ ∆. Define Bk via
Bk , {(i, j) ∈ Z2||i|+ |j| = k},∀k ∈ N.
Then the differential privacy constraint (A.4) implies that
P(i1, j1) ≤ eP(i2, j2),∀(i1, j1) ∈ Bk1 , (i2, j2) ∈ Bk2 , |i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| = D′.
(A.7)
The set of points in Bk forms a rectangle, which has 4 corner points and
4(k − 1) interior points on the edges. For each corner point in Bk1, which
appears in the left side of (A.7), there are (2D′ + 1) points in Bk2 close to
it with an `1 distance of D′. And for each interior point in Bk1, there are
(D′ + 1) points in Bk2 close to it with an `
1 distance of D′. Therefore, there
are in total 4(2D′ + 1) + 4(k1 − 1)(D′ + 1) distinct inequalities in (A.7).
If we can find certain nonnegative coefficients such that multiplying each
inequality in (A.7) by these nonnegative coefficients and summing them up
gives us ∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1 P(i′, j′)
4k1
≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2 P(i′, j′)
4k2
,
then (A.5) holds. Therefore, our goal is to find the “right” coefficients asso-
ciated with each inequality in (A.7). We formulate it as a matrix filling-in
problem in which we need to choose nonnegative coefficients for certain en-
tries in a matrix such that the sum of each row is k1+D
′
k1
, and the sum of each
column is 1.
More precisely, label the 4k1 points in Bk1 by {I1, I2, I3, . . . , I4k1}, where
we label the topmost point by 1 and sequentially label other points clockwise.
Similarly, we label the 4k2 points in Bk2 by {O1, O2, O3, . . . , O4k2}, where we
label the topmost point by 1 and sequentially label other points clockwise.
Consider the following 4k1 by 4k2 matrix M , where each row corresponds
to the point in Bk1 and each column corresponds to the point in Bk2, and
the entry Mij in the ith row and jth column is the coefficient corresponds
to inequality involved with the points Ii and Oj. If there is no inequality
associated with the points Ii and Oj, then Mij = 0.
In the case k1 = 2 and D
′ = 3, the zeros/nonzeros pattern of M has the
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following form:
x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x
0 x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x

,
where x denotes an entry which can take any nonnegative coefficient.
For general k1 and k2, the pattern of M is that the first, (k1 + 1)th, (2k1 +
1)th and (3k1 + 1)th rows can have 2D
′ + 1 nonzero entries, and all other
rows can have D′ + 1 nonzero entries.
We want to show that∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1 P(i′, j′)
4k1
≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2 P(i′, j′)
4k2
,
or equivalently,
(1 +
D′
k1
)
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1
P(i′, j′) ≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2
P(i′, j′).
Therefore, our goal is to find nonnegative coefficients to substitute each x
in the matrix such that the sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each
column is (1 + D
′
k1
). We will give explicit formulas on how to choose the
coefficients.
The case k1 = 1 is trivial. Indeed, one can set all diagonal entries to be 1,
and set all other nonzero entries to be 1
2
. Therefore, we can assume k1 > 1.
Consider two different cases: k1 ≤ D′ and k1 ≥ D′ + 1.
We first consider the case k1 ≤ D′. Due to the periodic patterns in M , we
only need to consider rows from 1 to k1 + 1. Set all entries to be zero except
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that we set
M11 = M22 = · · · = Mk1k1 = 1,
M2,D′+2 = M3,D′+3 = · · · = Mk1+1,k1+D′+1 = 1
M1,j =
D′
2k1(D′ − k1 + 1) , j ∈ [k1 + 1, D
′ + 1] ∪ [4k1 −D′ + 1, 4k1]
Mk1+1,j =
D′
2k1(D′ − k1 + 1) , j ∈ [k1 + 1, D
′ + 1] ∪ [2k1 + 1 +D′, k1 + 1 + 2D′]
Mi,j =
1− D′
k1(D′−k1+1)
k1 − 1 . (A.8)
It is straightforward to verify that the above matrix M satisfies the prop-
erties that the sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each row is (1 + D
′
k1
).
Therefore, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 , ∀0 < k1 < k2, k1 ≤ k2 − k1 ≤ ∆.
Next we solve the case k1 ≥ D′ + 1. Again due to the periodic patterns in
M , we only need to consider the nonzero entries in rows from 1 to k1 + 1.
We use the following procedures to construct M :
1. For the first row, set M11 = 1 and set all other 2D
′ nonzero entries to
be 1
2k1
.
2. For the second row, M22 is uniquely determined to be 1 − 12k1 . Set the
next D′−1 nonzero entries in the second row to be 1
k1
, i.e., M2j =
1
k1
for
j ∈ [3, D′ + 1]. The last nonzero entry M2,D′+2 is uniquely determined
to be
(1 +
D′
k1
)− (1− 1
2k1
)− D
′ − 1
k1
=
3
2k1
.
3. For the third row, the first nonzero entry M33 is uniquely determined
to be 1− 1
2k1
− 1
k1
= 1− 3
2k1
. Set the next D′ − 1 nonzero entries to be
1
k1
, i.e., M3j =
1
k1
for j ∈ [4, D′ + 2]. The last nonzero entry M3,D′+3
is uniquely determined to be
(1 +
D′
k1
)− (1− 3
2k1
)− D
′ − 1
k1
=
5
2k1
.
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4. In general, for the ith row (i ∈ [2, k1 − 1]), the first nonzero entry Mii
is set to be Mii = 1− 2i−32k1 , and the next D′− 1 nonzero entries are 1k1 ,
and the last nonzero entry Mi,i+D′ =
2i−1
2k1
.
5. For (k1 + 1)th row, by symmetry, we set Mk1+1,k1+1 = 1 and set other
2D′ nonzero entries to be 1
2k1
.
6. The nonzero entries in the k1th row are uniquely determined. Indeed,
we have
Mk1,k1 = 1−
2k1 − 3
2k1
,
Mk1,k1+D′ = 1−
1
2k1
,
Mk1,k1+j =
1
k1
, j ∈ [2, D′ − 1].
It is straightforward to verify that each entry in M is nonnegative and M
satisfies the properties that the sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each
row is (1 + D
′
k1
). Therefore, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 ,∀0 < k1 < k2, k1 ≥ D′ + 1 = k2 − k1 + 1.
Therefore, for all k1, k2 ∈ N such that |k2 − k1| ≤ ∆, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 .
This completes the proof of Lemma A.2.2.
Proof 3 (Proof of Lemma A.2.1) First we prove that Pi ∈ SP, i.e., Pi
satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7).
By the definition of fi(x), fi(x) is a nonnegative function, and∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
fi(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd
=
+∞∑
k=0
ai(k)Vol(Ai(k))
=
+∞∑
k=0
P(Ai(k))
=P(Rd) = 1.
86
So Pi is a valid probability distribution.
Next we show that fi(x) satisfies the differential privacy constraint. For
fixed i, on the x1 − x2 plane, we can use the lines x2 = x1 + ki∆ and x2 =
−x1 + ki∆ for all k ∈ Z to divide each Ai(k) into distinct squares with the
same size (each Ai(k) will be divided into 8k + 4 squares). By taking the
average of the probability density function over each square, we reduce the
probability density function to a discrete probability mass function over Z2
satisfying -differential privacy constraint. Then apply Lemma A.2.2, and we
have
ai(k1) ≤ eai(k2),∀k1, k2 ∈ N with |k1 − k2| ≤ i.
Given x,y ∈ Rd such that ‖x − y‖1 ≤ ∆, let k1, k2 be the integers such
that
x ∈ Ai(k1),
y ∈ Ai(k2).
Then |k1 − k2| ≤ i. Therefore,
fi(x) ≤ efi(y),
which implies that the probability distribution Pi satisfies the differential pri-
vacy constraint (2.7).
Therefore, for any integer i ≥ 1, Pi ∈ SP.
Next we show that
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Given δ > 0, since V (P) is finite, there exists T ∗ = m∆ > 1 for some
m ∈ N such that∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd) < δ
2
.
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For each Ai(k) we have∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
L(x)Pi(dx1dx2 . . . dxd) =
∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
‖x‖1Pi(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
≤ Pi(Ai(k))(k + 1)∆
i
= P(Ai(k))(k + 1)∆
i
≤ 2P(Ai(k))k∆
i
≤ 2
∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd).
Therefore, ∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
≤ 2
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
≤ 2δ
2
= δ.
L(x) is a bounded function when ‖x‖1 ≤ T ∗, and thus by the definition of
Riemann-Stieltjes integral, we have
lim
i→∞
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
=
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd).
So there exists a sufficiently large integer i∗ such that for all i ≥ i∗∣∣∣∣∫ ∫ . . . ∫{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗} L(x)Pi(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
−
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
To simplify notation, we use dx to denote dx1dx2 . . . dxd.
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Hence, for all i ≥ i∗
|V (Pi)− V (P)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫
Rd
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
Rd
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗} L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
+
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗} L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
+
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx) +
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
≤ (δ + δ + δ
2
)
≤ 5
2
δ.
Therefore,
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Define SP i,sym , {Pi|P ∈ SP} for i ≥ 1, i.e., SP i,sym is the set of proba-
bility distributions satisfying differential privacy constraint (2.7) and having
symmetric piecewise constant (over Ai(k) ∀k ∈ N) probability density func-
tions.
Due to Lemma A.2.1, we have Lemma A.2.3.
Lemma A.2.3
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,sym
V (P).
Therefore, to characterize V ∗, we only need to study probability distribu-
tions with symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions.
A.2.3 Step 2
Given P ∈ Psym, we call {ai(0), ai(1), ai(2), . . . } the density sequence of
Pi ∈ SP i,sym, where ai(k) is defined in (A.3) ∀k ∈ N.
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Next we show that indeed we only need to consider those probability dis-
tributions with symmetric piecewise constant probability density functions
the density sequences of which are monotonically decreasing.
Define
SP i,md ,
{P|P ∈ SP i,sym, and the density sequence of P is monotonically decreasing}.
Then we get Lemma A.2.4.
Lemma A.2.4
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
V (P).
Proof 4 We first show that among SP i,sym, to minimize the cost we only
need to consider these probability distributions with density sequences {a0, a1, a2, . . . }
satisfying that a0 ≥ a1. Indeed, given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence
{a0, a1, a2, . . . } such that a0 < a1, there exists Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density
sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } such that b0 ≥ b1 and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Consider the probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence
{b0, b1, b2, , . . . } defined as
b0 = (1 + δ)a0,
bk = (1− δ′)ak,∀k ≥ 1,
where we choose δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b0 = b1, (A.9)
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1. (A.10)
Equation (A.10) makes Pb be a valid probability distribution. One can
easily solve (A.9) and (A.10), and write down the explicit expression for
δ, δ′. The density sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } satisfies b0 ≥ b1 (indeed, we have
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b0 = b1), and it is easy to check it satisfies the differential privacy constraint,
i.e.,
bk1 ≤ ebk2 ,∀k1, k2 ∈ N with |k1 − k2| ≤ i.
Note that C(‖x‖1) is a monotonically increasing function of ‖x‖1, and
compared to Pa, Pb moves some probability of SP i,md from the (higher cost)
area {x|‖bx‖ ≥ ∆
i
} to the (lower cost) area {x|‖bx‖ ≤ ∆
i
}, and thus we have
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Therefore, among SP i,sym, to minimize the cost we only need to consider
these probability distributions with density sequences {a1, a2, a3, . . . } satisfy-
ing that a0 ≥ a1.
Next we show that among SP i,sym with density sequences {a1, a2, a3, . . . }
satisfying a0 ≥ a1, to minimize the cost we only need to consider these prob-
ability distributions with density sequences also satisfying that a1 ≥ a2.
Given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {a1, a2, a3, . . . } such that a0 ≥ a1
and a1 < a2, there exists Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {b1, b2, b3, . . . }
such that b0 ≥ b1 and
b1 ≥ b2.
If i ≤ 2, we can construct Pb by scaling up a0, a1 and scale down ak for all
k ≥ 2. More precisely, define Pb with density sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } via
bk = (1 + δ)ak, k ≤ 1,
bk = (1− δ′)ak, k ≥ 2,
for some δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b2 = b1,
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
So we have b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2. It is easy to check that Pb satisfies the differential
privacy constraint, and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa) using the fact that C(‖x‖1) is a
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monotonically decreasing function in terms of ‖x‖1.
If i ≥ 3, then without loss of generality we can assume a2 ≤ a0. Indeed,
if a2 > a0, we can scale up a0, a1 and scale down ak for all k ≥ 2 to make
a2 = a0, and this operation will preserve the differential privacy constraint
and decrease the cost. Note that in this case we cannot use the same scal-
ing operation to make a2 ≤ a0, because it is possible that after the scaling
operation a0
ak
> e for some 3 ≤ k ≥ i violating the differential privacy con-
straint. Hence, we can assume a0 ≥ a2 > a1. Let ak′ be the largest value in
{a3, . . . , a2+i}. If ak′a2 < e, we can scale up a1 and scale down a2 until a1 = a2
or
ak′
a2
= e. It is easy to see this scaling operation will preserve differential
privacy and decrease the cost. If after this scaling operation we have a2 = a1,
then we are done. Suppose a1 is still bigger than a2. Then a2 is the smallest
element in {a2, a3, . . . , a2+i}. Therefore, we have max2≤k≤i a0ak = a0a2 . Then we
can scale up a0, a1 and scale down ak for k ≥ 2 until a1 = a2. This operation
will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost. If we
call the final probability distribution we obtained Pb, we have Pb ∈ SP i,sym,
and the density sequence satisfying b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 (indeed, b1 = b2), and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
By induction, we can show that among all probability distributions in SP i,sym,
to minimize the cost we only need to consider probability distributions with
monotonically decreasing density sequence.
Suppose among SP i,sym to minimize the cost we only need to consider
probability distribution with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an. Then we can show that among SP i,sym to minimize the
cost we only need to consider probability distribution with density sequence
{a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an ≥ an+1.
Indeed, given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying
a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an, we can construct Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density
sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } satisfying
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn ≥ bn+1,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
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If an+1 ≤ an, then we can choose Pb = Pa.
Suppose an+1 > an. Without loss of generality, we can assume
an+1 ≤ ak, for k ≤ n+ 2− i. (A.11)
If an+1 > an+2−i, then we can scale up {a0, a1, . . . , an} and scale down
{an+1, an+2, . . . } until an+1 = ak. It is easy to verify that this scaling op-
eration will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost.
Let k∗ be the smallest integer such that ak∗ < an+1. Note that by (A.11)
we have n+ 3− i ≤ k∗ ≤ n. Let aj be the biggest element in
{an+2, an+3, . . . , an+1+i}.
Due to the differential privacy constraint, we have
aj
an+1
≤ e. Then we can
scale up ak∗ and scale down an+1 until ak∗ = an+1 or
aj
an+1
= e. This oper-
ation will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost.
If after this scaling operation ak∗ is still bigger than an+1, then we can scale
up {a0, a1, . . . , an} and scale down {an+1, an+2, . . . } until ak∗ = an+1. Due
to the fact that an+1 is the smallest element in {an+1, an+2, . . . , an+1+i}, this
scaling operation will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease
the cost. Therefore, we will have an+1 ≤ ak∗.
Repeat the above steps for each k ∈ k∗ + 1, k∗ + 2, . . . , n such that ak <
an+1. If we call the final probability distribution we obtained Pb, we have
Pb ∈ SP i,sym, and the density sequence satisfying
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn,
and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Hence, among SP i,sym to minimize the cost we only need to consider prob-
ability distribution with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥
a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an ≥ an+1.
Therefore, among all probability distributions in SP i,sym, to minimize the
cost we only need to consider probability distributions with monotonically
decreasing density sequence.
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We conclude that
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
V (P).
This completes the proof of Lemma A.2.4.
A.2.4 Step 3
Next we show that among all symmetric piecewise constant probability den-
sity functions, we only need to consider those which are geometrically decay-
ing.
More precisely, given positive integer i,
SP i,pd ,
{P|P ∈ SP i,md, and P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }
satisfying
ak
ak+i
= e,∀k ∈ N},
then we get Lemma A.2.5
Lemma A.2.5
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
V (P).
Proof 5 Due to Lemma A.2.4, we only need to consider probability distri-
butions with symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions
which are monotonically decreasing.
We first show that given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }, if a0ai < e, then we can construct a probability distribu-
tions Pb ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } such that b0bi = e
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } by scaling up a0 and scaling down
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{a1, a2, . . . }. More precisely, define {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } via
b0 = a0(1 + δ),
bk = ak(1− δ′),∀ k ≥ 1,
for some δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b0
bi
= e,
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
So {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density sequence. Let Pb be the
corresponding probability distribution. It is easy to check that Pb satisfies the
differential privacy constraint, i.e.,
bk
bk+i
≤ e,∀k ≥ 0.
Hence, Pb ∈ SP i,md. Since C(‖bx‖1) is a monotonically increasing function
of ‖x‖1, we have V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Therefore, for given i ∈ N, we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with
density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e.
Next, we argue that among all probability distributions P ∈ SP i,md with
density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , } satisfying a0ai = e, we only need to
consider those probability distributions with density sequence also satisfying
a1
ai+1
= e.
Given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
a0
ai
= e and a1
ai+1
< e, we can construct a new probability distribution Pb ∈
SP i,md with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } satisfying
b0
bi
= e,
b1
bi+1
= e,
and V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
First, it is easy to see a1 is strictly less than a0, since if a0 = a1, then
a1
ai+1
= a0
ai+1
≥ a0
ai
= e. We can construct a new density sequence by increasing
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a1 and decreasing ai+1 to make
a1
ai+1
. More precisely, we define a new sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } as
bk = ak, ∀k 6= 1, k 6= i+ 1,
b1 = a1(1 + δ),
bi+1 = ai+1(1− δ′),
where δ > 0 and δ′ > 0 are chosen such that b1
bi+1
= e and
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
It is easy to verify that {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density
sequence and the corresponding probability distribution Pb satisfies the dif-
ferential privacy constraint (2.7). Moreover, V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). Therefore, we
only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying a0
ai
= e and a1
ai+1
= e.
Use the same argument, we can show that we only need to consider P ∈
SP i,md with density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
ak
ai+k
= e,∀k ≥ 0.
Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
V (P).
Due to Lemma A.2.5, we only need to consider probability distribution
with symmetric, monotonically decreasing, and geometrically decaying piece-
wise constant probability density function. Because of the properties of sym-
metry and periodically (geometrically) decaying, for this class of probability
distributions, the probability density function over Rd is completely deter-
mined by the probability density function over the set {x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆}.
Next, we study what the optimal probability density function should be
over the set {x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆}. It turns out that the optimal probability
density function over the set {x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆} is a step function. We use
the following three steps to prove this result.
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A.2.5 Step 4
Lemma A.2.6 Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,pd (i ≥ 2) with
density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there exists an integer k(i) and a
probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,pd with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . }
such that
b0 = b1 = b2 = · · · = bk(i),
b0
bi−1
= e,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Proof 6 For 0 ≤ k ≤ i− 1, define
wk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ ∫
· · ·
∫
(j+ k
i
)∆≤‖x‖1<(j+ ki )∆
C(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd,
and
uk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−jVol(Ai(ji+ k)).
Then the cost V (Pa) =
∑i−1
k=0wkak, and the constraint on ak is that
a0 ≥ a1 ≥ · · · ≥ ai−1,
a0 ≤ ai−1e,
+∞∑
k=0
ukak = 1.
Therefore, to minimize V (P) among all probability distributions P ∈ SP i,pd,
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we need to solve the following linear programming problem
minimizea0,a1,...,ai−1
i−1∑
k=0
wkak,
subject to a0 ≥ a1 ≥ · · · ≥ ai−1,
a0 ≤ ai−1e,
+∞∑
k=0
ukak = 1.
Let
hk ,
wk
uk
. (A.12)
In the following we show that when d = 2, there exists an integer k(i) such
that:
h0 ≥ h1 ≥ · · · ≥ hk(i), (A.13)
hk(i) ≤ hk(i)+1 ≤ · · · ≤ hi−1, (A.14)
h0 ≤ hi−1. (A.15)
When d = 2,
hk =
wk
uk
=
4
3
∆3
i3
∑+∞
j=0 e
−j(1 + 3(ji+ k) + 3(ij + k)2
2∆
2
i2
∑+∞
j=0 e
−j(1 + 2(ji+ k))
=
2
3
∆
i
3i2c2 + (6ik + 3i)c1 + (1 + 3k + 3k
2)c0
(1 + 2k)c0 + 2ic1
.
Let g(k) =, 3i2c2+(6ik+3i)c1+(1+3k+3k2)c0
(1+2k)c0+2ic1
. It is easy to compute the derivative
of g(k) with respect to k:
g′(k) =
6c20k
2 + 6c20k + c
2
0 + 12c0c1ik + 6c0c1i− 6c2c0i2 + 12c21i2
((1 + 2k)c0 + 2ic1)2
.
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Note that the numerator of g′(k) is an increasing function of k, and
g′(0) = c20 + 6c0c1i− 6c2c0i2 + 12c21i2
=
b(6i2 − 6i+ 1)− 1
(b− 1)3 < 0,
for sufficiently large i, and
g′(i− 1) = 6i
2 − 6i+ 1− b
(1− b)3 > 0.
Therefore, hk first increases as k increases, and then decreases as k in-
creases to i − 1. Hence, there exists an integer k(i) such that (A.13) and
(A.14) hold.
Next we compare hi−1 and h0:
hi−1 − h0 = wi−1
ui−1
− w0
u0
=
2
3
∆
i
(3i− 2)(b− 1)2(i− 1)
(2bi− b+ 1)(b+ 2i− 1) > 0.
Hence, (A.15) also holds.
We are now ready to prove Lemma A.2.6. Suppose ak(i) < ak(i)−1. We can
scale up ak(i) and scale down ak(i)−1 to make ak(i) = ak(i)−1. Since hk(i) ≤
hk(i)−1, i.e.,
wk(i)
uk(i)
≤ wk(i)−1
uk(i)−1
, this scaling operation will not increase the cost
V (Pa). Now we have ak(i) = ak(i)−1.
Suppose ak(i) = ak(i)−1 < ak(i)−2. Then we can scale up ak(i) and ak(i)−1,
and scale down ak(i)−2 to make ak(i) = ak(i)−1 = ak(i)−2. Since hk(i) ≤
hk(i)−1 ≤ hk(i)−2, this scaling operation will not increase the cost V (Pa).
Now we have ak(i) = ak(i)−1 = ak(i)−2.
After k(i) steps of these scaling operations, we can make a0 = a1 = · · · =
ak(i), and this will not increase the cost V (Pa).
Finally, if a0
ai−1
< e, we can scale up a0, a1, . . . , ak(i), and scale down ai−1
to make a0
ai−1
= e. Since hi−1 ≥ h0 ≥ h1 ≥ · · · ≥ hk(i), this scaling operation
will not increase the cost V (Pa).
Let Pb be the probability distribution we obtained after the k(i) + 1 steps of
scaling operations. Then Pb ∈ SP i,pd, and its density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . }
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satisfies
b0 = b1 = b2 = · · · = bk(i),
b0
bi−1
= e,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
This completes the proof of Lemma A.2.6.
Therefore, due to Lemma A.2.6, for sufficiently large i, we only need to
consider probability distributions P ∈ SP i,pd with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying
a0 = a1 = a2 = · · · = ak(i), (A.16)
b0
bi−1
= e. (A.17)
More precisely, define
SP i,fr = {P ∈ SP i,pd|P has density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying (A.16) and (A.17)}.
Then due to Lemma A.2.6,
Lemma A.2.7
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,fr
V (P).
Next, we argue that for each probability distribution P ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3)
with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, we can assume that there exists
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an integer k(i) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2), such that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k, (A.18)
aj = ai−1,∀k < j < i. (A.19)
More precisely,
Lemma A.2.8 Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3) with
density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there exists a probability distri-
bution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that there
exists an integer k(i) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) with
bj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k, (A.20)
bj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i, (A.21)
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). (A.22)
Proof 7 If there exists an integer k(i) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) such that
aj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k,
aj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i,
then we can set Pb = Pa.
Otherwise, let k1 be the smallest integer in {k(i) + 1, k(i) + 2, . . . , i − 1}
such that
ak1 6= a0,
and let k2 be the biggest integer in {k(i) + 1, k(i) + 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak2 6= ai−1.
It is easy to see that k1 6= k2. Then we can scale up ak1 and scale down
ak2 simultaneously until either ak1 = a0 or ak2 = ai−1. Since hk , wkuk is
an increasing function of k when k > k(i), and k(i) < k1 < k2, this scaling
operation will not increase the cost.
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After this scaling operation we can update k1 and k2, and either k1 is
increased by one or k2 is decreased by one.
Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability
distribution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that
(A.20), (A.21) and (A.22) hold.
This completes the proof.
Define
SP i,step = {P ∈ SP i,fr | P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying(A.20) and (A.21) for some k(i) < k ≤ (i− 2)}.
Then due to Lemma A.2.8, we have Lemma A.2.9.
Lemma A.2.9
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
V (P).
As i → ∞, the probability density function of P ∈ SP i,fr will converge
to a multidimensional staircase function. Therefore, for d = 2 and the cost
function L(x) = ‖x‖1,∀x ∈ R2, then
inf
P∈SP
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)P(dx1dx2) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
A.3 Composition Theorem in Differential Privacy
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4.3
We propose a simple mechanism and prove that the proposed mechanism
dominates over all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Analyzing the
privacy region achieved by the k-fold composition of the proposed mechanism,
we get a bound on the privacy region under adaptive composition. This gives
an exact characterization of privacy under composition, since we show both
converse and achievability. We prove that no other family of mechanisms can
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achieve ‘more degraded’ privacy (converse), and that there is a mechanism
that we propose which achieves the privacy region (achievability).
Achievability
We propose the following simple mechanism M˜i at the i-th step in the compo-
sition. Null hypothesis (b = 0) outcomes X i,0 = Mi(D
i,0, qi)’s which are inde-
pendent and identically distributed as a discrete random variable X˜0 ∼ P˜0(·),
where
P(X˜0 = x) = P˜0(x) ≡

δ for x = 0 ,
(1−δ) eε
1+eε
for x = 1 ,
1−δ
1+eε
for x = 2 ,
0 for x = 3 .
(A.23)
Alternative hypothesis (b = 1) outcomes X i,1 = Mi(D
i,1, qi)’s are indepen-
dent and identically distributed as a discrete random variable X˜1 ∼ P˜1(·),
where
P(X˜1 = x) = P˜1(x) ≡

0 for x = 0 ,
1−δ
1+eε
for x = 1 ,
(1−δ) eε
1+eε
for x = 2 ,
δ for x = 3 .
(A.24)
In particular, the output of this mechanism does not depend on the database
Di,b or the query qi, and only depends on the hypothesis b. The privacy
region of a single access to this mechanism is R(ε, δ) in Figure 2.1. Hence,
by Theorem 2.2.4, all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms are dominated
by this mechanism.
In general, the privacy region R(M,D0, D1) of any mechanism can be rep-
resented as an intersection of multiple {(ε˜j, δ˜j)} privacy regions. For a mech-
anism M , we can compute the (ε˜j, δ˜j) pairs representing the privacy region
as follows. Given a null hypothesis database D0, an alternative hypothesis
database D1, and a mechanism M whose output space is X , let P0 and P1
denote the probability density function of the outputs M(D0) and M(D1)
respectively. To simplify notations we assume that P0 and P1 are symmetric,
i.e. there exists a permutation pi over X such that P0(x) = P1(pi(x)) and
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P1(x) = P0(pi(x)). This ensures that we get a symmetric privacy region.
The privacy regionR(M,D0, D1) can be described by its boundaries. Since
it is a convex set, a tangent line on the boundary with slope −eε˜j can be
represented by the smallest δ˜j such that
PFA ≥ −eε˜jPMD + 1− δ˜j , (A.25)
for all rejection sets (cf. Figure 2.5). Letting S denote the complement of
a rejection set, such that PFA = 1 − P0(S) and PMD = P1(S), the minimum
shift δ˜j that still ensures that the privacy region is above the line (A.25) is
defined as δ˜j = dε˜j(P0, P1) where
dε˜(P0, P1) ≡ max
S⊆X
{
P0(S)− eε˜ P1(S)
}
.
The privacy region of a mechanism is completely described by the set of
slopes and shifts, {(ε˜j, δ˜j) : ε˜j ∈ E and δ˜j = dε˜j(P0, P1)}, where
E ≡ { 0 ≤ ε˜ <∞ : P0(x) = eε˜ P1(x) for some x ∈ X} .
Any ε˜ /∈ E does not contribute to the boundary of the privacy region. For
the above example distributions P˜0 and P˜1, E = {ε} and dε(P˜0, P˜1) = δ.
Remark 3 For a database access mechanism M over a output space X and
a pair of neighboring databases D0 and D1, let P0 and P1 denote the proba-
bility density function for random variables M(D0) and M(D1) respectively.
Assume there exists a permutation pi over X such that P0(x) = P1(pi(x)).
Then, the privacy region is
R(M,D0, D1 ) =
⋂
ε˜∈E
R( ε˜, dε˜(P0, P1) ) ,
where R(M,D,D′) and R(ε˜, δ˜) are defined as in (2.3) and (2.2).
The symmetry assumption is to simplify notations, and the analysis can be
easily generalized to deal with non-symmetric distributions.
Now consider a k-fold composition experiment, where at each sequential
access M˜i, we receive a random output X
i,b independent and identically
distributed as X˜b. We can explicitly characterize the distribution of k-fold
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composition of the outcomes: P(X1,b = x1, . . . , Xk,b = xk) =
∏k
x=1 P˜b(xi).
It follows form the structure of these two discrete distributions that, E =
{e(k−2bk/2c)ε, e(k+2−2bk/2c)ε, . . . , e(k−2)ε, ekε}. After some algebra, it also follows
that
d(k−2i)ε
(
(P˜0)
k, (P˜1)
k
)
= 1− (1− δ)k + (1− δ)k
∑i−1
`=0 (
k
`)
(
eε(k−`)−eε(k−2i+`)
)
(1+eε)k
for i ∈ {0, . . . , bk/2c}. From Remark 3, it follows that the privacy region is
R({εi, δi}) =
⋂bk/2c
i=0 R
(
εi, δi
)
, where εi = (k − 2i)ε and δi’s are defined as in
(2.12). Figure 2.4 shows this privacy region for k = 1, . . . , 5 and for ε = 0.4
and for two values of δ = 0 and δ = 0.1.
Converse
We will now prove that this region is the largest region achievable under
k-fold adaptive composition of any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms.
From Corollary 2.2.2, any mechanism whose privacy region is included in
R({εi, δi}) satisfies (ε˜, δ˜)-differential privacy. We are left to prove that for
the family of all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms, the privacy region
of the k-fold composition experiment is included inside R({εi, δi}). To this
end, consider the following composition experiment, which reproduces the
view of the adversary from the original composition experiment.
At each time step i, we generate a random variable X i,b distributed as
X˜b independent of any other random events, and call this the output of a
database access mechanism M˜i such that M˜i(D
i,b, qi) = X
i,b. Since, X i,b only
depends on b, and is independent of the actual database or the query, we use
M˜i(b) to denote this outcome.
We know that M˜i(b) has privacy region R(ε, δ) for any choices of Di,0,
Di,1 and qi. Now consider the mechanism Mi from the original experiment.
Since it is (ε, δ)-differentially private, we know from Theorem 2.2.1 that
R(Mi, Di,0, Di,1) ⊆ R(ε, δ) for any choice of neighboring databases Di,0, Di,1.
Hence, from the converse of data processing inequality (Theorem 2.2.4), we
know that there exists a mechanism Ti that takes as input X
i,b and produces
an output Y i,b which is distributed as Mi(D
i,b, qi) for all b ∈ {0, 1}. Hence,
Y i,b is independent of the past conditioned on X i,b, Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi. Precisely
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we have the following Markov chain:
(b, R, {X`,b, D`,0, D`,1, q`,M`}`∈[i−1])–(X i,b, Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi)–Y i,b ,
where R is any internal randomness of the adversary A. Since, (X, Y )–Z–W
implies X–(Y, Z)–W , we have
b–(R, {X`,b, D`,0, D`,1, q`,M`}`∈[i])–Y i,b .
Notice that if we know R and the outcomes {Y `,b}`∈[i], then we can repro-
duce the original experiment until time i. This is because the choices of
Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi are exactly specified by R and {Y `,b}`∈[i]. Hence, we can
simplify the Markov chain as
b–(R,X i,b, {X`,b, Y `,b}`∈[i−1])–Y i,b . (A.26)
Further, since X i,b is independent of the past conditioned on b, we have
X i,b–b–(R, {X`,b, Y `,b}`∈[i−1]) . (A.27)
It follows that
P(b, r, x1 . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk)
= P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1)P(yk|r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1)
= P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk−1, y1, . . . , yk−1)P(xk|b)P(yk|r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1) ,
where we used (A.26) in the first equality and (A.27) in the second. By
induction, we get a decomposition
P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk)
= P(b, r)
k∏
i=1
P(xi|b)
k∏
i=1
P(yi|r, x1, . . . , xi, y1, . . . , yi−1)
= P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk|r, x1, . . . , xk)
= P(b|r, x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk, r, x1, . . . , xk) .
From the construction of the experiment, it also follows that the inter-
nal randomness R is independent of the hypothesis b and the outcomes
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X i,b’s: P(b|r, x1, . . . , xk) = P(b|x1, . . . , xk). Then, marginalizing over R, we
get P(b, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) = P(b|x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xk). This
implies the following Markov chain:
b–({X i,b}i∈[k])–({Y i,b}i∈[k]) , (A.28)
and it follows that a set of mechanisms (M1, . . . ,Mk) dominates (M˜1, . . . , M˜k)
for two databases {Di,0}i∈[k] and {Di,1}i∈[k]. By the data processing inequal-
ity for differential privacy (Theorem 2.2.3), this implies that
R({Mi}i∈[k], {Di,0}i∈[k], {Di,1}i∈[k])
⊆ R({M˜i}i∈[k], {Di,0}i∈[k], {Di,1}i∈[k])
= R({εi, δi}) .
This finishes the proof of the desired claim.
Alternatively, one can prove (A.28), using a probabilistic graphical model.
Precisely, the Bayesian network shown in Figure A.1 describes the depen-
dencies among various random quantities of the experiment described above.
Since the set of nodes (X1,b, X2,b, X3,b, X4,b) d-separates node b from the rest
of the Bayesian network, it follows immediately from the Markov property
of this Bayesian network that (A.28) is true (cf. [61]).
A.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.4.4
We need to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by X˜0 and
X˜1 defined in (A.23) and (A.24) under k-fold composition. Let P0 denote
the probability mass function of X˜0 and P1 denote the PMF of X˜1. Also, let
P k0 and P
k
1 denote the joint PMF of k i.i.d. copies of X˜0 and X˜1 respectively.
Also, for a set S ⊆ X k, we let P k0 (S) =
∑
x∈S P
k
0 (x). In our example,
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b R
X1,b
X2,b
X3,b
X4,b
Y 1,b
Y 2,b
Y 3,b
Y 4,b
D1,0, D1,1, q1,M1
D2,0, D2,1, q2,M2
D3,0, D3,1, q3,M3
D4,0, D4,1, q4,M4
Figure A.1: Bayesian network representation of the composition
experiment. The subset of nodes (X1,b, X2,b, X3,b, X4,b) d-separates node b
from the rest of the network.
X = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
P0 =
[
δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε
1−δ
1+eε
0
]
,
P1 =
[
0 1−δ
1+eε
(1−δ)eε
1+eε
δ
]
,
P 20 =

δ2 δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε
δ (1−δ)
1+eε
0
δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε
(
(1−δ)eε
1+eε
)2 (
1−δ
1+eε
)2
eε 0
δ 1−δ
1+eε
(
1−δ
1+eε
)2
eε
(
1−δ
1+eε
)2
0
0 0 0 0
 , etc.
We can compute the privacy region from P k0 and P
k
1 directly, by computing
the line tangent to the boundary. A tangent line with slope −eε˜ can be
represented as
PFA = −eε˜PMD + 1− dε˜(P k0 , P k1 ) . (A.29)
To find the tangent line, we need to maximize the shift, which is equivalent to
moving the line downward until it is tangent to the boundary of the privacy
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region (cf. Figure 2.5).
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) ≡ max
S⊆Xk
P k0 (S)− eε˜P k1 (S) .
Notice that the maximum is achieved by a set B ≡ {x ∈ X k |P k0 (x) ≥
eε˜P k1 (x)}. Then,
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = P
k
0 (B)− eε˜P k1 (B) .
For the purpose of proving the bound of the form (2.12), we separate the
analysis of the above formula into two parts: one where either P k0 (x) or P
k
1 (x)
is zero and the other when both are positive. Effectively, this separation
allows us to treat the effects of (ε, 0)-differential privacy and (0, δ)-differential
privacy separately. In previous work [16], they separated the analysis in a
similar way. Here we provide a simpler proof technique. Further, all the
proof techniques we use naturally generalize to compositions of general (ε, δ)-
differentially private mechanisms other than the specific example of X˜0 and
X˜1 we consider in this section.
Let X˜k0 denote a k-dimensional random vector whose entries are inde-
pendent copies of X˜0. We partition B into two sets: B = B0
⋃
B1 and
B0
⋂
B1 = ∅. Let B0 ≡ {x ∈ X k : P k0 (x) ≥ eε˜P k1 (x), and P k1 (x) = 0} and
B1 ≡ {x ∈ X k : P k0 (x) ≥ eε˜P k1 (x), and P k1 (x) > 0}. Then, it is not hard
to see that P k0 (B0) = 1 − P(X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2, 3}k) = 1 − (1 − δ)k, P k1 (B0) = 0,
P k0 (B1) = P
k
0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k)P(X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k) = (1 − δ)k P k0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈
{1, 2}k), and P k1 (B1) = (1− δ)k P k1 (B1|X˜k1 ∈ {1, 2}k). It follows that
P k0 (B0)− eε˜P k1 (B0) = 1− (1− δ)k , and
P k0 (B1)− eε˜P k1 (B1) = (1− δ)k
(
P k0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k)
− eε˜P k1 (B1|X˜k1 ∈ {1, 2}k)
)
.
Let P˜ k0 (x) ≡ P k0 (x|x ∈ {1, 2}k) and P˜ k1 (x) ≡ P k1 (x|x ∈ {1, 2}k). Then, we
have
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = P
k
0 (B0)− eε˜P k1 (B0) + P k0 (B1)− eε˜P k1 (B1)
= 1− (1− δ)k + (1− δ)k(P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)) . (A.30)
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Now, we focus on upper bounding P˜ k0 (B1) − eε˜P˜ k1 (B1), using a variant of
Chernoff’s tail bound. Notice that
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) = EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)]
− eε˜EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
) P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
]
= EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)(1− eε˜ P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
)]
≤ E[eλZ−λε˜+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1)] , (A.31)
where we use a random variable Z ≡ log(P˜ k0 (X˜k0 )/P˜ k1 (X˜k0 )) and the last line
follows from I(x≥ε˜)(1 − eε˜−x) ≤ eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) for any λ ≥ 0. To
show this inequality, notice that the right-hand side is always non-negative.
So it is sufficient to show that the inequality holds, without the indicator on
the left-hand side. Precisely, let f(x) = eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) + eε˜−x− 1.
This is a convex function with f(x∗) = 0 and f ′(x∗) = 0 at x∗ = ε˜+ log((λ+
1)/λ). It follows that this is a non-negative function.
Next, we give an upper bound on the moment generating function of Z.
EP˜0 [e
λ log(P0(X)/P1(X))] =
eε
eε + 1
eλε +
1
eε + 1
e−λε
≤ e e
ε−1
eε+1
λε+ 1
2
λ2ε2 ,
for any λ, which follows from the fact that pex + (1− p)e−x ≤ e(2p−1)x+(1/2)x2
for any x ∈ R and p ∈ [0, 1] [62, Lemma A.1.5]. Substituting this into (A.31)
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with a choice of λ = ε˜−kε(e
ε−1)/(eε+1)
kε2
, we get
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)
≤ exp
{eε − 1
eε + 1
λεk +
1
2
λ2ε2k − λε˜+ λ log λ− (λ+ 1) log(λ+ 1)
}
= exp
{
− kε
2
2
(
λ− 1
kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
))2
− 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kε(e
ε − 1)
eε + 1
)2
+ λ log
λ
λ+ 1
− log(λ+ 1)
}
≤ exp
{
− 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
)2
− log(λ+ 1)
}
≤ 1
1 + ε˜−kε(e
ε−1)/(eε+1)
kε2
exp
{
− 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
)2 }
=
1
1 +
√
2kε2 log(e+(
√
kε2/δ˜))
kε2
1
e+
√
kε2
δ˜
≤ 1√
kε2 +
√
2 log(e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜))
δ˜
eδ˜√
kε2
+ 1
,
for our choice of ε˜ = kε(eε − 1)/(eε + 1) + ε
√
2k log(e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜)). The
right-hand side is always less than δ˜.
Similarly, one can show that the right-hand side is less than δ˜ for the
choice of ε˜ = kε(eε − 1)/(eε + 1) + ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜). We get that the k-fold
composition is (ε˜, 1− (1− δ)k(1− δ˜))-differentially private.
A.3.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.5
In this section, we closely follow the proof of Theorem 2.4.4 in Section A.3.2
carefully keeping the dependence on `, the index of the composition step.
For brevity, we omit the details which overlap with the proof of Theorem
2.4.4. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.4.3, we only need
to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by X˜
(`)
0 and X˜
(`)
1
under k-fold composition, defined as
P(X˜(`)0 = x) = P˜
(`)
0 (x) ≡

δ` for x = 0 ,
(1−δ`) eε`
1+eε`
for x = 1 ,
1−δ`
1+eε`
for x = 2 ,
0 for x = 3 .
, and
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P(X˜(`)1 = x) = P˜
(`)
1 (x) ≡

0 for x = 0 ,
1−δ`
1+eε`
for x = 1 ,
(1−δ`) eε`
1+eε`
for x = 2 ,
δ` for x = 3 .
Using the similar notations as Section A.3.2, it follows that under k-fold
composition,
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = 1−
k∏
`=1
(1− δ`)
+
(
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)
) k∏
`=1
(1− δ`) . (A.32)
Now, we focus on upper bounding P˜ k0 (B1) − eε˜P˜ k1 (B1), using a variant of
Chernoff’s tail bound. We know that
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) = EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)]
− eε˜EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
) P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
]
= EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)(1− eε˜ P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
)]
≤ E[eλZ−λε˜+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1)] , (A.33)
where we use a random variable Z ≡ log(P˜ k0 (X˜k0 )/P˜ k1 (X˜k0 )) and the last line
follows from the fact that I(x≥ε˜)(1−eε˜−x) ≤ eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) for any
λ ≥ 0.
Next, we give an upper bounds on the moment generating function of Z.
From the definition of P˜
(`)
0 and P˜
(`)
1 , E[eλZ ] =
(
E
P˜
(`)
0
[eλ log(P˜
(`)
0 (X˜
(`)
0 )/P˜
(`)
1 (X˜
(`)
0 ))]
)k
.
Let ε˜ =
∑k
`=1(e
ε` − 1)ε`/(eε` + 1) +
√
2
∑k
`=1 ε
2
` log
(
e+ (
√∑k
`=1 ε
2
`/δ˜)
)
.
Next we show that the k-fold composition is (ε˜, 1 − (1 − δ˜)∏`∈[k](1 − δ`) )-
differentially private.
E
P˜
(`)
0
[eλ log(P
(`)
0 (X)/P
(`)
1 (X))] ≤ e e
ε`−1
eε`+1
λε`+
1
2
λ2ε`
2
,
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for any λ. Substituting this into (A.33) with a choice of
λ =
ε˜−∑`∈[k] ε`(eε` − 1)/(eε` + 1)∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
,
we get
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)
≤ 1
1 +
ε˜−∑`∈[k] ε`(eε`−1)/(eε`+1)∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
exp
{
− 1
2
∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
(
ε˜−
∑
`∈[k]
ε`
eε` − 1
eε` + 1
)2 }
.
Substituting ε˜, we get the desired bound.
Similarly, we can prove that with
ε˜ =
k∑
`=1
(eε` − 1)ε`/(eε` + 1) +
√√√√2 k∑
`=1
ε2` log
(
1/δ˜
)
,
the desired bound also holds.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
B.1 Operational Interpretation of Differential Privacy
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
We start by proving the following equivalent definition for local differential
privacy.
Claim 1 A conditional distribution Q is said to be ε-locally differentially
private if and only if for all A,B ⊂ X , such that A ∩ B = ∅ and all S ⊂ Y,
we have that
Q (S|A) ≤ eεQ (S|B) , (B.1)
where Q (S|A) = P(Y ∈ S|X ∈ A) and ε ∈ [0,∞).
Proof 8 To see that Claim 1 implies local differential privacy, set A = {x}
and B = {x′} for any x 6= x′. Observe that Q (S|x) ≤ eεQ (S|x′) holds
trivially for x = x′. We now show that local differential privacy implies
Claim 1. First, observe that
Q (S|A) = P(Y ∈ S|X ∈ A) =
∑
x∈AQ (S|x)P (X = x)
P (X ∈ A) .
Therefore,
Q (S|A)
Q (S|B) =
P (X ∈ B)
P (X ∈ A)
∑
x∈AQ (S|x)P (X = x)∑
x∈B Q (S|x)P (X = x)
≤ maxx∈AQ (S|x)
minx∈B Q (y|x)
≤ eε,
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where the first inequality follows from the fact that
∑
x∈AQ (y|x)P (X = x) ≤
maxx∈AQ (y|x)P (X ∈ A),
∑
x∈B Q (y|x)P (X = x) ≥ minx∈B Q (y|x)P (X ∈ B),
and the second inequality follows from Claim 1. This finishes the proof.
Assume that Q is ε-locally differentially private and fix any sets A,B ⊂ X
such that A ∩ B = ∅. Without loss of generality1, consider the set of all
deterministic decision rules Xˆ : Y → {A,B}. These rules can be described
by (a) partitioning the output alphabet Y into (S, Sc) for some S ⊂ Y , and
(b) assigning Xˆ = A whenever Y ∈ S and Xˆ = B whenever Y ∈ Sc. In this
case,
PFA = P(Xˆ = A|X ∈ B) = Q(Y ∈ S|X ∈ B) ≥ e−εQ(Y ∈ S|X ∈ A)
PMD = P(Xˆ = B|X ∈ A) = Q(Y ∈ Sc|X ∈ A) ≥ e−εQ(Y ∈ Sc|X ∈ B),
where both inequalities follow from Claim 1. Replacing Q(Y ∈ S|X ∈ A) by
1− PMD and Q(Y ∈ Sc|X ∈ B) by 1− PFA, we get that
PFA + e
εPMD ≥ 1
eεPFA + PMD ≥ 1. (B.2)
This proves that local differential privacy implies Theorem 3.2.1. The con-
verse can be shown similarly.
B.3 Optimal Mechanisms for Differential Privacy
We start the proof with a few definitions, a lemma, and a general result that
applies to any convex utility function that obeys a mild assumption.
Recall that for an input alphabet X with |X | = k, we represent the set
of ε-locally differentially private mechanisms that lead to output alphabets
Y with |Y| = ` by Dε,`. The set of all ε-locally differentially private mech-
anisms is given by Dε = ∪`∈NDε,`. A utility function U (Q) is convex in Q
if U
(
λQ(1) + (1− λ)Q(2)) ≤ λU (Q(1))+ (1− λ)U (Q(2)) for any λ ∈ (0, 1).
Convex utility functions are ubiquitous in information theory and statistics.
1Randomized rules can never achieve a (PFA, PMD) pair outside the convex hull of
(PFA, PMD) pairs achieved by deterministic rules.
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Assumption 1 If a k × ` privatization mechanism Q(1) ∈ Dε,` is obtained
by deleting an all-zero column of a k× `+ 1 privatization mechanism Q(2) ∈
Dε,`+1, then U
(
Q(1)
)
= U
(
Q(2)
)
.
Naturally, one would expect that if we delete the zero columns of a pri-
vatization mechanism Q(2) to obtain a new privatization mechanism Q(1),
we would still get the same utility. This is because a “reasonable” utility
function should not depend on output alphabets with zero probability.
Theorem B.3.1 If U (Q) is a convex utility function that satisfies Assump-
tion 1, then the following holds
max
Q∈Dε
U (Q) = max
Q∈∪k`=1Dε,`
U (Q) . (B.3)
This theorem implies that among all ε-locally differentially private mecha-
nisms, we only need to consider those that lead to output alphabets of size
` ≤ k. In other words, enlarging the input alphabet cannot further maximize
the utility. The proof of Theorem B.3.1 is given in Section B.3.1.
Lemma B.3.2 A k × ` conditional distribution Q is ε-locally differentially
private if and only if it can be written as Q = SΘ, where S is a k× ` matrix
with Sij ∈ [1, eε] and Θ = diag (θ1, . . . , θ`) with its diagonal entries in R+.
The proof of Lemma B.3.2 is provided in Section B.3.2. With the above re-
sults, we are now ready to prove Theorems 3.3.2 and 3.3.4. By Lemma B.3.2,
for any Q ∈ Dε,` we have that Qj = θjSj. Suppose U (Q) =
∑
j∈[`] µ(Qj),
where µ is a sublinear function. Since µ is sublinear, it is convex and
µ (θjSj) = θjµ (Sj). U (Q) is convex in Q because
U
(
λQ(1) + (1− λ)Q(2)) = ∑
j∈[`]
µ
(
λθ
(1)
j S
(1)
j + (1− λ) θ(2)j S(2)j
)
≤
∑
j∈[`]
λµ
(
θ
(1)
j S
(1)
j
)
+ (1− λ)µ
(
θ
(2)
j S
(2)
j
)
= λU
(
Q(1)
)
+ (1− λ)U (Q(2)) ,
for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, U (Q) satisfies Assumption 1 because
µ (Qj) = 0 whenever θj = 0. Let Q
∗ = S∗Θ∗ ∈ arg maxQ∈∪k`=1Dε,` U (Q)
and note that by Theorem B.3.1, U (Q∗) = maxQ∈Dε U (Q). Suppose that
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Q∗ is of dimensions k × `, where ` ≤ k. Each of the ` columns of Q∗ can be
expressed as a convex combination of the columns of S(k), the staircase pat-
tern matrix. This is because the 2k columns of S(k) are the corner points of
the cube [1, eε]k and each S∗j ∈ [1, eε]k. Therefore, S∗j =
∑2k
i=1 λijS
(k)
i , where
λij ≥ 0 for all i and j, and
∑2k
i=1 λij = 1 for all j. Create the 2
k-dimensional
vector θ˜ such that θ˜i =
∑`
j=1 λijθ
∗
j and let Q˜ = S
(k)Θ˜.
U (Q∗)− U(Q˜) =
∑`
j=1
µ
(
S∗j
)
θ∗j −
2k∑
i=1
µ
((∑`
j=1
λijθ
∗
j
)
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑`
j=1
µ
 2k∑
i=1
λijS
(k)
i
 θ∗j − 2k∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
λijθ
∗
jµ
(
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑`
j=1
θ∗j
µ
 2k∑
i=1
λijS
(k)
i
− 2k∑
i=1
λijµ
(
S
(k)
j
)
≤ 0,
by the convexity of µ (z) and the non-negativity of θ∗j ’s. Moreover, observe
that since S(k)θ˜ = 1, θ˜ is a valid choice for the linear program of (3.12). This
implies that
max
S(k)θ=1,θ≥0
2k∑
j=1
µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
θj ≥ U(Q˜) ≥ U (Q∗) = max
Q∈Dε
U (Q) (B.4)
On the other hand, for any Q˜ = S(k)Θ˜, where θ˜ is valid for the linear program
of (3.12), we have that Q˜ ∈ Dε,2k ⊂ Dε and therefore,
max
S(k)θ=1,θ≥0
2k∑
j=1
µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
θj ≤ max
Q∈D
U (Q) .
Thus, maxS(k)θ=1,θ≥0
∑2k
j=1 µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
θj = maxQ∈D U (Q). This proves Theo-
rem 3.3.4.
The polytope given by S(k)θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed and bounded one.
Thus, the linear program of (3.12) is bounded and has a solution, say θ∗, at
one of the corner points of the polytope. Since there are k equality constraints
given by S(k)θ = 1 and 2k inequality constraints given by θ ≥ 0, any corner
point, including θ∗, cannot have more than k non-zero entries. Form S˜ by
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deleting the columns of S(k) corresponding to zero entries of θ∗. Similarly,
form θ˜ by deleting the zero entries of θ∗ and let Q˜ = S˜Θ˜, where Θ˜ = diagθ˜. It
is easy to verify that U(Q˜) = U(Q∗) = µT θ∗; hence, Q˜ solves linear program
of (3.12). Moreover, Q˜ has at most k columns and S˜ij = {1, eε}. Therefore,
Q˜ is a staircase mechanism of dimension k × `, where ` ≤ k.
B.3.1 Proof of Theorem B.3.1
We start the proof of Theorem B.3.1 with an important lemma the proof of
which is presented in Section B.3.3.
Lemma B.3.3 The set of all k × `, ε-locally differentially private mecha-
nisms Dε,` forms a closed and bounded polytope in Rk`+ . Moreover, let Q be a
corner point of the polytope formed by Dε,`, then Q has at most k non-zero
columns.
Fix an ` > k. Since U (Q) is convex in Q, it suffices to consider the corner
points of Dε,` when maximizing U (Q) subject to Q ∈ Dε,`. By Lemma
B.3.3, any Q(1), a k× ` corner point of Dε,`, has at most k non-zero columns.
Therefore, the privatization mechanism Q(2), obtained by deleting the all-
zero columns of Q(1), has at most k columns. Notice that Q(2) ∈ ∪ki=1Dε,i.
Since U (Q) satisfies Assumption 1, we have that U
(
Q(1)
)
= U
(
Q(2)
)
and
therefore, it suffices to consider Q ∈ ∪ki=1Dε,i when maximizing U (Q) subject
to Q ∈ Dε,`. Thus,
sup
Q∈Dε
U (Q) = sup
`∈N
{
max
Q∈Dε,`
U (Q)
}
= sup
`∈N
{
max
Q∈∪ki=1Dε,i
U (Q)
}
= max
Q∈∪ki=1Dε,i
U (Q) ,
which finishes the proof.
B.3.2 Proof of Lemma B.3.2
Claim 2 Let Q ∈ Dε,`. If Qij = 0 for some j ∈ {1, ..., `} then Qij = 0 for
all i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
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Proof 9 Assume that Qi1j = 0 and Qi2j 6= 0 for some i1, i2 ∈ {1, ..., k}. It
is obvious that q (yj|xi2) ≤ q (yj|xi1) eε is not satisfied. Therefore, Q is not a
locally differentially private mechanism.
It is easy to check that any k × ` stochastic matrix Q = SΘ, where Θ is
a diagonal matrix with non-negative entries and S is a k × ` matrix with
Sij ∈ [1, eε], satisfies the local differential privacy constraints. Thus, Q ∈
Dε,`. On the other hand, assume that Q ∈ Dε,`. If Qij = 0 for some j then
by Claim 2 we have that Qij = 0 for all i and therefore, we can set θj = 0
and Sij = 1 for all i. If Qij > 0 then by Claim 2 we have that Qij > 0 for
all i. In this case, let θj = miniQij and observe that θj > 0 since Qij > 0
for all i. Let Sij = Qij/θi, then it is clear (from the definition of θi) that
Sij ≥ 1. On the other hand, from the differential privacy constraints, we
have that Qij ≤ Qkjeε for all k and thus, Qij ≤ minkQkjeε which proves
that Sij = Qij/minkQkj ≤ eε. This establishes that any Q ∈ Dε,` can be
written as Q = SΘ, where Θ is a diagonal matrix with non-negative entries
and S is a k × ` matrix with Sij ∈ [1, eε].
B.3.3 Proof of Lemma B.3.3
We start by showing that Dε,` forms a closed and bounded polytope in Rk`+ .
We are interested in studying the corner points of the polytope formed by
Dε,` because convex utility functions are maximized at one of these corner
points whenever the space of privatization mechanisms is restricted to Dε,`.
Claim 3 A privatization mechanism Q ∈ Dε,` if and only if for all x, x′ ∈ X
and all y ∈ Y we have that Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x′) eε.
Proof 10 By definition, Q is differentially private if for all x, x′ ∈ X and
all B ⊆ Y we have that Q (B|x) ≤ Q (B|x′) eε. By choosing B = {y} for
some y ∈ Y the first direction of the above lemma is proven. In order to
prove the other direction, assume that for all x, x′ ∈ X and all y ∈ Y we
have that Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x′) eε. Then for any B ⊆ Y, the following holds:∑
y∈B
Q (y|x) ≤
∑
y∈B
Q (y|x′) eε
⇔ Q (B|x) ≤ Q (B|x′) eε.
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Letting Q ∈ Dε,`, then by Claim 3, it is easy to see that Q must satisfy
`k(k − 1) inequalities of the form Q (y|x) ≤ Q (y|x′) eε. These inequalities
can be compactly represented by
A˜q ≤ 0, (B.5)
where q = [Q (y1|x1) , ..., Q (y1|xk) , ...., Q (y`|x1) , ..., Q (y`|xk)]T and A˜ is a
`k(k − 1) × k` matrix that contains all the local differential privacy linear
constraints. Observe that there is a one-to-one mapping between Q and q.
Here is an example for the case when k = ` = 2
1 −eε 0 0
−eε 1 0 0
0 0 1 −eε
0 0 −eε 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜

Q (y1|x1)
Q (y1|x2)
Q (y2|x1)
Q (y2|x2)
 ≤ 0. (B.6)
Moreover, since Q is a row stochastic matrix (a conditional distribution)
it satisfies Q1 = 1, where 1 represents the all ones vector of appropriate
dimensions. This condition can be rewritten as
Bq = 1, (B.7)
where B is a k × k` binary matrix. For the case when k = ` = 2, we have
that [
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

Q (y1|x1)
Q (y1|x2)
Q (y2|x1)
Q (y2|x2)
 =
[
1
1
]
. (B.8)
Finally, observe that Q (y|x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . These constraints
can be incorporated as follows. Let A =
[
A˜T , −I`k
]T
, where I`k is the
`k × `k identity matrix, then Aq ≤ 0. To summarize, Q ∈ Dε,` if and only if
Aq ≤ 0 (B.9)
Bq = 1.
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Therefore, the set of all k× `, ε-locally differentially private mechanisms Dε,`
forms a convex polytope in Rk`+ .
We now proceed to proving that if Q is a corner point of the polytope
formed by Dε,`, then Q has at most k non-zero columns. This claim is obvious
for all k× ` privatization mechanisms with ` ≤ k. Therefore, we restrict our
attention to the case where ` > k. Let Aj be the matrix including all the
inequality constraints imposed on the jth column of Q. Observe that the rows
of Aj form a subset of the rows of A, defined in (B.9), and recall that there
are k(k − 1) differential privacy and k non-negativity inequality constraints
imposed on the jth column of Q. Therefore, Aj is a k
2 × k matrix and we
have that AjQj ≤ 0, where Qj represents the jth column of Q. By Claim 2,
we know that Qj is either equal to zero or contains non-zero entries.
Claim 4 In what follows, the term linearly independent inequality constraints
refers to linear independent rows of Aj.
• If Qj = 0, then k linearly independent inequality constraints are achieved
with equality.
• If Qj 6= 0, then at most k−1 linearly independent inequality constraints
can be achieved with equality.
Proof 11 In fact, the number of linearly independent inequality constraints
(achieved or not) cannot exceed k because Aj has a rank less than or equal
to k. If Qj = 0, then the k non-negativity inequality constraints are achieved
with equality and it is easy to see that they are all linearly independent (in
fact, they form an orthonormal basis to Rk). This proves the first part of the
claim. We now establish the second part of the claim by showing that if Qj 6=
0, we cannot have k linearly independent inequality constraints achieved with
equality. Assume that Qj 6= 0 and let A˜j be the matrix including the largest
collection of linearly independent rows of Aj corresponding to the inequality
constraints that are achieved with equality. In other words, A˜jQj = 0. If
A˜j contains k rows, then its rank is equal to k. However, this implies that
Qj = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, at most k − 1 linearly independent
inequality constraints can be achieved with equality when Qj 6= 0.
Suppose that Q is a corner point of Dε,` and out of its ` columns, `>0 are
non-zero and `=0 (`=0 = `−`>0) are zero. Moreover, assume that the number
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of non-zero columns of Q is larger than k (i.e., `>0 > k). In this case, from
Claim 4, we can see that Q achieves at most `>0(k− 1) + (`− `>0)k linearly
independent inequality constraints with equality. Furthermore, at most k ad-
ditional linearly independent equality constraints (linearly independent rows
of the matrix B defined in (B.9)) can be met by Q. Therefore, the total
number of linearly independent constraints that Q achieves with equality is
at most `>0(k − 1) + (`− `>0)k + k = −`>0 + (` + 1)k < `k, where the last
strict inequality follows from the fact that `>0 > k. This implies that Q
cannot be a corner point of Dε,`. Therefore, any corner point of Dε,` must
have at most k non-zero columns.
B.4 Private Hypothesis Testing
B.4.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
Let T = {x : P0(x) ≥ P1(x)}. In other words,
P0(T )− P1(T ) = max
A⊆X
P0(A)− P1(A).
Recall that for a given P0 and P1, the binary mechanism is defined as a
staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying
Q(0|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) ,
1
1+eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) .
Q(1|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) ,
1
1+eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) .
(B.10)
Lemma B.4.1 For any pair of distributions P0 and P1, there exists a posi-
tive ε∗ that depends on P0 and P1 such that for all y ∈ Y, all ` ∈ N, and all
Q ∈ Dε,` with ε ≤ ε∗, we have that
(eε − 1)P0 (T c) + 1
(eε − 1)P1 (T c) + 1 ≤
M0(y)
M1(y)
≤ (e
ε − 1)P0 (T ) + 1
(eε − 1)P1 (T ) + 1 . (B.11)
Moreover, the above upper and lower bounds are achieved by the binary mech-
anism given in (B.10).
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Observe that because P0 (T ) ≥ P1 (T ) and P0 (T c) ≤ P1 (T c), the direction
of the above inequalities makes sense.
Let M˜ν be the induced marginal for the binary mechanism when Pν is the
original distribution. Following the analysis techniques developed in [43], we
define hypothesis testing region R(M˜0, M˜1) as the convex hull of all achievable
probabilities of missed detection and false alarm, when testing whether ν = 0
or ν = 1 based on Ybin distributed as M˜ν :
R(M˜0, M˜1) ≡ conv
({
(M˜1(S), M˜0(S
c)) : ∀S ⊆ Y}) ,
where S ∈ Y is the accept region for hypothesis ν = 0. For the binary
mechanism, this ends up being a very simple triangular region. The slopes
defining the two sides of the triangular region are: −maxS M˜0(S)/M˜1(S) =
−((eε − 1)P0(T ) + 1)/((eε − 1)P1(T ) + 1) and −minS M˜0(Sc)/M˜1(Sc) =
−((eε − 1)P0(T c) + 1)/((eε − 1)P1(T c) + 1).
M˜0(S
c)
M˜1(S)
R(M˜0, M˜1) R(M0,M1)
Figure B.1: Hypothesis testing regions for two mechanisms.
For any other mechanism satisfying the ε-local differential privacy for ε ≤
ε∗, the above lemma implies that for any choice of the rejection region S, the
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slopes satisfy −M0(S)/M1(S) ≥ −((eε − 1)P0(T ) + 1)/((eε − 1)P1(T ) + 1)
and −M0(Sc)/M1(Sc) ≤ −((eε − 1)P0(T c) + 1)/((eε − 1)P1(T c) + 1). In the
hypothesis testing region, this implies that
R(M0,M1) ⊆ R(M˜0, M˜1) ,
as in the following Figure B.1.
From Theorem 2.5 of [43], we know that this implies a certain Markov
property. Precisely, let Ybin denote the output of the binary mechanism, and
Ydp denote the output of any ε-local differentially private mechanism. Then,
it follows that there exists a coupling of Ybin and Ydp such that they form
a Markov chain: ν–Ybin–Ydp, where ν is the hypothesis on Pν whether the
data was generated from ν = 0 or ν = 1. Then, it follows from the data
processing inequality of f -divergences that
Df (M˜0, M˜1) ≥ Df (M0,M1) .
It follows that there is no algorithm with larger f -divergence than the binary
mechanism.
B.4.2 Proof of Lemma B.4.1
We start by showing that the binary mechanism achieves the upper and lower
bounds presented in the statement of the lemma. Let MB0 and M
B
1 denote
the induced marginals under the binary mechanism given in (B.10). For
ν ∈ {0, 1}, we have that
MBν (0) =
∑
x∈X
P0 (x)Q(0|x) = 1
eε + 1
((eε − 1)Pν (T ) + 1)
MBν (1) =
∑
x∈X
P0 (x)Q(1|x) = 1
eε + 1
((eε − 1)Pν (T c) + 1) .
ComputingMB0 (0) /M
B
1 (0) andM
B
0 (1) /M
B
1 (1) we see that the binary mech-
anism achieves the upper and lower bounds for all values of ε.
As in Lemma B.3.2, for any ` ∈ N, Q ∈ Dε,` can be represented as Q = SΘ,
where S ∈ [1, eε]k×` and Θ = diag (θ1, ..., θ`) with its diagonal entries in R+.
We now show that for any ` ∈ N and any Q ∈ Dε,`, the following upper
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bound holds:
M0(y)
M1(y)
=
∑
i∈[k] P0 (xi)Sij∑
i∈[k] P1 (xi)Sij
≤ (e
ε − 1)P0 (T ) + 1
(eε − 1)P1 (T ) + 1 , (B.12)
for all y ∈ Y and sufficiently small ε. The above expression can be alterna-
tively written as
(eε − 1) (P0 (T )− P1 (T ))
+ (eε − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(Sij − 1) (P0 (T )P1 (xi)− P1 (T )P0 (xi))
−
∑
i∈[k]
(Sij − 1) (P0 (xi)− P1 (xi)) ≥ 0, (B.13)
where Sj ∈ [1, eε]k. Equation (B.13) is linear in Sj and is therefore minimized
(and maximized) at the corner points of [1, eε]k×`, a cube in Rk×`+ . The
corner points of this cube are given by the staircase patterns: Sj ∈ {1, eε}k.
To begin with, let Sj be a staircase pattern with Tj = {xi : Sij = eε} 6= T .
Then Equation (B.13) is equivalent to
(eε − 1) {(P0 (T )− P1 (T ))− (P0 (Tj)− P1 (Tj))}
+ (eε − 1)2 {P0 (T )P1 (Tj)− P1 (T )P0 (Tj)} ≥ 0. (B.14)
Using the fact that P0 (T )−P1 (T ) > P0 (Tj)−P1 (Tj) for all Tj 6= T , the in-
equality in (B.13) holds true for all ε whenever P0 (T )P1 (Tj) ≥ P1 (T )P0 (Tj).
If P0 (T )P1 (Tj) < P1 (T )P0 (Tj), then the inequality in (B.13) holds true for
all ε ≤ ε(j), where
ε(j) = log
(
(P0 (T )− P1 (T ))− (P0 (Tj)− P1 (Tj))
P1 (T )P0 (Tj)− P0 (T )P1 (Tj) + 1
)
> 0. (B.15)
On the other hand, it is easy to verify that when Tj = T , we have that
(eε − 1) {(P0 (T )− P1 (T ))− (P0 (Tj)− P1 (Tj))
+ (eε − 1) (P0 (T )P1 (Tj)− P1 (T )P0 (Tj))} = 0,
for all ε. In this case, set ε(j) = 0 and ε1 = minj∈[2k] ε(j). Therefore, for any
` ∈ N and any Q ∈ Dε,`, the upper bound in the statement of the lemma
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holds for all ε ≤ ε1.
We now show that for any ` ∈ N and any Q ∈ Dε,`, the following lower
bound holds
(eε − 1)P0 (T c) + 1
(eε − 1)P1 (T c) + 1 ≤
M0(y)
M1(y)
=
∑
i∈[k] P0 (xi)Sij∑
i∈[k] P1 (xi)Sij
, (B.16)
for all y ∈ Y and sufficiently small ε. The above expression can be alterna-
tively written as
(eε − 1) (P0 (T )− P1 (T ))
+ (eε − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(Sij − 1) (P0 (T )P1 (xi)− P1 (T )P0 (xi))
+ eε
∑
i∈[k]
(Sij − 1) (P0 (xi)− P1 (xi)) ≥ 0, (B.17)
where Sj ∈ [1, eε]k. Equation (B.17) is linear in Sj and is therefore minimized
at the corner points of [1, eε]k, a cube in Rk+. The corner points of this cube
are given by staircase patterns: Sj ∈ {1, eε}k. To begin with, let Sj be a
staircase pattern with Tj = {xi : Sij = eε} 6= T c, then Equation (B.17) is
equivalent to
(eε − 1) {(P0 (T )− P1 (T )) + eε (P0 (Tj)− P1 (Tj))}
+ (eε − 1)2 {P0 (T )P1 (Tj)− P1 (T )P0 (Tj)} ≥ 0. (B.18)
Using the fact that P0 (T )− P1 (T ) > P1 (Tj)− P0 (Tj) for all Tj 6= T c, then
for sufficiently small ε, Equation (B.17) can be written as
ε {(P0 (T )− P1 (T ))− (P1 (Tj)− P0 (Tj))}+O
(
ε2
)
> 0. (B.19)
This proves that there exists a positive ε(j) such that the left hand side of
Equation (B.18) is positive for all ε ≤ ε(j). On the other hand, it is easy to
verify that when Tj = T
c, we have that
(eε − 1) {(P0 (T )− P1 (T )) + eε (P0 (Tj)− P1 (Tj))
+ (eε − 1) (P0 (T )P1 (Tj)− P1 (T )P0 (Tj))} = 0,
for all ε. In this case, let ε(j) = 0 and let ε2 = minj∈[2k] ε(j). Therefore, for
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any ` ∈ N and any Q ∈ Dε,`, the lower bound in the statement of the lemma
holds for all ε ≤ ε2. To conclude, let ε∗ = min(ε1, ε2). Then both, the upper
and lower bounds, hold for all ε ≤ ε∗.
B.4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
The total variation (TV) distance ‖M0 − M1‖TV is a special case of f -
divergence Df (M0||M1) with f(x) = 12 |x− 1|. Therefore, by Theorem 3.3.4,
we have that
max
Q∈Dε
∥∥M0 −M1∥∥TV = maximizeθ µT θ
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
(B.20)
where µj = µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
= 1
2
∣∣∑
i∈[k] (P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij
∣∣ for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}
and S(k) is the k × 2k staircase pattern matrix given in Definition 3.3.3.
The polytope given by S(k)θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed and bounded
one. Thus, there is no duality gap and solving the above linear program is
equivalent to solving its dual
minimize
α
1Tα
subject to S(k)
T
α ≥ µ.
(B.21)
Note that any satisfiable solution α∗ to (B.21) provides an upper bound to
(B.20) since maxµT θ = min 1Tα ≤ 1Tα∗. Let T = {x : P0(x) ≥ P1(x)} and
Tj = {xi : S(k)ij = eε} for j ∈ [2k]. Consider the following choice of dual
variable
α∗i =
1
2
eε − 1
eε + 1
∣∣P0(xi)− P1(xi)∣∣, (B.22)
for i ∈ [k]. Observe that
1Tα∗ =
1
2
eε − 1
eε + 1
∑
i∈[k]
∣∣P0(xi)− P1(xi)∣∣
=
1
2
eε − 1
eε + 1
∥∥P0 − P1∥∥1
=
eε − 1
eε + 1
∥∥P0 − P1∥∥TV. (B.23)
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We claim that α∗ is a feasible dual variable for all values of ε. In order to
prove that α∗ is a feasible dual variable, we show that S(k)
T
j α
∗ − µj ≥ 0 for
all j ∈ [2k] and all ε. For all j ∈ [2k], we have that
gj = 2
(
S(k)
T
j α
∗ − µj
)
=
eε − 1
eε + 1
∑
i∈[k]
|P0(xi)− P1(xi)|S(k)ij −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[k]
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
eε − 1
eε + 1
{∑
xi∈T
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij +
∑
xi∈T c
(P1(xi)− P0(xi))S(k)ij
}
−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
xi∈T
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij −
∑
xi∈T c
(P1(xi)− P0(xi))S(k)ij
∣∣∣∣∣ .(B.24)
Notice that we have arranged the equation such that all the summands are
non-negative. Without loss of generality, we will assume that∑
xi∈T
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij ≥
∑
xi∈T c
(P1(xi)− P0(xi))S(k)ij .
From the equality
∑
xi∈T (P0(xi)− P1(xi)) =
∑
xi∈T c (P1(xi)− P0(xi)) and
the fact that S
(k)
ij ∈ {1, eε} for all i and j, it follows that
e−ε
∑
xi∈T
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij ≤
∑
xi∈T c
(P1(xi)− P0(xi))S(k)ij . (B.25)
This is true because the right-hand side is minimized when the S
(k)
ij ’s for
xi ∈ T c are all equal to 1 and the left-hand side is maximized when the S(k)ij ’s
for xi ∈ T are all equal to eε. Now, (B.24) can be written as
gj =
1
eε + 1
{
−2
∑
xi∈T
(P0(xi)− P1(xi))S(k)ij + 2eε
∑
xi∈T c
(P1(xi)− P0(xi))S(k)ij
}
≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from (B.25).
This establishes the satisfiability of α∗ for all ε which, in turn, shows that
(B.23) is indeed an upper bound to the primal problem. It remains to show
that this upper bound can be achieved via the binary mechanism. To this
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extent, recall that for a given P0 and P1, the binary mechanism is defined as
a staircase mechanism with only two outputs y ∈ {0, 1} satisfying
Q(0|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) ,
1
1+eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) .
Q(1|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if P0(x) < P1(x) ,
1
1+eε
if P0(x) ≥ P1(x) .
(B.26)
Computing the TV distance between M0 and M1 under (B.26), we get that
∥∥M0 −M1∥∥TV = eε − 1eε + 1∥∥P0 − P1∥∥TV. (B.27)
Hence, the binary mechanism in (B.26) achieves the upper bound in (B.23).
This proves the optimality of the binary mechanism for all ε.
B.4.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4.4
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence Dkl(M0||M1) is a special f -divergence
Df (M0||M1) with f(x) = x log x. Therefore, by Theorem 3.3.4, we have that
max
Q∈Dε
Dkl(M0||M1) = maximize
θ
µT θ
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
(B.28)
where
µj = µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑
i∈[k]
P0(xi)S
(k)
ij log
(∑
i∈[k] P0(xi)S
(k)
ij∑
i∈[k] P1(xi)S
(k)
ij
)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} and S(k) is the k × 2k staircase pattern matrix given in
Definition 3.3.3.
The polytope given by S(k)θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed and bounded
one. Thus, there is no duality gap and solving the above linear program is
equivalent to solving its dual
minimize
α
1Tα
subject to S(k)
T
α ≥ µ.
(B.29)
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Note that any satisfiable solution α∗ to (B.29) provides an upper bound to
(B.28) since maxµT θ = min 1Tα ≤ 1Tα∗. Let T = {x : P0(x) ≥ P1(x)} and
Tj = {xi : S(k)ij = eε} for j ∈ [2k]. Set ji = {j : Tj = xi} for i ∈ [k], and
consider the following choice of dual variable
α∗i =
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)µ(S(k)ji )− ∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
) ,
(B.30)
for i ∈ [k]. Observe that since Tji = xi we have that Pν (Tji) = Pν (xi) and
since
µj =
∑
i∈[k]
P0(xi)S
(k)
ij log
(∑
i∈[k] P0(xi)S
(k)
ij∑
i∈[k] P1(xi)S
(k)
ij
)
= (P0 (Tj) (e
ε − 1) + 1) log (P0 (Tj) (e
ε − 1) + 1)
(P1 (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1)
we have that
1Tα∗
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(eε + k − 2)µ(S(k)ji )− ∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
)
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
−
∑
i∈[k]
∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
)
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
− (k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
=
1
(eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
=
1
(eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(P0 (xi) (e
ε − 1) + 1) log (P0 (xi) (e
ε − 1) + 1)
(P1 (xi) (eε − 1) + 1) . (B.31)
We claim that α∗ is a feasible dual variable for sufficiently large ε. In order
to prove that α∗ is a feasible dual variable, we show that S(k)
T
j α
∗ − µj ≥ 0
for all j ∈ [2k] for all ε ≥ ε∗, where ε∗ is a positive quantity that depends on
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the priors P0 and P1. Using the facts that
log (a+ eεb) = ε+ log b+O
(
e−ε
)
1
eε + k − 1 = e
−ε +O
(
e−2ε
)
,
for large ε, we get that
µj = (P0 (Tj) (e
ε − 1) + 1) log (P0 (Tj) (e
ε − 1) + 1)
(P1 (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1)
=
(
P0 (Tj) log
P0 (Tj)
P1 (Tj)
)
eε + (1− P0 (Tj)) log P0 (Tj)
P1 (Tj)
+O
(
e−ε
)
.
On the other hand,
S(k)
T
j α
∗ =
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
S
(k)
ij (e
ε + k − 2)
(
P0 (xi) log
P0 (xi)
P1 (xi)
eε +O (1)
)
− 1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
S
(k)
ij
(
P0 (xl) log
P0 (xl)
P1 (xl)
eε +O (1)
)
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
xi∈Tj
P0 (xi) log
P0 (xi)
P1 (xi)
 e3ε +O (e2ε)

=
∑
xi∈Tj
P0 (xi) log
P0 (xi)
P1 (xi)
 eε +O (1) .
Assume, to begin with, that j 6= {j1, j2, ..., jk}. Then
S(k)
T
j α
∗ − µj =
P0 (Tj) log P0 (Tj)
P1 (Tj)
−
∑
xi∈Tj
P0 (xi) log
P0 (xi)
P1 (xi)
 eε +O (1) .
(B.32)
Notice that for j 6= {j1, j2, ..., jk}, P0 (Tj) log P0(Tj)P1(Tj) >
∑
xi∈Tj P0 (xi) log
P0(xi)
P1(xi)
by the log-sum inequality. Therefore, there exists a ε(j) > 0 such that
S(k)
T
j α
∗−µj ≥ 0 for all ε ≥ ε(j). If j ∈ {j1, j2, ..., jk}, it is not hard to check
that S(k)
T
j α
∗−µj = 0 for all ε. In this case, set ε(j) = 0. This establishes the
satisfiability of α∗ for all ε ≥ ε∗ = maxj∈[2k] ε(j). The satisfiability of α∗, in
turn, shows that (B.31) is indeed an upper bound to the primal problem. It
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remains to show that this upper bound can be achieved via the randomized
response. To this extent, recall that the randomized response is given by
Q(y|x) =
{
eε
|X |−1+eε if y = x ,
1
|X |−1+eε if y 6= x .
(B.33)
Computing the KL divergence between M0 and M1 under (B.33), we get that
Dkl(M0||M1) = 1
(eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(P0 (xi) (e
ε − 1) + 1) log (P0 (xi) (e
ε − 1) + 1)
(P1 (xi) (eε − 1) + 1) .
(B.34)
Hence, the randomized response in (B.33) achieves the upper bound in (B.31).
This proves the optimality of the randomized response for all ε ≥ ε∗.
B.4.5 Proof of Theorem 3.4.3
We start the proof with a fundamental bound on the symmetrized KL diver-
gence between the M0 and M1.
Lemma B.4.2 For any ε ≥ 0, let Q be any conditional distribution that
guarantees ε differential privacy. Then for any pair of distributions P0 and
P1, the induced marginals M0 and M1 must satisfy the bound
Dkl
(
M0||M1
)
+Dkl
(
M1||M0
) ≤ 4 (eε − 1)2 ∥∥P0 − P1∥∥2TV. (B.35)
The above lemma appears as Theorem 1 in [22]. By Lemma B.4.2, we have
that
OPT = max
Q∈Dε
Dkl
(
M0||M1
) ≤ 4 (eε − 1)2 ∥∥P0 − P1∥∥2TV. (B.36)
Let MB0 and M
B
1 be the marginals obtained by using the binary mechanism
given in (3.15). By Corollary 3.4.7, we have that ‖MB0 −MB1 ‖TV = e
ε−1
eε+1
‖P0−
P1
∥∥
TV
. Consequently, by applying Pinsker’s inequality to the KL divergence
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between MB0 and M
B
1 we get that
BIN = Dkl
(
MB0 ||MB1
)
≥ 2∥∥MB0 −MB1 ∥∥2TV
= 2
(
eε − 1
eε + 1
)2 ∥∥P0 − P1∥∥2TV. (B.37)
Combining (B.36) and (B.37) we get that BIN ≥ 1
2(eε+1)2
OPT which was
to be shown.
B.5 Information Preservation
B.5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
By Theorem 3.3.4, we have that
max
Q∈Dε
I (X;Y ) = maximize
θ
µT θ
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
(B.38)
where µj = µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑
i∈[k] P (xi)S
(k)
ij log
(
S
(k)
ij∑
i∈[k] P (xi)S
(k)
ij
)
for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}
and S(k) is the k× 2k staircase pattern matrix given in Definition 3.3.3. The
polytope given by S(k)θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed and bounded one. Thus,
there is no duality gap and solving the above linear program is equivalent to
solving its dual
minimize
α
1Tα
subject to S(k)
T
α ≥ µ.
(B.39)
Note that any satisfiable solution α∗ to (B.39) provides an upper bound to
(B.38) since maxµT θ = min 1Tα ≤ 1Tα∗. Let Tj = {xi : S(k)ij = eε} and set
j1 = {j : Tj = T} and j2 = {j : Tj = T c}. Consider the following choice of
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dual variable
α∗i =
1
(eε + 1) (eε − 1)

eεµ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
−µ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
|T | ∀i ∈ T
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
−µ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
|T c| ∀i ∈ T c
. (B.40)
Observe that since Tj1 = T , Tj2 = T
c, and
µj = P (Tj) e
ε log
eε
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
+ P (Tj
c) log
1
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
, (B.41)
we have that
1Tα∗
=
1
(eε + 1) (eε − 1)
{∑
i∈T
1
|T |
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j2
))
+
∑
i∈T c
1
|T c|
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j1
))}
=
1
(eε + 1)
(
µ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
+ µ
(
S
(k)
j1
))
=
1
eε + 1
{
P (T ) eε log
eε
P (T c) + eεP (T )
+ P (T c) log
1
P (T c) + eεP (T )
}
+
1
eε + 1
{
P (T c) eε log
eε
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
+ P (T ) log
1
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
}
.
(B.42)
We claim that α∗ is a feasible dual variable for sufficiently small ε. In order
to prove that α∗ is a feasible dual variable, we show that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
−µj ≥ 0
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} and all ε ≤ ε∗, where ε∗ is a positive quantity that
depends on P . Using the facts that
eε = 1 + ε+
1
2
ε+O
(
ε3
)
log (a+ eεb) = bε+
b(1− b)
2
ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
1
1 + eε
=
1
2
− 1
4
ε+O
(
ε2
)
,
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for small ε, we get that
µj = P (Tj) e
ε log
eε
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
+ P (Tj
c) log
1
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
= P (Tj) e
εε− (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1) log (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1)
=
1
2
P (Tj)P
(
T cj
)
ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
.
On the other hand,(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
= S
(k)
j
T
α∗
=
1
(eε + 1) (eε − 1)
{∑
i∈T
S
(k)
ij
|T |
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j2
))
+
∑
i∈T c
S
(k)
ij
|T c|
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j1
))}
=
1
(eε + 1) (eε − 1)
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j2
))( |Tj ∩ T |
|T | e
ε +
|T cj ∩ T |
|T |
)
+
1
(eε + 1) (eε − 1)
(
eεµ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
− µ
(
S
(k)
j1
))( |Tj ∩ T c|
|T c| e
ε +
|T cj ∩ T c|
|T c|
)
=
1
(eε + 1)
(
1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2 +O
(
ε3
)){ |Tj ∩ T c|
|T c| +
|T cj ∩ T c|
|T c|
+
|Tj ∩ T |
|T | +
|T cj ∩ T |
|T | +O (ε)
}
=
1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
,
where we have used the facts that Tj1 = T , Tj2 = T
c, and
µ
(
S
(k)
j1
)
=
1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
µ
(
S
(k)
j2
)
=
1
2
P (T )P (T c) ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
.
Let f(z) = |z − 1
2
|, g(z) = −z log z − (1− z) log(1− z), and h(z) = z(1− z)
for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. On the one hand, g and h are monotonically increasing
over 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
2
and monotonically decreasing over 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1 but on the
other hand, f is monotonically decreasing over 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
2
and monotonically
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increasing over 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1. Therefore,
T ∈ arg min
A⊆X
∣∣∣P (A)− 1
2
∣∣∣
⇔ T ∈ arg max
A⊆X
− P (A) logP (A)− P (Ac) logP (Ac)
⇔ T ∈ arg max
A⊆X
P (A)P (Ac).
Since the set T was chosen so that it maximizes P (T )P (T c), we have that
P (T )P (T c) ≥ P (Tj)P
(
T cj
)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}. Assume, to begin with,
that j 6= {j1, j2}. Then by the uniqueness of the maximizer assumption
stated in the theorem, we have that P (T )P (T c) > P (Tj)P
(
T cj
)
.
(
STα∗
)
j
− µj = 1
2
(
P (T )P (T c)− P (Tj)P
(
T cj
))
ε2 +O
(
ε3
)
, (B.43)
and thus, there exists an ε∗ that depends on P such that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
−µj ≥ 0
for all ε ≤ ε∗. If j = {j1, j2}, it is not hard to check that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
−µj = 0
for all ε. This establishes the satisfiability of α∗ for all ε ≤ ε∗ which proves
an upper bound on the primal problem (given in (B.42)). It remains to show
that the upper bound can be indeed achieved via the binary mechanism. To
this extent, recall that the binary mechanism is given by
Q(0|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if x ∈ T ,
1
1+eε
if x /∈ T . Q(1|x) =
{
eε
1+eε
if x /∈ T ,
1
1+eε
if x ∈ T . (B.44)
Computing the I (X;Y ) under (B.44), we get that
I (X;Y )
=
1
eε + 1
{
P (T ) eε log
eε
P (T c) + eεP (T )
+ P (T c) log
1
P (T c) + eεP (T )
}
+
1
eε + 1
{
P (T c) eε log
eε
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
+ P (T ) log
1
P (T ) + eεP (T c)
}
.
Hence, the binary mechanism in (B.44) achieves the upper bound in (B.42).
This proves the optimality of the binary mechanism for all ε ≤ ε∗.
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B.5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.5.2
We start by proving an upper bound on maxQ∈Dε I (X;Y ) which is tight for
ε ≤ 1. Recall that by Theorem 3.3.4, we have that
OPT = max
Q∈Dε
I (X;Y ) = maximize
θ
2k∑
j=1
µjθj
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
where
µj = µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑
i∈[k]
P (xi)S
(k)
ij log
(
S
(k)
ij∑
i∈[k] P (xi)S
(k)
ij
)
= P (Tj) e
εε
− (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1) log (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1) , (B.45)
Tj = {i : S(k)ij = eε}, and S(k) is the k × 2k staircase pattern matrix given in
Definition 3.3.3.
Lemma B.5.1 For all distributions P and all ε, the following bound holds
OPT = max
Q∈Dε
I (X;Y ) ≤
(
max
j
µj
)
k
eε + k − 1 . (B.46)
The proof of this lemma is given in Section B.5.3. In what follows, we will
make the dependency of µj on P (Tj) and ε explicit by writing µj (P (Tj) , ε)
for µj. From the proof of Theorem 3.5.1, we have that the partition set T
defined in (3.21) is given by T ∈ arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac). It is easy to check
that the binary mechanism given in (3.22) achieves the following utility
BIN =
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
eε + 1
. (B.47)
Lemma B.5.2 For all distributions P and all ε ≤ 1, the following bound
holds:
maxj µj
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
≤ 1. (B.48)
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The proof of the above lemma is given in Section B.5.4. Combining the
results of lemmas B.5.1 and B.5.2 we get that
OPT
BIN
≤ maxj µj
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
k
eε + k − 1 (e
ε + 1)
≤ k
eε + k − 1 (e
ε + 1)
≤ eε + 1,
for all ε ≤ 1. This concludes the proof.
B.5.3 Proof of Lemma B.5.1
To begin with, since S
(k)
1 = 1 =
1
eε
S
(k)
2k
and µ is homogeneous, we have that
θ1µ1 + θ2kµ2k =
(
1
eε
θ1 + θ2k
)
µ2k . Therefore, the following two maximization
problems are equivalent:
maximize
θ
2k∑
j=1
µjθj
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0
=
maximize
θ
2k−1∑
j=1
µ˜jθj
subject to S˜(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
(B.49)
where µ˜j = µj+1 and S˜
(k) is obtained by deleting the first column of S(k).
Moreover, using the fact that maxj∈[2k−1] µ˜j ≤ maxj∈[2k] µj and weak duality,
we get that
maximize
θ
µ˜T θ
subject to S˜(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0
≤
(
max
j∈[2k−1]
µ˜j
)
maximize
θ
1T θ
subject to S˜(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0
≤
(
max
j∈[2k]
µj
)
minimize
α
1Tα
subject to S˜(k)
T
α ≥ 1.
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Consider the following choice of dual variable α∗i =
1
eε+k−1 . We claim that
α∗ is satisfiable. This can be easily verified by noting that(
S˜(k)
T
α∗
)
j
= S˜
(k)T
j α
∗ =
|Tj|eε + (k − |Tj|)
eε + k − 1 =
|Tj|(eε − 1) + k
eε + k − 1 ≥ 1,
where the last inequality holds since |Tj| ≥ 1 (this is true because we have
deleted the first column of S(k)). Therefore, OPT ≤ (maxj µj) 1Tα∗ =
(maxj µj)
k
eε+k−1 which was to be shown.
B.5.4 Proof of Lemma B.5.2
Let µ (z, ε) be the function obtained by replacing P (Tj) by the continuous
variable z ∈ [0, 1] in µj (P (Tj) , ε). Taking the derivative of µ (z, ε) with
respect to z we get
µ′ (z, ε) = eεε− (eε − 1)− (eε − 1) log (z(eε − 1) + 1) . (B.50)
Observe that µ′ (z, ε) > 0 for all
z < z∗(ε) =
1
eε − 1
(
e{ e
εε
eε−1−1} − 1
)
, (B.51)
µ′ (z, ε) < 0 for all z > z∗(ε), and µ′ (z, ε) = 0 for z = z∗(ε). Combining
this with the fact that µ (0, ε) = µ (1, ε) = 0 we get that µ (z, ε) ≥ 0 for all
z ∈ [0, 1] and for any fixed ε, µ (z, ε) is maximized at z∗(ε).
Set x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈X P (x) and fix an ε ≤ 1. We will treat the following
three cases separately.
Case 1: P (x∗) ∈ [1− z∗(ε), 1].
Claim 5 Let T = {x∗}. Then
{T, T c} = arg max
A⊆X
P (A)P (Ac)
and
max
A⊆X
µ(P (A), ε) = max (µ(P (T ), ε), µ(P (T c), ε)) .
Proof 12 Observe that z∗(ε) ≤ 1
2
for all ε and T c = X \ {x∗}. The
function f(z) = z(1 − z) decreases over the range [1
2
, 1] ⊇ [1 − z∗(ε), 1].
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Thus, for all A ⊃ T , P (T )P (T c) > P (A)P (Ac) because P (T ) ≥ 1 − z∗(ε).
This proves that T ∈ arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac) and for all A ⊃ T , A /∈
arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac). Using a similar approach, we can show that T c ∈
arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac) and for all A ⊂ T c, A /∈ arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac).
Therefore, {T, T c} = arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac). This proves the first part of
the claim. The function µ (z, ε) increases over the range [0, z∗(ε)]. Thus, for
all A ⊆ T c, µ(P (A), ε) ≤ µ(P (T c), ε) because P (T c) ≤ z∗(ε). On the other
hand, note that µ (z, ε) decreases over the range [z∗(ε), 1] which includes the
range [1−z∗(ε), 1]. Thus, for all A such that A ⊇ T , µ(P (A), ε) ≤ µ(P (T ), ε)
because P (T ) ≥ 1− z∗(ε). This proves that max (µ(P (T ), ε), µ(P (T c), ε)) =
maxA⊆X µ(P (A), ε).
Using the above claim, we can conclude that the partition set T defined in
(3.21) is equal to {x∗} and
maxj µj
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
=
maxA⊆X µ(P (A), ε)
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
≤ maxA⊆X µ(P (A), ε)
max (µ(P (T ), ε), µ(P (T c), ε))
= 1.
Case 2: P (x∗) ∈ [1
2
, 1 − z∗(ε)]. Using the first part of the proof of Claim
5, we can show that if T = {x∗}, then {T, T c} = arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac).
Therefore, the partition set T defined in (3.21) is equal to {x∗} and
maxj µj
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
=
maxA⊆X µ(P (A), ε)
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
≤ µ(z
∗(ε), ε)
µ (P (x∗) , ε) + µ (1− P (x∗) , ε)
≤ 1.
Case 3: P (x∗) ∈ [0, 1
2
].
Claim 6 There exists a set A ⊂ X such that 1
2
− P (x∗) ≤ P (A) ≤ 1
2
.
Proof 13 Without loss of generality, assume that the sequence P (xi), i ∈ [k],
is sorted in increasing order. Let l∗ = min{l : ∑li=1 P (xi) ≥ 12}. From the
definition of l∗, P ({x1, . . . , xl∗−1}) < 12 and P ({x1, . . . , xl∗}) ≥ 12 . Further,
P ({x1, . . . , xl∗−1}) = P ({x1, . . . , xl∗})− P (xl∗)
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and since x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈X P (x), P (xl∗) ≤ P (x∗). Therefore, if A =
{x1, . . . , xl∗−1}, then 12 − P (x∗) ≤ P (A) ≤ 12 .
Let P (T ) = min{P (B) : B ∈ arg maxA⊆X P (A)P (Ac)}. We claim that
1
4
≤ P (T ) ≤ 1
2
. The upper bound on P (T ) follows immediately from its
definition. To prove the lower bound on P (T ), consider the set A given in
Claim 6 and observe that
P (T ) ≥ max(P (x∗), P (A))
≥ max(P (x∗), 1
2
− P (x∗))
≥ 1
4
.
All the inequalities follow from Claim 6 and the fact that P (x∗) ∈ [0, 1
2
].
Since 1
4
≤ P (T ) ≤ 1
2
, we have that 1
2
≤ P (T c) ≤ 3
4
. Moreover, the
function µ (z, ε) decreases over the range [z∗(ε), 1] ⊃ [1
2
, 3
4
] and increases over
the range [1
4
, z∗(ε)]. Therefore, µ (P (T c), ε) ≥ µ (3
4
, ε
)
and µ (P (T ), ε) ≥
min
(
µ
(
1
2
, ε
)
, µ
(
1
4
, ε
))
. Putting it all together, we have that
maxj µj
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
=
maxA⊆X µ(P (A), ε)
µ (P (T ) , ε) + µ (P (T c) , ε)
≤ µ(z
∗(ε), ε)
min
(
µ
(
1
2
, ε
)
, µ
(
1
4
, ε
))
+ µ
(
3
4
, ε
)
≤ 1.
B.5.5 Proof of Theorem 3.5.3
By Theorem 3.3.4, we have that
max
Q∈Dε
I (X;Y ) = maximize
θ
µT θ
subject to S(k)θ = 1
θ ≥ 0,
(B.52)
where
µj = µ
(
S
(k)
j
)
=
∑
i∈[k]
P (xi)S
(k)
ij log
(
S
(k)
ij∑
i∈[k] P (xi)S
(k)
ij
)
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for j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} and S(k) is the k × 2k staircase pattern matrix given in
Definition 3.3.3. The polytope given by S(k)θ = 1 and θ ≥ 0 is a closed
and bounded one. Thus, there is no duality gap and solving the above linear
program is equivalent to solving its dual
minimize
α
1Tα
subject to S(k)
T
α ≥ µ.
(B.53)
Note that any satisfiable solution α∗ to (B.53) provides an upper bound to
(B.52) since maxµT θ = min 1Tα ≤ 1Tα∗. Let Tj = {xi : S(k)ij = eε} and set
ji = {j : Tj = i} for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Consider the following choice of dual
variable
α∗i =
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)µ(S(k)ji )− ∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
) ,
(B.54)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Observe that since Tji = i we have that P (Tji) = P (xi)
and since
µj = P (Tj) e
ε log
eε
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
+ P (Tj
c) log
1
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
,
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we have that
1Tα∗
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
(eε + k − 2)µ(S(k)ji )− ∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
)
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
−
∑
i∈[k]
∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
µ
(
S
(k)
jl
)
=
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
(eε + k − 2)∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
− (k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
=
1
(eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
µ
(
S
(k)
ji
)
=
1
(eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
{
P (xi) e
ε log
eε
P (xi) (eε − 1) + 1
+ (1− P (xi)) log 1
P (xi) (eε − 1) + 1
}
.
(B.55)
We claim that α∗ is a feasible dual variable for sufficiently large ε. In order
to prove that α∗ is a feasible dual variable, we show that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
−µj ≥ 0
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} and all ε ≥ ε∗, where ε∗ is a positive quantity that
depends on P . Using the fact that
log (a+ eεb) = ε+ log b+O
(
e−ε
)
, (B.56)
for large ε, we get that
µj = P (Tj) e
ε log
eε
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
+ P (Tj
c) log
1
P (Tj
c) + eεP (Tj)
= P (Tj) e
εε− (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1) log (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1)
= P (Tj) e
εε− (P (Tj) (eε − 1) + 1)
(
ε+ logP (Tj) +O
(
e−ε
))
= − (P (Tj) logP (Tj)) eε +O (ε) .
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On the other hand,(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
= S
(k)
j
T
α∗
= eε
∑
i∈Tj
α∗i +
∑
i∈T cj
α∗i
=
−1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
S
(k)
ij (e
ε + k − 2) (P (xi) logP (xi) eε +O (ε))
}
+
1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈[k]
∑
l∈[k],l 6=i
S
(k)
ij ((P (xl) logP (xl)) e
ε +O (ε))

= − 1
(eε − 1) (eε + k − 1)
∑
i∈Tj
P (xi) logP (xi)
 e3ε +O (e2εε)

= −
∑
i∈Tj
P (xi) logP (xi)
 eε +O (ε) .
Assume, to begin with, that j 6= {j1, j2, ..., jk}. Then
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
− µj =
P (Tj) logP (Tj)−∑
i∈Tj
P (xi) logP (xi)
 eε +O (ε) .
(B.57)
Notice that for j 6= {j1, j2, ..., jk}, P (Tj) logP (Tj) >
∑
i∈Tj P (xi) logP (xi).
Therefore, there exists an ε∗ > 0 such that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
−µj ≥ 0 for all ε ≥ ε∗.
If j ∈ {j1, j2, ..., jk}, it is not hard to check that
(
S(k)
T
α∗
)
j
− µj = 0 for all
ε. This establishes the satisfiability of α∗ for all ε ≥ ε∗. It remains to show
that the upper bound can be indeed achieved via the randomized response
mechanism. To this extent, recall that the randomized response is given by
Q(y|x) =

eε
|X | − 1 + eε if y = x ,
1
|X | − 1 + eε if y 6= x .
(B.58)
144
Computing the I (X;Y ) under (B.58), we get that
I (X;Y ) =
1
eε + k − 1
∑
i∈[k]
{
P (xi) e
ε log
eε
P (xi) (eε − 1) + 1
+ (1− P (xi)) log 1
P (xi) (eε − 1) + 1
}
.
Hence, the randomized response mechanism achieves the upper bound (B.55).
This proves the optimality of the randomized response for all ε ≥ ε∗.
B.6 Approximate Local Differential Privacy
B.6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6.1
Let U (Q) be a utility mechanism of the form U (Q) =
∑
Y µ(Qy), where
µ is a sublinear function. Consider a stochastic mapping W of dimensions
` ×m and let QW be the stochastic mapping obtained by first applying Q
to X ∈ X to obtain Y ∈ Y and then applying W to Y to obtain Z ∈ Z.
U (QW ) =
∑
Z
µ ((QW )z)
=
∑
Z
µ
(∑
Y
QyWy,z
)
≤
∑
Y,Z
Wy,zµ (Qy)
=
∑
Y
µ(Qy)
= U (Q) ,
where the inequality follows from sublinearity and the second to last equality
follows from the row stochastic property of W . Therefore, U (Q) obeys the
data processing inequality.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR MULTI-PARTY
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
C.1 Proof of Main Result
To prove Theorem 4.4.1, it is sufficient to prove Theorem C.1.1 stating that
any other protocol can be simulated from the randomized response outputs.
Let {xi}i∈[k] and τRR = {x˜i}i∈[k] denote the k private bits and transcript
under the randomized response PRR (Equation (4.8)), respectively. We will
prove that any differentially private multi-party protocol can be simulated
from τRR. This proves the desired theorem, since the optimal protocol and
the optimal decision rules can be simulated by each node (and the central
observer) upon receiving the randomized responses. Hence, proving that
randomized response is sufficient to achieve optimal performance (on any
metric).
Theorem C.1.1 For any protocol P that generates a random transcript τ ,
there exists a stochastic transformation T such that the joint distribution of
the bits and the transcript can be simulated from the randomized outputs:
(x1, . . . , xk, τ)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T (x˜1, . . . , x˜k)) , (C.1)
where
D
= denotes equality in distribution, and x˜i is a randomized response of
xi.
To prove the above theorem, our strategy is to apply an induction argument
over a class of stochastic transformations {T1, T2, · · · , Tk}, where T` operates
on x˜`1 = (x˜1, . . . , x˜`) and x
k
`+1 = (x`+1, . . . , xk). We will prove the following
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series of equations:
(x1, . . . , xk, τ)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T1(x˜1, x
k
2)) (C.2)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T2(x˜
2
1, x
k
3)) (C.3)
...
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, Tk(x˜
k
1)) . (C.4)
We first prove Equation (C.2). To do so, we show an equivalent version of
this equation, which is (x1, τ)
D
= (x1, T (x˜1, x
k
2)) for all fixed values of x
k
2.
Equation (C.2) follows by applying Bayes rule to this equation. First, note
that for all fixed xk2,
R(P, x1 = 0, x1 = 1) ⊆ R(ε1, δ1) , (C.5)
by the fact that τ is (ε1, δ1)-differentially private and Lemma 4.3.1. Next,
notice that by construction, the randomized response achieves this outer
bound, i.e.
R(PRR, x1 = 0, x1 = 1) = R(ε1, δ1) , (C.6)
for all values of xk2 which holds only under the current assumption that
xk1 are independent. Hence from the reverse data processing inequality in
Corollary 4.3.3, it follows that for each instance of xk2, there exists a stochastic
transformation such that τ is simulated from x˜1, i.e. (x1, τ)
D
= (x1, T (x˜1, x
k
2)).
This proves the desired Equation (C.2).
We now prove an inductive step that allows us to recursively show Equations
(C.3) and (C.4). We want to prove that there always exists a stochastic
transformation T`+1 such that
(xk1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (xk1, T`+1(x˜
`+1
1 , x
k
`+2)) , (C.7)
for any stochastic transformation T` satisfying (ε`+1, δ`+1)-differential privacy.
Again, we prove that (x`+1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (x`+1, T`+1(x˜
`+1
1 , x
k
`+2)) for all val-
ues of (x`1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1). Then, Equation (C.7) follows from Bayes rule. First note
that from the assumption that T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) is (ε`+1, δ`+1)-differentially private
with respect to x`+1, we know that for any fixed values of (x
`
1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+2), bi-
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nary hypothesis testing on x`+1 based on the observation T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) must
obey the differential privacy constraint:
P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x`1, x˜`1, xk`+2) ≤
eε`+1P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x`1, x˜`1, xk`+2) + δ`+1 ,
and since T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) is conditionally independent of x
`
1 given x˜
`
1, we get
P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x˜`1, xk`+2) ≤
eε`+1P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x˜`1, xk`+2) + δ`+1 .
This implies that for each value of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2),
R(T`, x`+1 = 0, x`+1 = 1) ⊆ R(ε`+1, δ`+1) .
Next, notice that by construction, the randomized response achieves this
outer bound, i.e.
R(PRR, x`+1 = 0, x`+1 = 1) = R(ε`+1, δ`+1) , (C.8)
for all values of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2) which holds only under the current assumption
that xk1 are independent. Hence from the reverse data processing inequal-
ity in Corollary 4.3.3, it follows that for each instance of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2), there
exists a stochastic transformation such that T` is simulated from x˜`+1, i.e.
(x`+1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (x`+1, T`+1(x˜`+1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+2)). This proves the desired in-
duction step in Equation (C.7). Consequently, by induction Equation (C.4)
holds, and this proves Theorem C.1.1.
C.2 Proof of Optimal Multi-Party XOR Computation
Recall that λ = eε. Let X˜ denote the random output of the randomized
response, and let f(X˜) denote the XOR of all k bits. Notice that P (X, X˜) =
(λk−dh(X,X˜))/(1 + λ)k where dh(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance. For a
given X˜ the decision is either f(X˜) or the complement of it. We will first
show that f(X˜) is the optimal decision rule.
It is sufficient to show that E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜] ≥ E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜].
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Since, E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜] = ∑i even (ki)λk−i/(1+λ)k and E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜] =∑
i odd
(
k
i
)
λk−i/(1 + λ)k, it follows that
E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜]− E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜] = (λ− 1)k/(1 + λ)k ≥ 0 ,
since λ ≥ 1. By symmetry, the decision rule is the same for all X˜, and also
for the worst case accuracy. This finishes the desired characterization of the
optimal accuracy.
To get the asymptotic analysis of the accuracy, notice that E[w(f(X), f(X˜))]+
E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))] = 1 and E[w(f(X), f(X˜))] + E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))] = (λ −
1)k/(1 +λ)k = (eε− 1)k/(2 + (eε− 1))k = (1/2)kεk +O(εk+1). It follows that
E[w(f(X), f(X˜))] = 1/2 + (1/2)k+1εk +O(εk+1).
149
REFERENCES
[1] L. Sweeney, “Guaranteeing anonymity when sharing medical data, the
datafly system.” in Proceedings of the AMIA Annual Fall Symposium.
American Medical Informatics Association, 1997, p. 51.
[2] L. Sweeney, “Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using general-
ization and suppression,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzzi-
ness and Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 05, pp. 571–588, 2002.
[3] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets,” in Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Sym-
posium on. IEEE, 2008, pp. 111–125.
[4] A. Narayanan, E. Shi, and B. I. Rubinstein, “Link prediction by de-
anonymization: How we won the kaggle social network challenge,” in
Neural Networks (IJCNN), The 2011 International Joint Conference
on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1825–1834.
[5] M. Gymrek, A. L. McGuire, D. Golan, E. Halperin, and Y. Erlich, “Iden-
tifying personal genomes by surname inference,” Science, vol. 339, no.
6117, pp. 321–324, 2013.
[6] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in Automata, Languages and Program-
ming. Springer, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[7] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise
to sensitivity in private data analysis,” in Theory of Cryptography.
Springer, 2006, pp. 265–284.
[8] C. Dwork and J. Lei, “Differential privacy and robust statistics,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing.
ACM, 2009, pp. 371–380.
[9] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor, “Our
data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation,” in Advances
in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2006. Springer, 2006, pp. 486–503.
[10] L. Wasserman and S. Zhou, “A statistical framework for differential
privacy,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 105, no.
489, pp. 375–389, 2010.
150
[11] D. Blackwell, “Equivalent comparisons of experiments,” The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 265–272, 1953.
[12] Q. Geng and P. Viswanath, “The optimal mechanism in differential pri-
vacy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1212.1186, 2012.
[13] Q. Geng and P. Viswanath, “The optimal mechanism in (,δ)-differential
privacy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1305.1330, 2013.
[14] Q. Geng, P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath, “The staircase mecha-
nism in differential privacy,” Selected Topics in Signal Processing, IEEE
Journal of, vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 1176–1184, 2015.
[15] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy: A survey of results,” in Theory and
applications of models of computation. Springer, 2008, pp. 1–19.
[16] C. Dwork, G. N. Rothblum, and S. Vadhan, “Boosting and differen-
tial privacy,” in Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010 51st
Annual IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 51–60.
[17] J. Blocki, A. Blum, A. Datta, and O. Sheffet, “The Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform itself preserves differential privacy,” in Foun-
dations of Computer Science, 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on.
IEEE, 2012, pp. 410–419.
[18] M. Hardt and A. Roth, “Beyond worst-case analysis in private singular
vector computation,” in Proceedings of the 45th Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2013, pp. 331–340.
[19] A. Acquisti, “Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of im-
mediate gratification,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce. ACM, 2004, pp. 21–29.
[20] A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What can behavioral economics teach
us about privacy,” Digital Privacy, p. 329, 2007.
[21] S. L. Warner, “Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating
evasive answer bias,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
vol. 60, no. 309, pp. 63–69, 1965.
[22] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy and
statistical minimax rates,” in Foundations of Computer Science, 2013
IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 429–438.
[23] A. B. Tsybakov and V. Zaiats, Introduction to Nonparametric Estima-
tion. Springer, 2009, vol. 11.
151
[24] S. Oh and P. Viswanath, “The composition theorem for differential
privacy,” CoRR, vol. abs/1311.0776, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0776
[25] R. F. Barber and J. C. Duchi, “Privacy and statistical risk: Formalisms
and minimax bounds,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.4451, 2014.
[26] K. Chatzikokolakis, T. Chothia, and A. Guha, “Statistical measurement
of information leakage,” in Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems. Springer, 2010, pp. 390–404.
[27] L. Sankar, S. R. Rajagopalan, and H. V. Poor, “Utility-privacy tradeoffs
in databases: An information-theoretic approach,” Information Foren-
sics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 838–852,
2013.
[28] W. Wang, L. Ying, and J. Zhang, “On the relation between identifiabil-
ity, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1402.3757, 2014.
[29] F. McSherry and K. Talwar, “Mechanism design via differential pri-
vacy,” in Foundations of Computer Science, 2007. 48th Annual IEEE
Symposium on. IEEE, 2007, pp. 94–103.
[30] M. Hardt and G. N. Rothblum, “A multiplicative weights mechanism for
privacy-preserving data analysis,” in Foundations of Computer Science,
2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 61–70.
[31] K. Chaudhuri, A. D. Sarwate, and K. Sinha, “Near-optimal differentially
private principal components,” in NIPS, 2012, pp. 998–1006.
[32] M. Hardt and A. Roth, “Beating randomized response on incoherent ma-
trices,” in Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing.
ACM, 2012, pp. 1255–1268.
[33] M. Kapralov and K. Talwar, “On differentially private low rank approx-
imation,” in SODA, vol. 5. SIAM, 2013, p. 1.
[34] M. Hardt and K. Talwar, “On the geometry of differential privacy,”
in Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing.
ACM, 2010, pp. 705–714.
[35] M. Hardt, K. Ligett, and F. McSherry, “A simple and practical algorithm
for differentially private data release,” in NIPS, 2012, pp. 2348–2356.
[36] K. Chaudhuri and C. Monteleoni, “Privacy-preserving logistic regres-
sion,” in NIPS, vol. 8, 2008, pp. 289–296.
[37] J. Lei, “Differentially private m-estimators,” in NIPS, 2011, pp. 361–369.
152
[38] A. Ghosh, T. Roughgarden, and M. Sundararajan, “Universally utility-
maximizing privacy mechanisms,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 41,
no. 6, pp. 1673–1693, 2012.
[39] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. John
Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[40] A. Beimel, K. Nissim, and E. Omri, “Distributed private data analy-
sis: Simultaneously solving how and what,” in Advances in Cryptology–
CRYPTO 2008. Springer, 2008, pp. 451–468.
[41] K. Chaudhuri and D. Hsu, “Convergence rates for differentially private
statistical estimation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1206.6395, 2012.
[42] A. De, “Lower bounds in differential privacy,” in Theory of Cryptogra-
phy. Springer, 2012, pp. 321–338.
[43] P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath, “Extremal mechanisms for local
differential privacy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.1338, 2014.
[44] E. A. Abbe, A. Khandani, and A. W. Lo, “Privacy-preserving methods
for sharing financial risk exposures,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 102, pp. 65–70, 2011.
[45] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in 2013 IEEE 54th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, 1982,
pp. 160–164.
[46] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, “Completeness theorems
for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting. ACM, 1988, pp. 1–10.
[47] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, “How to play any mental
game,” in Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, ser. STOC ’87. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
1987. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/28395.28420 pp.
218–229.
[48] D. Chaum, “The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender
and recipient untraceability,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 1, 1988.
[49] L. Sweeney, “Simple demographics often identify people uniquely,”
Health, vol. 671, pp. 1–34, 2000.
[50] J. A. Calandrino, A. Kilzer, A. Narayanan, E. W. Felten, and
V. Shmatikov, “ “You might also like:” privacy risks of collaborative
filtering,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on.
IEEE, 2011, pp. 231–246.
153
[51] N. Homer, S. Szelinger, M. Redman, D. Duggan, W. Tembe,
J. Muehling, J. V. Pearson, D. A. Stephan, S. F. Nelson, and D. W.
Craig, “Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts of DNA to
highly complex mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping microar-
rays,” PLoS Genetics, vol. 4, no. 8, p. e1000167, 2008.
[52] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large
sparse datasets,” in Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Sym-
posium on. IEEE, 2008, pp. 111–125.
[53] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy: A survey of results,” in Theory and
Applications of Models of Computation. Springer, 2008, pp. 1–19.
[54] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor, “Our
data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation,” in Advances
in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2006. Springer, 2006, pp. 486–503.
[55] A. McGregor, I. Mironov, T. Pitassi, O. Reingold, K. Talwar, and
S. Vadhan, “The limits of two-party differential privacy,” in Foundations
of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on.
IEEE, 2010, pp. 81–90.
[56] V. Goyal, I. Mironov, O. Pandey, and A. Sahai, “Accuracy-privacy
tradeoffs for two-party differentially private protocols,” in Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 2013. Springer, 2013, pp. 298–315.
[57] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova, and
A. Smith, “What can we learn privately?” SIAM Journal on Computing,
vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 793–826, 2011.
[58] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. D. Sarwate, “Differentially pri-
vate empirical risk minimization,” The Journal of Machine Learning
Research, vol. 12, pp. 1069–1109, 2011.
[59] A. Blum, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, and K. Nissim, “Practical pri-
vacy: the SuLQ framework,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth ACM
SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Sys-
tems. ACM, 2005, pp. 128–138.
[60] K. Chaudhuri, A. D. Sarwate, and K. Sinha, “A near-optimal algo-
rithm for differentially-private principal components,” Journal of Ma-
chine Learning Research, vol. 14, pp. 2905–2943, 2013.
[61] S. L. Lauritzen, Graphical Models. Oxford University Press, 1996.
[62] N. Alon and J. H. Spencer, The Probabilistic Method. Wiley, 2004.
154
